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INTRODUCTION

The mix of drinking and driving results in tragedy each year.
Approximately 26,000 people die from alcohol-related highway accidents annually.1 Seventy lives are lost each day; one death occurs
every twenty-three minutes. The estimated cost of drinking and
driving to society is somewhere between $21 and $24 billion each
year. 2 Although these statistics are alarming, they should no longer
be unfamiliar. Public awareness of the problem of drinking and
driving has increased dramatically in recent years. 3 Private citizens
have formed lobbies seeking tougher drunk driving laws, and organizations like the Automobile Club of America have proposed their
I See MOTHERS AGAINST DRUNK DRIVERS, A SUMMARY OF STATISTICS RELATED TO
THE NATIONAL DRUNK DRIVING PROBLEM (citing National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and National Safety Council statistics) (1985).
2 See UNITED STATES PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON DRUNK DRIVING, FINAL REPORT
1 (1983).
3 According to the Insurance Information Institute, in 1984 "signs appeared that
the public [was] getting the message and attitudes [were] starting to change about drinking and driving." INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, CONSUMER NEWS I (Dec. 3, 1984).

Among those signs were a federal law penalizing states that fail to adopt a drinking age
of 21 by October 1, 1983; President Reagan's proclamation of December 9-15, 1984, as
"National Drunk and Drugged Driving Awareness Week;" and media events, such as the
December 11, 1984, television special on Students Against Driving Drunk (SADD). Id.

at 2.

1060

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 70:1058

own plans for getting drunk drivers off the road.4
According to one legal periodical, "1984 was the year the
courts joined the legislatures in earnest in the 5-year-old crackdown
on drunken driving." 5 Two recent Supreme Court decisions and
one case in which the Supreme Court denied certiorari will facilitate
police detection of drunk drivers and enforcement of the law. 6 In
June of 1984, the United States Supreme Court held that police
need not preserve for the defense a sample of a suspect's breath that
was analyzed in breath-testing machines. 7 A month later, the Court
4
The AAA has proposed an "integrated approach" to the problem of drinking
and driving, including:
(1)Reasonable laws that will encourage enforcement agencies to arrest
DWI's, prosecutors to pursue the cases without plea bargaining to nonalcohol related offenses, and the judiciary to convict.
(2) Rehabilitation and reeducation programs with required attendance for
all first time DWI offenders as a supplement to other court actions, not as
a substitute for them.
(3) Professional evaluations and assignment to appropriate treatment for
repeat DWI offenders until they are judged fit to return safely to the
highways.
(4) Year round public information and education programs to make drunk
driving an unacceptable social behavior and achieve greater community
and citizen support.
(5) Alcohol and traffic information and education programs established in
kindergarten through 12th grades, the formative years for attitude and
behavior in relation to DWI.
(6) Evaluation procedures maintained to assure effective operation of all
elements of the program.

AM. AUTro. Ass'N FOUND. FOR TRAFFIC SAFETY, DRUNK DRIVING: Is THERE AN

ANSWER?

(1983).
The AAA believes that its program will be more effective in dealing with the
problems associated with drunk driving than the various "crackdown" approaches proposed by Mothers Against Drunk Drivers (MADD) and the Presidential Commission on
Drunk Driving. The AAA argues that mandatory sentencing for convicted drunk drivers, police road blocks near local bars, and organized citizen monitoring of judges'
courtrooms to insure sufficiently harsh sentences for alcohol-related traffic offenses will
not be as effective as its proposals to reform the drinking driver and to prevent future
drivers from drinking and driving. See Address by D. Malfetti, DWI Countermeasures: Past,
Present, and Future, Am. Auto. Ass'n Traffic Safety Workshop (Nov. 7-9, 1982) (available
as pamphlet printed by Am. Auto. Ass'n -Traffic Safety Dep't). See The Year in Law,
1984-The Top Ten Stories, Nat'l LJ., Dec. 31, 1984, at 22. "Although defense attorneys
had some court successes this year, federal and state judges in both civil and criminal
cases have made drunken driving a more perilous act for drivers, bartenders, social
hosts, and others." Id. One explanation for this judicial crackdown is the recent Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving report. The Commission's major concerns included the enforcement of drunk driving laws, the prosecution of drunk drivers, and the
adjudication of Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) cases. See UNrrED STATES PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON DRUNK DRIVING, supra note 2, at 12.
5 The Year in Law, 1984-The Top Ten Stories, supra note 4,at 22.
6 See California v. Trombetta, 104 S.Ct. 2528 (1984); Berkemer v. McCarty, 104 S.
Ct. 3138 (1984); Burg v. Municipal Court, 104 S. Ct. 2337 (1984).
7
California v. Trombetta, 104 S.Ct. 2528 (1984). In Trombetta the respondents
submitted to a breath analysis test after being stopped for suspicion of drunken driving.
Id. at 2531. Although preservation was technically feasible, the arresting officers did not
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unanimously held that the circumstances surrounding the roadside
questioning of a suspected drunken driver do not constitute "custodial interrogation" 8 for the purpose of applying the admissibility
rules of Miranda v. Arizona.9 The Court refused to hear a case that
upheld a strict liability statute which made driving with a blood-alcohol content higher than a specified level a crime. 10
State courts have also contributed to the "crackdown" against
drunk drivers by approving certain methods used by police to detect
drunken drivers. In Romano v. Kimmelman" the NewJersey Supreme
Court ruled that breath-testing machines are "scientifically reliable
and accurate." 12 In People v. Scott13 the New York Court of Appeals
approved the use of roadblocks to discover drunken drivers.
In addition to aiding the prosecution of drunken drivers, courts
also made drinking more difficult for drivers. The recent campaign
against drunk driving led to the New Jersey Supreme Court's decipreserve the breath samples of the respondents. Id. at 2531 n.3. The respondents were
subsequently charged with drunken driving. At trial the respondents argued that the
court should have suppressed the intoxilyzer's test results because the breath samples
would have impeached the test results. Id. at 2531.
The Court rejected the respondents' argument by holding that police do not violate
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment when they fail to preserve breath
samples in drunk driving cases. Id. at 2532-34. The Court reasoned that "[tihe evidence to be presented at trial was not the breath itself but rather the Intoxilyzer results
obtained from the breath samples." Id. at 2533. Furthermore, the Court noted that the
authorities had not destroyed the breath samples in a calculated effort to circumvent due
process. Id. at 2534.
8 Berkemer v. McCarty, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3144-48 (1984). According to the Court,
the typical roadside interrogation is not as "police dominated" as a station house interrogation because it is held in public. Id. at 3150. Consequently, the police are not
required to read a suspected drunk driver his "Miranda" rights when he is interrogated.
Id.
9 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10 See Burg v. Municipal Court, 104 S. Ct. 2337 (1984). The Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving supported this position by recommending that all states "make it
illegal per se to drive or be in possession of a car if an individual has a .10 blood alcohol
content level or higher." See UNrED STATES PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON DRUNK DPIvING, supra note 2, at 17.
11 96 NJ. 66, 474 A.2d 1 (1984).
12
Id. at 82, 474 A.2d at 9. The court held that the manufacturer's breathalyzers
were scientifically reliable for the purposes of determining blood alcohol content. Id.
The Presidential Commission supports the use of breath tests and suggests that all
states adopt "implied consent" laws. See UNrrED STATES PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
DRUNK DRIVING, supra note 2, at 15. Implied consent laws require suspected drunk drivers to take breath tests or face a presumption in court that they were driving while intoxicated. Id. (citing UNIF. VEHICLE CODE §§ 6-205.1 & 11-902 (1962)).
13 63 N.Y.2d 518, 473 N.E.2d 1, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1984). The use of "safety
checkpoints" has provoked some controversy. The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue, but the use of such checkpoints may not violate the fourth amendment
if they are conducted in a "reasonable" fashion. See THE USE OF SAFETY CHECKPOINTS
FOR DWI ENFORCEMENT, 3-10 (1983) (prepared by R. Compton & R. Engle for Nat'l
Highway Traffic Safety Ad., U.S. Dep't of Transp.).
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sion in Kelly v. Gwinnell,1 4 allowing an injured third party's negligence action against a social host who served an adult guest beyond
the point of visible intoxication knowing that the guest would soon
be driving.' 5 According to the court,
[i]n a society where thousands of deaths are caused each year by
drunken drivers, where the damage caused by such deaths is regarded increasingly as intolerable, where liquor licensees are prohibited from serving intoxicated adults, and where long-standing
criminal sanctions against drunken driving have recently been significantly strengthened[J. . . the imposition of such a duty by the
judiciary seems both fair and fully in accord with the state's
16
policy.
Although the New Jersey court was not the first to impose liability
17
on a social host for the tortious conduct of his intoxicated guests,
no other decision imposing such liability has survived legislative review. 18 Moreover, most courts have refused to hold hosts liable because they believe that the intoxicated driver is at fault, not the
social host. 19 Thus social host liability remains a controversial tool
20
for reducing the incidence of drunk driving.
The concept of social host liability raises many questions concerning the average person's ability to monitor and control a guest's
consumption of alcohol and the extent to which society is willing to
bear responsibility for drinking and driving. This Special Project
addresses some of these questions.
Part I addresses the antecedents of host liability. It traces the
early law imposing liability on the commercial purveyor of alcohol
and explores the development of a parallel cause of action against
the noncommercial purveyor.
Part II examines the recent NewJersey Supreme Court decision
in Kelly. It considers the New Jersey court's historical development
of social host liability and considers whether the responsibility for
allocating liability properly lies with the courts or with the legislature. Finally, Part II discusses and evaluates the standard of conduct
96 NJ. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
Id.
16
Id. at 544-45, 476 A.2d at 1222 (footnotes omitted).
17
See, e.g., Coulter v. Superior Ct. of San Mateo County, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 575 P.2d
664, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978); Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972);
Ross v. Ross, 294 Minn. 115, 200 N.W.2d 149 (1974); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of
Alpha Tau Omega Frat., 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971).
18 See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602(b), (c) (West Supp. 1984).
19 See infra notes 84-101, 164-77, 224-28 and accompanying text.
20
Immediately after Kelly, a New York Times editorial criticized the court's decision
because of the difficulty in policing the drinking of one's guests. The editorial also posited that hosts may not be able to insure against liability and thus would face possible
financial ruin. See N.Y. Times, June 30, 1984, at 22, col. 1.
14

15
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the court imposed on New Jersey hosts and the policy justifications
for the imposition of liability.
Part III analyzes the various theories of social host liability and
considers whether any theory is appropriate. Part III also predicts
how legislatures will respond to judicial activism in this area of the
law. This Project concludes with some alternatives to the negligence standard the New Jersey Supreme Court recently imposed on
social hosts.
I
THEORIES OF SOCIAL HOST LIABILITY

The New Jersey Supreme Court in Kelly v. Gwinnell21 upheld a
cause of action against a social host predicated on principles of ordinary negligence. The New Jersey Court held that the social host
created an unreasonable risk of harm to the plaintiff, the driver of
another car, by continuing to serve a visibly intoxicated guest who
the host knew would be driving, that the risk created was foresee22
able, and that the risk resulted in an equally foreseeable injury.
The Kelly decision is noteworthy because imposition of liability upon
a social host occurs infrequently and does not flow exclusively from
principles of ordinary negligence. Rather, state courts have relied
on three different approaches when holding social hosts liable for
injuries caused by their inebriated guests.
First, courts have applied dramshop acts 23 to social hosts. At
common law the furnisher of intoxicating liquor was not liable for
injuries caused by the drinker. The drinker was solely responsible
because the courts deemed the excessive consumption of alcohol,
not its sale or gratuitous transfer, as the proximate cause of any resulting injuries. 2 4 Dramshop acts, however, abrogated the common
law rule with respect to tavern owners who sell or give away alcoholic beverages under a state liquor license. In some jurisdictions
21
22

96 NJ. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984). See infra Section II.
Kelly, 96 NJ. at 543-44, 476 A.2d at 1221-22.

23 In general, a dramshop act imposes civil liability on a tavern owner for harm
caused by a person to whom the tavern owner furnished intoxicating liquor. Dramshop
acts are legislative remedies because at common law an "able-bodied man" who drank
intoxicating liquor was solely responsible for damage resulting from his intoxication. See
generally McGough, DramshopActs, 1967 A.B.A. SEC. INS. NEGL. & COMPENSATION LBILrry 448.
24 See, e.g., Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231, 234, 20 N.E. 73, 74 (1889); State ex reL Joyce
v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754 (195 1);J. LAWSON, THE CMvIL REMEDY FOR INJURIES ARISING FROM THE SALE OR GiFr OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS 4-5 (20 THE BOOK OF
MONOGRAPHS (1877)). Somejurisdictions have qualified the common law rule to allow a
cause of action against a furnisher of alcoholic beverages where the furnisher gave or
sold liquor to an intoxicated person knowing that he was in an unsafe and untrustworthy
condition. See, e.g., Nally v. Blandford, 291 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. 1956).
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plaintiffs have successfully argued that these statutes create a cause
of action against social hosts as well as against tavern owners. 25
Second, plaintiffs have asserted liability based on a social host's
violation of an alcoholic beverage control act. 26 Under this theory

plaintiffs argue that the host's violation of a statutory duty is the
proximate cause of their injuries. Courts typically regard the violation of a criminal statute, such as an alcoholic beverage control act,
27
as presumptive evidence of negligence or as negligence per se.
Finally, plaintiffs have argued that ordinary principles of negligence apply to social hosts who provide intoxicating liquor to their
guests.28 Under this theory a social host's conduct must conform to
that of a reasonable person under like circumstances. 29 A breach of
this duty occurs when the social host serves intoxicating drinks to an
already inebriated guest,3 0 thus creating an unreasonable risk of
harm to the public. The host's negligence is actionable when the
drunken guest causes a foreseeable injury to the plaintiff.3 1
25 See, e.g., Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972) (scope of dramshop act included any person who sold or gave liquor to another); Ross v. Ross, 294
Minn. 115, 200 N.W.2d 149 (1972) (dramshop act covers noncommercial vendors who
gratuitously furnish liquor). For cases denying the application of the dramshop act to
social hosts, see, e.g., DeLoach v. Mayer Elec. Supply Co., 378 So. 2d 733 (Ala. 1979)
(dramshop act inapplicable to social host because there was no sale); Camille v. Berry
Fertilizers, Inc., 30 Ill. App. 3d 1050, 1053, 334 N.E.2d 205, 207 (1975) ("[Any enlargement to extend liability to persons not engaged in the liquor business is the prerogative of the legislature."); Lover v. Sampson, 44 Mich. App. 173, 181, 205 N.W.2d 69,
73 (1972) ("[s]ince the dramshop act only applies to commercial vendors . . . [it] is
wholly inapplicable to the instant case" involving social hosts); Gabrielle v. Craft, 75
A.D.2d 939, 940, 428 N.Y.S.2d 84, 86 (1980) ("The Dram Shop Act must be narrowly
construed, and if liability is to be extended so as to impose liability upon that social host,
it should be accomplished through the legislative process and not through the courts.").
For discussion of social host liability under dramshop acts, see infra notes 84-140 and
accompanying text.
26 An alcoholic beverage control act regulates the furnishing of intoxicating liquor.
Typically, the act makes it illegal to serve a minor or intoxicated person. For a discussion of beverage control acts, see infra notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
27 See, e.g., Brattain v. Herron, 159 Ind. App. 663, 674, 309 N.E.2d 150, 156 (1974)
(violation of statute by a social host is negligence per se); Thaut v. Finley, 50 Mich. App.
611, 613, 213 N.W.2d 820, 821-22 (1973) (violation of statute is negligence per se even
if it does not provide a civil remedy). But cf. Runge v. Watts, 180 Mont. 91, 93, 589 P.2d
145, 147 (1979) (beverage control acts "do not. . . create a civil cause of action"); see
also infra notes 129-206 and accompanying text (discussing violation of beverage control
act as basis for furnisher's liability).
28 This theory of liability was approved in Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d
1219 (1984). See infra Section II.
29 See infra note 208 and accompanying text.
3o
A plaintiff could also argue that service of alcohol to a minor, a mental incompetent, or a person unusually affected by alcohol creates an unreasonable risk of harm.
31
See Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 544, 476 A.2d 1219, 1221-22 (1984) (discussed infra Section II); see also Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669,
145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978) (discussed infra notes 247-56 and accompanying text); Wiener
v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Frat., 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971)
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Dramshop Acts as a Basis for Social Host Liability
1. Historical Background

Dramshop acts, first introduced into state codes in the nineteenth century, 3 2 were part of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries' campaign for temperance.3 3 Historians have referred to
the temperance movement, active at both the state and federal
levels, as a battle between the "wets" and the "dries." 3 4 The"wets"
sought to defeat measures limiting or prohibiting the availability of
alcohol. The "dries" supported such measures. 3 5 The temperance
movement's crusade for "gallon laws," '3 6 state prohibition,3 7 and
dramshop acts38 indicates that the movement sought to cut off the
supply of liquor rather than attempt to reform the individual
drinkers.3 9
State "gallon laws" were aimed at destroying taverns by barring
the sale of less than a prescribed quantity of liquor.4 ° Statewide
prohibition first appeared in Maine in 1851.41 Thirty-three states
(discussed infra notes 230-46 and accompanying text). But see Klein v. Raysinger, 298 Pa.
Super. 246, 444 A.2d 753 (1982) (no cause of action under principles of ordinary negligence); Runge v. Watts, 180 Mont. 91, 93, 589 P.2d 145, 147 (1979) (beverage control
acts "do not ... create a civil cause of action").
32 See generally J. LAwsoN, supra note 24.
33 See McGough, supra note 23, at 449.
34
35

Id.
Id.

See generallyJ. KRoTrr, THE ORIGINS OF PROHIBITION 285 (1925).
See generally E. CHERRINGTON, THE EVOLUTION OF PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA (1920); A. FEHLANDT, A CENTURY OF DRINK REFORM IN THE UNITED
36
37

STATES

38
39
40

(1904).
See infra notes 45-56 and accompanying text.
McGough, supra note 23, at 448.

G.

CLARK, HISTORY OF THE TEMPERANCE REFORM IN MASSACHUSETTS,

1813-1883,

at 39-40 (1888). In 1832 a bill was introduced in the Massachusetts legislature to prohibit the sale of "ardent spirits" in quantities less than 30 gallons. Although this "30
gallon law" failed to pass, the governor approved a "15 gallon law" in 1838. Id. Similar
laws were enacted in other states. Tennessee and Mississippi, for example, enacted "I
gallon laws." McGough, supra note 23, at 448. In 1846 Maine passed a "28 gallon law."
J. KRouT, supra note 36, at 290-91.
41 In 1843 the territorial legislature of Oregon adopted prohibition. The law was
repealed in 1848. Three years later, Maine enacted the Dow Prohibition Law, which
became the first statewide prohibition of alcoholic beverages. E. CHERRIUNTON, supra
note 37, at 135-36. The Dow Prohibition Law, moreover, served as a model for other
states. Following Maine's lead, in 1852 the territory of Minnesota and the states of
Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and Vermont passed prohibition bills similar to the Maine

law. A. FEHLANDT, supra note 37, at 125; E. CHERRINGTON, supra note 37, at 136-37. The
citizens of Michigan approved a "Maine law" in 1853. A. FEHLANDT, supra note 37, at
126. In 1854 Connecticut also enacted prohibition, a year after the governor vetoed
similar legislation passed by the legislature. E. CHERRINGTON, supra note 37, at 137.
New York, New Hampshire, Delaware, Indiana, and the territory of Nebraska also
adopted prohibitory laws during the mid-1850s. Id. at 137-39; A. FEHLANDT, supra note
37, at 127-30.
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had already followed suit when national prohibition became effective in January 1920.42 The eighteenth amendment prohibited the
"manufacture, sale,. . . transportation,. . . importation, [and] exportation" of intoxicating liquors within the United States and its
territories.4 3 Federal prohibition, however, was only a temporary
victory for the reformers. After thirteen years the states ratified the
twenty-first amendment, nullifying the eighteenth amendment -and
44
ending national prohibition.
Prior to the advent of national prohibition states had begun to
enact laws assigning civil liability to furnishers of intoxicating liquor
for harm arising from the furnishing of that liquor. 45 These dramshop acts were similar in emphasis to "gallon laws" and prohibition
because they concentrated on restricting the supply of liquor rather
than reforming the individual drinker.4 6 The imposition of civil liability, however, represented a unique approach to achieving this
end. According to a commentator writing in 1877,
[t]he seller of intoxicating liquors is made responsible for the injurious results of his sales on the same principle as common carriers, bailees and agents are liable for the negligent conduct of their
affairs. The statutes but extend a well-known principle of the
common law, that one shall be held to strict account for the consequences of his acts, and the application of an ancient maxim that
47
there is no wrong without its appropriate remedy.
The common law, nevertheless, did not impose civil liability upon
furnishers of intoxicating liquor 48 because the injury was considered too remote from the sale or furnishing of the liquor. 49 Thus,
when a plaintiff relies on a dramshop act in order to impose liability
on a tavern owner or social host, the cause of action "is purely a
creature of the statutes."' 0
The Indiana dramshop act, enacted in 1853, represents a proto42

D.PicKET,

C. WILSON & E. SMrrH, THE CYCLOPEDIA OF TEMPERANCE PROHIBI-

TION AND PUBUC MORALS 1 (Supp. 1917 ed.).
43
U.S. CONsT. amend. XVIII.
44
U.S. CONsT. amend. XXI, § I.
45
See infra notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
46 Although dramshop acts do not restrict the sale of liquor in the same manner as
"gallon laws" and prohibition, the imposition of civil liability creates a disincentive to
supply liquor and thereby affects its availability.
47 J. LAwsON, supra note 24, at 4-5.
48 Id. at 5.
49 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
50 J. LAwsON, supra note 24, at 5. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of dramshop acts in Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129 (1873). The court rejected the argument that selling liquor is one of the privileges and immunities of being a
United States citizen and held that state legislatures may regulate items injurious to
society.
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type of present-day dramshop acts. 5 1 The statute read in part:
Any ... person, who shall be injured in person, or property, or
means of support, by any intoxicated person, or in consequence
of the intoxication. . . of any person, shall have a right of action
. . . against any person, and his sureties on the bond aforesaid,
who shall, by retailing spirituous liquors, have caused the intoxication of such person,
for all damages sustained, and for exem52
plary damages.
The Indiana dramshop act thus excluded social hosts from civil liability for damages arising from the gratuitous furnishing of intoxicating liquor. Maine and Connecticut enacted similar dramshop
laws that restricted the cause of action to the seller or retailer of
53
intoxicating liquors.
Not all dramshop acts, however, distinguished between the sale
and the gift of intoxicating liquors. Seven states, for example, enacted broad dramshop acts that could be construed as imposing civil
liability on both sellers and givers of alcoholic beverages.5 4 The Illinois dramshop act provided a cause of action "against any person
. . . who shall, by selling, or giving, intoxicating liquors, have
caused the intoxication."' 55 Similarly, the New York dramshop act
created a cause of action "against any person or persons who shall,
by selling or giving away intoxicating liquors, [have] caused the intoxication in whole or in part." 56
Thus, the earliest dramshop acts could be categorized by their
broad or narrow language. A dramshop act such as New York's arguably created a cause of action against a social host, but an act such
as Maine's, which included the word "sell" but not "give," indicated
that the legislature deliberately refused to extend liability to social
hosts. Although many states repealed their dramshop acts after the
repeal of national prohibition, those acts that remain can still be categorized on this basis.
2.

Contemporary Dramshop Acts

Currently ten states have broadly worded dramshop acts, 57 creating a cause of action against any person who sells or gives away
J. LAWSON, supra note 24, at 7; McGough, supra note 23, at 449.
J. LAwsoN, supra note 24, at 7 n.12 (quoting Act of Mar. 4, 1853, sec. 10).
53
See id. at 7-9.
54
The seven states were Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, New York, Ohio, and
Wisconsin. Id. at 9.
55
Id. at 9 n.19 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 9 (1874)).
56
Id. at 12 n.19 (quoting 1873 N.Y. Laws ch. 646, § 1).
57
ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 (1975); Liquor Control Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 135
(1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2002 (1964); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 436.22
(Supp. 1985); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 11-101 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1984-85); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 5-01-06 (Supp. 1983); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4399.01 (Page 1982); R.I.
51
52
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intoxicating liquor.58 The reference to "any person" suggests that
the dramshop acts could be applied to social hosts as well as retailers of liquor.5 9 Moreover, the inclusion of the terms "giving," "furnishing," or "assisting in procuring" implies that the statutes do not
limit the act of furnishing liquor to a sale involving an expectancy of
profit. 60 Except for Rhode Island, 6 1 the broad dramshop acts profor injury to "person," "property," or
vide for recovery of damages
"means of support." 62 Of the states with broad dramshop acts, only
63
Illinois limits the amount of recoverable damages.
Narrowly tailored dramshop acts remain in several other states.
The Connecticut dramshop act expressly limits the cause of action
to a seller of intoxicating liquor, thereby denying a cause of action
against a social host."4 The Wyoming dramshop act also denies social host liability by limiting the cause of action to licensees and permittees. 6 5 In Colorado, a cause of action accrues if a person who
"sells or gives away" intoxicating liquors has notice that the recipi§ 3-11-1 (1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 32-11-1 (Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
7, § 501 (1972).
58
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 (1975) ("right of action against any person who shall
[sell, give, or otherwise dispose of liquors or beverages]"); Liquor Control Act, ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (1975) ("right of action. . . against any person who [sells or gives]
alcoholic liquor"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2002 (1964) (same as Illinois); N.Y.
GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 11-101 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1984-85) ("right of action against
any person who. . . unlawfully [sells or assists] in procuring liquor").
59 The possibility of such an interpretation prompted the Iowa legislature to amend
its dramshop act so that only a "licensee or permitee" could be liable for injuries caused
by intoxicated patrons. IOWA CODE § 123.92 (1977). For a discussion of cases in which
plaintiffs successfully applied dramshop acts against social hosts, see infra notes 102-26
and accompanying text.
60 A New York court has interpreted the words "give away" as manifesting a legislative purpose to include only those instances when a licensee provides a drink "on the
house." Kohler v. Wray, 114 Misc. 2d 856, 857-58, 452 N.Y.S.2d 831, 833 (Sup. Ct.
1982).
The Minnesota dramshop act, formerly broad in scope, was amended in 1977 to
limit the cause of action by requiring an illegal sale or barter of liquor before civil liability may attach. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1984). The Minnesota legislature's action was in partial response to a Minnesota Supreme Court decision construing
its dramshop act to apply to a social host. See Ross v. Ross, 294 Minn. 115, 200 N.W.2d
149 (1972) (discussed infra at notes 112-23 and accompanying text).
R.I. GEN. LAws § 3-11-1 (1976) (omitting any reference to means of support).
61
62
See supra note 57. Moreover, several of these acts provide for recovery of "other"
damages. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2002 (1964) ("injured in person, property, means of support or otherwise"); MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 436.22 (Supp. 19841985) (same as Maine); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 11-101 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 19841985) (same as Maine and Michigan).
63 In Illinois recovery of damages for injury to person or property is limited to
$15,000. Recovery for injury to means of support is limited to $20,000. Liquor Control
Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (1975). Connecticut also limits the amount recoverable under its dramshop act, but its act is not "broad-form" because its language apparently denies a cause of action against a social host. See infra text accompanying note 64.
64
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 30-102 (1985).
65 Wyo. STAT. § 12-5-502 (1984).
GEN. LAWS
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ent is a habitual drunkard. 66 This language suggests that social
hosts would be liable for furnishing liquor to a known habitual
drunkard. In Georgia, a parent has a right of action "against any
person who shall sell or furnish alcoholic beverages to" a minor
67
without the parent's permission.
3.

Recovery Under Dramshop Acts

Two situations commonly arise in which furnishers of intoxicating liquor may be liable for civil damages. First, a court could hold a
furnisher accountable for injuries sustained by the consumer of the
intoxicating liquor. Second, a court could hold a furnisher liable to
a third person injured as a result of the intoxicated person's
68
conduct.
Injured drinkers have not been successful in using dramshop
acts to recover damages from the furnisher of the liquor because
most courts have held that these acts do not provide a cause of action to the intoxicated person. 69 Courts often have imposed this
limitation despite broad statutory language creating a right of action
for "any person" injured.7 0 In Brooks v. Cook71 a saloon patron sued
a saloonkeeper to recover money stolen by a pickpocket while the
patron was intoxicated. 72 The court found that the intoxicated person was the person most likely to be injured and bring suit, but it
dismissed the case because the statute did not "distinctly and unequivocally" 7 3 give the intoxicated person a right of action.7 4 The
court reasoned that because the statute listed only persons "who
stand . . . in special relations" to the intoxicated person, it ex66
67
68

COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-103 (1973).
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-18 (1982).

See generally Graham, Liability of the Social Hostfor Injuries Caused by the Negligent Acts
of Intoxicated Guests, 16 WLLAmFE LJ.561 (1980).
69 McGough, supra note 23, at 451-52.
70 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. The Connecticut and Rhode Island
acts limit the cause of action to a person injured by the intoxicated person. CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 30-102 (1985) ("intoxicated person. . . thereafter injures the person or property of another"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-11-1 (1976) ("person in a state of intoxication
commits any injury to the person or property of another").
71 44 Mich. 617, 7 N.W. 216 (1880).
72 Id. at 617, 7 N.W. at 216.
73 Id. at 618, 7 N.W. at 216-17 (quoting state law).
74 Id. at 618-19, 7 N.W. at 217. The "police act" provided in part:
[E]very wife, child, parent, guardian, husband or other person, who shall
be injured in person and property or means of support, by an intoxicated
person. .
toxicating

.

or by reason of the selling, giving or furnishing any. . . inliquors to any person, shall have a right of action . . .

. . .

against any person or persons who shall, by selling or giving any intoxicating. . . liquor, have caused or contributed to the intoxication of such
person.

...

Id. at 618, 7 N.W. at 216-17.
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cluded the intoxicated party from bringing suit. 75 Other jurisdictions have followed Brooks and denied a cause of action to
intoxicated persons 76 on the ground that the drunkard should not
"recover when he or she was as culpable as the furnisher" of the
77

liquor.
Dramshop acts directly address the second situation involving
the liability of a furnisher of liquor to an injured third person.
Thus, dramshop acts provide a cause of action against a seller of
78
liquor for injured third parties and their families.
To establish a prima facie case under a dramshop act, a plaintiff
79
must establish the following elements:
1. An intoxicating liquor must be involved;8 0
2. The defendant must transfer the liquor;8 1
3. The transferee must consume the liquor;
4. The transferee must become intoxicated, or the drink must
contribute to an existing state of intoxication;
5. The intoxicated transferee must cause an actionable injury
to the plaintiff;
6. The intoxication must have a causal connection to the
82
plaintiff's injury;
7. The plaintiff must be entitled to bring suit under the dram83
shop act.
Id. at 619, 7 N.W. at 217.
See, e.g., Holmes v. Rolando, 320 Ill. App. 475, 51 N.E.2d 786 (1943) (citing
Brooks v. Cook, 44 Mich. 617, 7 N.W. 216 (1880)); Moyer v. Lo Jim Cafe, Inc., 19
A.D.2d 523, 523, 240 N.Y.S.2d 277, 279 (1963) (per curiam) ("Jr]he cause of action
...is limited to a third party injured or killed by the intoxicated person."), aft'd, 14
N.Y.2d 792, 200 N.E.2d 212, 251 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1964).
77 Graham, supra note 68, at 583.
78 The intoxicated person's family members often suffer injury to their means of
support. See, e.g., Benes v. Campion, 186 Minn. 578, 244 N.W. 72 (1932) (spouse sued
when husband permanently incapacitated after three drinks of defendant's moonshine);
Fest v. Olson, 138 Minn. 31, 163 N.W. 798 (1917) (widow sued tavern owner who illegally sold liquor to decedent and proximately caused his drowning); see also Cruse v.
Aden, 127 Ill. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889) (wife of deceased drinker sued social host under
Illinois dramshop act for injury to her means of support; discussed infra notes 87-93 and
accompanying text).
79
12 AM. JuR. TRL6Ls Dram Shop Litigation 729, 738 (1966).
80
States have different definitions of what constitutes an intoxicating liquor. Compare, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAws § 3-1-1 (1976) (3.2 beer is not an intoxicating liquor) with
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 30-1 (1985) (3.2 beer is an intoxicating liquor).
81
A transfer may involve selling, giving, procuring, furnishing, or other means of
provision. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
82 The intoxication need not be the proximate cause of the injury. There need only
be a causal connection between the fact of intoxication and the injury. McGough, supra
note 23, at 454.
83 Most dramshop acts require that the furnishing of liquor be unlawful. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06 (Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
7, § 501 (1972). But see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (1975).
75
76
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Case Law Under Dramshop Acts

a. Dramshop Acts Held Inapplicable to Social Hosts. With few exceptions courts have held that dramshop acts do not apply to social
hosts.8 4 Even when the act's language is broad enough to include
social hosts, courts have confined their application to tavern owners.
In denying a cause of action against social hosts, courts have reasoned that either the legislature did not intend to include the social
host within the purview of the dramshop act 8 5 or that the act was
86
penal in character, not remedial or compensatory.
The Illinois Supreme Court, in Cruse v. Aden, 8 7 was one of the
first courts to refuse to extend liability under a dramshop act to a
social host. In Cruse the decedent became intoxicated and suffered
fatal injuries when he was thrown from his horse after consuming
two drinks. The lower court found that the defendant had given the
decedent liquor out of "courtesy and politeness, and not for any
pay, profit, benefit, or advantage." 8 8 The decedent's wife sued the
defendant under the dramshop act to recover damages for injury to
her means of support.8 9 The Illinois Supreme Court noted that it
was not a tort at common law to sell or give intoxicating liquor to a
strong and able-bodied man; hence, the dramshop act necessarily
provided the only possible cause of action. 90 Despite the broad language in the act, 9 1 the court denied the plaintiff's claim by reading
the statute in light of the whole act. The court stated that "[bioth
the general tide, 'Dram-Shops,' and the title of the act itself, indicate
• . . the statute [was] aimed at dram-shops, and at those who are
engaged . . . in the liquor traffic." 92 The court reasoned further
that despite the language providing a cause of action against "any
persons selling or giving" intoxicating liquors, the courts are not
confined to the literal meaning of the words, but may enlarge or
84 See infra notes 87-101 and accompanying text. For the four cases in which state
courts have applied dramshop acts to social hosts, see infra notes 102-26 and accompanying text.
85
86
87

88
89

90
91

See infra notes 87-93, 100-01 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.

127 Ill. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889).
Id. at 233, 20 N.E. at 74.
Id. at 232, 20 N.E. at 73.
Id. at 234, 20 N.E. at 74-75.
The act provided in part:
[E]very.

.

. person.

. .

injured in person or property or means of sup-

port by an intoxicated person, or in consequence of the intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of any person, shall have a right of action. . . against
any person. . . who shall, by selling or giving intoxicating liquors, have
caused the intoxication .

...

Id. at 235, 20 N.E. at 75; Dram-Shops Act § 9, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 9 (1874).
92
127 Ill. at 236, 20 N.E. at 75. The title of the act read: "An act to provide for the
licensing of and against the evils arising from the sale of intoxicating liquors."
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restrict them according to the true intent of the act. 93
In a more recent Illinois case, Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 94
an appellate court again denied a right of action against a social host
under the dramshop act. 9 5 In Miller, the plaintiffs suffered injuries
when struck by an automobile driven by an employee of the defendant. The driver had attended a company picnic on the defendant's
premises. A second defendant sponsored the picnic. 9 6 The driver
had been served alcoholic beverages at the picnic and was intoxicated at the time of the accident. 97 Neither defendant was engaged
in the liquor business nor licensed to do business as a liquor
98
dealer.
The Miller court, unlike the court in Cruse, did not rely solely
upon legislative intent to deny a cause of action against the social
host. Instead, the court noted that although the act was remedial in
purpose, the Illinois courts had held it to be penal in character,
therefore requiring a strict construction of the act's language. 99 Accordingly, the absence of explicit statutory reference to social hosts
controlled, and the court denied the plaintiffs' cause of action. To
bolster its conclusion, the court, without discussing the legislative
history or other evidence of legislative intent, stated, "This court
does not believe that the legislature ever intended to enact a law
that makes social drinking. . . and the giving of drinks. . . to another, such conduct as to render the giver or host liable under the
Dram Shop Act." 10 0 The court held that the act applies only to the
business of purveying alcoholic liquors for profit and dismissed as
93
Id. at 239, 20 N.E. at 77 (quoting Castner v. Warod, 83 Ill. 171 (1876)). Other
courts have similarly relied on legislative intent to deny a cause of action against a social
host under a dramshop act. See, e.g., DeLoach v. Mayer Elec. Supply Co., 378 So. 2d
733, 734 (Ala. 1979) (requirement of prohibited sale not satisfied when employee, who
attended open house hosted by employer, could be called into service by employer to
help at open house); LeGault v. Klebba, 7 Mich. App. 640, 643, 152 N.W.2d 712, 713
(1967) (strict construction indicates that legislature intended dramshop act to cover only
licensees); Kohler v. Wray, 114 Misc. 2d 856, 858, 452 N.Y.S.2d 831, 833 (Sup. Ct.
1982) (Dramshop act requirement of a prohibited sale not met when social hosts requested to "chip in" to buy beer because no pecuniary gain expected). But cf. Guitar v.
Bieniek, 68 Mich. App. 82, 85-86, 238 N.W.2d 205, 206-07 (1975) (criticizing LeGault
and applying liberal construction of act to reach rental hall that had charged for setting
up keg of beer).
94 48 Ill. App. 2d 412, 199 N.E.2d 300 (1964).
95 Id. at 423-24, 199 N.E.2d at 306.
96 The second defendant was a voluntary organization of the first defendant's employees. Id. at 413-14, 199 N.E.2d at 301.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 418, 199 N.E.2d at 301-02.
99 Id. at 420, 199 N.E.2d at 305; see also Camille v. Berry Fertilizers, Inc., 30 Ill.
App.
3d 1050, 1053, 334 N.E.2d 205, 207 (1975) (dramshop act is penal in character and
must be strictly construed); cf. LeGault v. Klebba, 7 Mich. App. 640, 643, 152 N.W.2d
712, 713 (1967) (although dramshop act is remedial, it will be strictly construed).
100 48 Ill. App. 2d at 423, 199 N.E.2d at 306.
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"far fetched" any contention that the defendants had a pecuniary
interest in the picnic.' 0 '
b. Dramshop Acts Held Applicable to Social Hosts. Courts in Iowa
and Minnesota have interpreted their dramshop acts to allow an injured party to maintain a cause of action against a furnisher not engaged in the liquor business. 0 2 Following the decisions, both the
Iowa and Minnesota legislatures amended their dramshop acts to
bar a right of action against a nonlicensee.' 0 3 Despite the legislative
nullification of these cases, an analysis of the Iowa and Minnesota
courts' rationale will illustrate how dramshop acts can be applied to
nonlicensees.
In Williams v. Klemesrud'0 4 the Iowa Supreme Court upheld a
right of action under the Iowa dramshop act against a defendant not
engaged in the liquor business. The defendant had purchased
vodka for a minor friend' 0 5 who consumed the liquor, became intoxicated, and crashed his automobile into another vehicle, causing
1
the plaintiff's injuries. 06
The court based its decision on the Iowa dramshop act which at
that time provided:
Every ... person who shall be injured in person or property...
by an intoxicated person . . . shall have a right of action ...
against any person who shall, by selling or giving to another contrary to the provisions of this title any intoxicating liquors, cause
the intoxication of such person, for all damages actually
sustained .... 107
l
rejecting
The court read "any person" to include the defendant,Os
the defendant's contention that "any person" was restricted to
those engaged in the liquor business. Furthermore, the court held
that the act was remedial or compensatory in character, not penal. 10 9 Consequently, the court was free to abandon a strict construction of the statuteiO and conclude that the dramshop act
10 Id.; see also Heldt v. Brei, 118 Ill. App. 3d 798, 800, 455 N.E.2d 842, 844 (1983)
(following Miller analysis that dramshop act is penal and must be strictly construed).
102

Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972); Ross v. Ross, 297 Minn.

115, 200 N.W.2d 194 (1972).
10S Iowa: Liquor and Beer Control Act of 1971, IowA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West
Supp. 1982); Minnesota: amended in 1977, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp.
1982); see also infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972).
104
105 Id. at 615. Defendant's friend was 20 years old, and Iowa law prohibited the
provision of liquor to a person under age 21. Id.
106
107

108
109
11o
court

Id.
Id. (quoting IowA CODE ANN § 129.2 (West 1949) (emphasis added)).

Id.
Id. at 615-16.
Id. The Williams court emphasized the character of the dramshop act. If the
had determined that the act was penal in character, a strict construction would
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created a right of action against the defendant. 1 1
In Ross v. Ross'1 2 the Minnesota Supreme Court extended liability to a social host. The defendants illegally purchased liquor for a
minor 11 3 whose subsequent intoxication proximately caused his
death when he drove off the road. 1 14 The Minnesota dramshop act
was similar to the Iowa statute at issue in Williams. The Minnesota
act provided in pertinent part: "Every . . .person who is injured

. . .by the intoxication of any person, has a right of action . . .
against any person who, by illegally selling, bartering or giving intoxicating liquors, caused the intoxication of such person, for all
damages sustained." 1 5 The Ross court found that the
"[d]efendant's argument that the act was adopted as a part of the
control of the sale of liquor by licensed vendors [was] not. . supported by the evidence" 116 or by the language of the act which provided a cause of action against "any person." 117 The court
concluded that "the legislature intended to create a new cause of
action against every violator whether in the liquor business or
118
not."
9 the Minnesota court held that
Like the Iowa court in Williams, "1
have precluded extending liabilty to the defendant in the absence of specific statutory
language to that effect. By holding the Iowa act to be remedial or compensatory, the
court was able to distinguish Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48 Ill.App. 2d 412, 199
N.E.2d 300 (1964), discussed supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text, and other Illinois cases cited by the defendant which had interpreted the Illinois dramshop act as
penal in character. Id. at 615.
111 The court also rejected the defendant's contention that the Liquor Control Act
of 1934 repealed the dramshop act. Id. at 616. The court stated that the dramshop act
was repealed after the events complained of occurred and that the legislature had enacted a law limiting civil liability to licensees and permittees. The court stated, however,
that the new law was not applicable to the case. Id.
112
294 Minn. 115, 200 N.W.2d 149 (1972).
113 Id. at 116, 200 N.W.2d at 150.
114 Id.
115 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West 1972), amended version at MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 340.95 (West Supp. 1984).
294 Minn. at 118-19, 200 N.W.2d at 151. The court reasoned that the act was
116
included in a chapter concerning intoxicating liquor in general and made no reference
to prior provisions specifically regulating the sale of liquor. The court also stated that if
the act was confined to liquor vendors, "it [seemed] likely [the dramshop act] would
have been included as an amendment to the statute requiring a bond. . . or" as a section of the act initially providing for a bond by the licensee, as was done in 1858 and
1905. Id. at 119, 200 N.W.2d at 151.
117
Id. The court acknowledged that when the dramshop act was passed in 1911 the
problems of drunk driving were not the menace they are today. The court stated, however, that the development of the widespread use of cars does not evidence a legislative
intent not to apply the dramshop to social hosts; rather, it demonstrates only that the
legislature envisaged a limited application of the act to social hosts and that this "is not a
reason for. . . misapplying legislative intent 60 years later." Id.
118 Id. at 121, 200 N.W.2d at 152-53.
119 See supra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
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a person not engaged in liquor traffic could be sued under the state
dramshop act. The Ross court, however, did not emphasize the remedial or compensatory character of the act and the need for a liberal construction.1 20 Instead, the court based its analysis on
legislative intent, stating that the search for legislative intent "is the
12 1
only subject of our inquiry."
The Ross court also noted that although its previous decisions
had imposed strict liability through dramshop acts on a licensee because a licensee "can best bear the loss occasioned by a violation of
law regulating the business or activity, even though the violation
was unintentional or did not involve any deviation from the standard of due care,"' 2 2 it was the legislature's prerogative to amend
123
the act and allow a social host to plead the defense of due care.
Thus, until the legislature acted, social hosts who provided liquor
illegally would be held to a standard of strict liability.
Both the Minnesota and Iowa dramshop acts have been
124
amended, effectively reversing the decisions in Ross and Williams.
The Minnesota legislature simply omitted the word "giving" and
left the injured person with a cause of action against any person who
illegally sells or barters intoxicating liquors. 2 5 The Iowa legislature
repealed its dramshop act and enacted a new one limiting the act to
causes of action against licensees and permittees who give or sell
126
intoxicating liquors.
120 The court did note, however, that it had previously construed the act as both
penal and remedial and that the act was to be liberally construed. 294 Minn. at 120, 200
N.W.2d at 152.
121
Id. at 117, 200 N.W.2d at 150. The Minnesota Supreme Court distinguished
Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48 Ill. App. 2d 412, 199 N.E.2d 300 (1964), discussed
supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text, by noting that the Illinois dramshop act applied to all cases of damage resulting from intoxication and was not restricted to illegal
sales. Ross, 294 Minn. at 121, 200 N.W.2d at 152. Minnesota's dramshop act, on the
other hand, applied only to illegal sales. Id. The Ross court thus concluded that the
Illinois legislature did not intend to apply its dramshop act to social hosts because to do
so "would open the floodgates of litigation." Id. If the Minnesota act applied to all
cases of damage resulting from intoxication, the court might have found a different legislative intent. Id.
122
294 Minn. at 120, 200 N.W.2d at 152 (citing Dahl v. Northwestern Nat. Bank,
265 Minn. 216, 220, 121 N.W.2d 321, 324 (1963)).
123
Id. The concurrence added that strict liability of social hosts under the dramshop act would not advance the remedial objective of the act in a suit against uninsured
private individuals. Id. at 124-25, 200 N.W.2d at 155 (Rogosheske, J., concurring specially). Hence, only the penal objective would be advanced by applying the act to social
hosts. With some prescience, the concurrence added, "[i]nevitably, attempts will now
be made to amend the statute, or our construction of it, and to inject into it the element
of fault or proof of negligence." Id. at 126, 200 N.W.2d at 155.
124
See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
125
See supra note 115 and accompanying text; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West
Supp. 1982).

126

IOWA CODE ANN.

§ 123.92 (West Supp. 1982).
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Thus, plaintiffs attempting to base social host liability on dramshop acts have generally been unsuccessful. Courts consistently
deny recovery, reasoning either that the legislature never intended
the dramshop act to apply to social hosts or that the dramshop act is
penal and therefore must be strictly construed. Where courts have
entertained such actions, legislatures have promptly amended the
acts to extend liability only to licensees.
B.

Negligence as a Basis for Social Host Liability

Plaintiffs have sought a right of action against social hosts
under two negligence-based theories of liability. One theory involves a social host's violation of an alcoholic beverage control act.
Plaintiffs argue that a violation of an alcoholic beverage control act
constitutes negligence per se or presumptive evidence of the negli27
gence of the social host.'
The second theory of social host liability rests upon principles
of ordinary negligence. A plaintiff's case depends upon a showing
that the social host, by furnishing intoxicating liquor to the guest,
created a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of injury which actually
materialized into a foreseeable injury to the plaintiff. 128 The plaintiff must also show that the social host's actions proximately caused
the plaintiff's injuries.
1.

Violation of an Alcoholic Beverage Control Act as a Basis for
Social Host Liability

Social host liability may be predicated upon the violation of alcoholic beverage control acts. 12 9 Alcoholic beverage control acts
regulate the furnishing and sale of intoxicating liquors.1 30 The acts
generally prohibit sales 13 ' or gifts' 3 2 of intoxicating liquors to minors13 3 and inebriated persons. 134 Such statutes exist in every jurisdiction, 135 and their violation generally results in a misdemeanor
127
128
129
130

131

D.C.

See infra notes 129-206 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 207-56 and accompanying text.
Graham, supra note 68, at 562.

Id.
CODE § 28-7-21 (Supp. 1984); ARK.
§ 25-121 (1981).

See, e.g., ALA.
CODE ANN.

STAT. ANN.

§ 48-529 (1977);

132
See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 7.1-5-10-14, 7.1-5-10-15 (Burns 1984); IOWA
§ 123.46 (1977); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 41-715 (1981).

CODE

See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-241, 4-244(9) (Supp. 1984); COLO. REV.
§ 12-47-128(1)(a) (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 30-86 (1985).
134 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 711 (1975 & Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 23-929
(1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 118 (1984); see also ALA. CODE § 28-7-21 (Supp. 1984)
(bars furnishing alcohol to insane persons, habitual drunkards, and persons of known
intemperate habits, as well as minors and persons visibly intoxicated); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 53-180 (1978) (prohibits service of alcohol to the mentally incompetent).
135 ALA. CODE, § 28-7-21 (Supp. 1984); ALAsKA STAT. §§ 04.16.030, 04.16.051
133

STAT.
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offense.1 36 The rationale for these statutes is that consumption of
alcohol by minors and inebriated persons poses an unacceptable
37
risk of danger to the general public.'
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines negligence as "conduct
which falls below the standard established by law for the protection
of others against unreasonable risk of harm."' 3 8 Absent a statutory
standard, the benchmark for conduct is that of a reasonable person
under like circumstances.13 9 Courts, however, often adopt more
precise standards of conduct from relevant legislative enactments.
For example, courts may look to a statute for a standard of care even
40
though the statute does not provide a civil remedy.'
As was the case with dramshop actions, injured third parties or
the consumers of the liquor usually bring negligence suits against
(1980); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-241, 4-244 (Supp. 1984); ARK.STAT. ANN., § 48-529
(1977); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West Supp. 1984); COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-47128 (1978 & Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT., § 30-86 (1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4,
§§ 711, 713 (1975 & Supp. 1984); D.C. CODE ANN. § 25-121 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 562.11 (West Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 5A-9901.1 (Supp. 1982); HAwAIn REV.
STAT. § 281-78 (1976); IDAHO CODE, § 23-929 (1977); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 131
(1975); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 7.1-5-7-8, 7.1-5-10-14, 7.1-5-10-15 (Burns 1984); IowA CODE
§ 123.46 (1977); KAN. STAT. ANN., § 41-715 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 244.080
(Baldwin 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91 (West 1974); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 28,
§ 303 (Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE. art. 2B, § 118 (1984); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 138,
§§ 34, 69 (1981 & Supp. 1984); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 436.29, 436.33 (1978 &
Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.73 (West 1972 & Supp. 1984); Miss. CODE ANN.
§§ 67-1-81, 67-1-83 (Supp. 1984); Mo. REv. STAT. § 311.310 (1978); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-6-304, 16-6-305 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 53-180 (1978); NEv. REv. STAT.
§ 202.055 (1981); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 175:6 (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-77
(West Supp. 1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-7A-16 (Supp. 1981); N.Y. ALco. BEV. CoNT.
LAw § 65 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 18B-302, 18B-305 (1983);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-09 (1975); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4301.22, 4301.69 (Page
1982); OKmA STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 537 (West Supp. 1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 471.410
(1983); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4-493 (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 3-8-1, 3-8-6 (Supp. 1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-3-990 (Law Co-op Supp. 1983); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 35-4-78 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-4-203 (Supp. 1984); TEX.
ALco. BEV. CODE ANN. §§ 101.63, 106.03 (Vernon 1978 & Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 32-7-14, 32-7-15 (1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 658 (Supp. 1984); VA. CODE
§ 4-62 (1983); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 66.44.200, 66.44.270 (1962); W. VA. CODE
§ 60-3-22 (1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 125.07 (West Supp. 1984); Wyo. STAT. § 12-6-101
(1981).
136 See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 562.11 (West Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 5A-99901.1 (Supp. 1982).
137 Graham, supra note 68, at 572.
138 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965) (Negligence Defined).
139 See infra note 208 and accompanying text.
140 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285(c) (1965). "Even where a legislative
enactment contains no express provision that its violation shall result in tort liability,
and no implication to that effect, the court may ... adopt the requirements of the enactment as the standard of conduct necessary to avoid liability for negligence." Id. at
comment c.
Section 286 of the Restatement provides:
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the

1078

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 70:1058

furnishers of alcoholic beverages. If the third party did not contribute to his own injuries, 14 ' he simply must show that a cause of action
14 2
arises under the beverage control act against the social host.
When the drinker himself is injured, however, the furnisher of liquor can usually assert a contributory or comparative negligence
defense. Thus, even if the drinker succeeds in establishing a cause
of action under a beverage control act, 143 a court may deny all or
14 4
part of the claim.
a. Statutory Violations Applied to Licensees. Courts more readily
recognize violations of beverage control acts as a basis for negligence claims against licensees than against social hosts.' 4 5 Much of
the reasoning in the licensee cases applies to cases involving social
hosts, however, and because the courts which have adopted this theory of social host liability did so relying upon licensee cases, it is
useful at the outset to discuss cases involving licensee liability under
a beverage control act.
Although many state courts in licensee actions have refused to
adopt a beverage control act as the standard of conduct, 14 6 several
requirements of a legislative enactment. . . whose purpose is found to be
exclusively or in part
(a) to protect a class ofpersons which includes the one whose interest is
invaded, and
(b) to protect the particularinterest which is invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted,
and
(d) to protect that interest against the particularhazardfrom which the
harm results.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965) (emphasis added).
141 This Project focuses on the issue of social host liability for the injuries to third
parties; a discussion of contributory or comparative negligence of a third party injured
as a result of an intoxicated person's conduct is beyond its scope. The reader should be
aware that in the case of an injured drinker who alleges that his host was negligent,
questions of contributory or comparative negligence will arise.
142
For a discussion of third parties alleging a cause of action in negligence for violation of a beverage control act, see infra notes 145-206 and accompanying text.
143
A court, however, could conclude that a drinker may not maintain a negligence
claim under a beverage control act. Then the issue of contributory or comparative negligence would not be reached. See, e.g., Noonan v. Golick, 19 Conn. Supp. 308, 112 A.2d
892 (1955) (beverage control act does not protect injured drinker).
For example, in Schelin v. Goldberg, 188 Pa. Super. 341, 348, 146 A.2d 648,
144
651-52 (1958), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that contributory negligence
could bar an injured drinker's recovery. The court, however, went on to conclude that
in this case, contributory negligence could not bar recovery by the drinker because the
beverage control act in question sought "to protect a class of persons from their inability
to exercise self-protective care." Id. at 652; see also Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46
NJ. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966), discussed infra at notes 289-95 and accompanying text.
The Schelin and Soronen rationale for failing to recognize the contributory negligence
defense has been extended to bar a comparative negligence defense. See Rhyner v. Madden, 188 NJ. Super. 544, 457 A.2d 1243 (1983).
145 See infra notes 148-63 and accompanying text.
146 In negligence actions against licensees, some courts have refused to adopt a bev-
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jurisdictions have used such a standard. 147 In these states, licensees
who violate beverage control acts are subject to liability, and the
plaintiff must only prove legal cause and the absence of defenses.
In Vesely v. Sager,148 for example, the California Supreme Court
held that a presumption of negligence arose against the defendant
licensee from the violation of section 25602 of the California Business and Professions Code. 14 9 In Vesely the defendant served a patron large quantities of alcoholic beverages knowing that the patron
could not exercise the same degree of control over his consumption
as the average person. 5 0 Moreover, the defendant knew that the
patron had to drive down a steep, narrow, and winding mountain
road. 15 ' After leaving the defendant's lodge, the patron attempted
to drive down the road, veered into the opposite lane, and struck
the plaintiff's car, causiig personal injuries and property damage to
the plaintiff.'5 2
erage control act as the standard of due care, following instead the common law rule of
proximate cause. This approach requires the legislature to impose civil liability on licensees through dramshop acts before plaintiffs may proceed with a negligence action.
These courts havejustified their holdings on the following grounds: (1) at common law,
the consumption of liquor, rather than its sale, proximately causes any harm; e.g., Meade
v. Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 462 P.2d 54 (1969); Yoscovitch v. Wasson, 98 Nev. 250, 645
P.2d 975 (1982); Griffin v. Sebeck, 90 S.D. 692, 245 N.W.2d 481 (1976); (2) the legislature did not intend to impose civil liability on tavern owners through the beverage control act in question; e.g., Meade v. Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 462 P.2d 54 (1969); Holmes
v. Circo, 196 Neb. 496, 244 N.W.2d 65 (1976); Hamm v. Carson City Nugget, Inc., 85
Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358 (1969); Griffin v. Sebeck, 90 S.D. 692, 245 N.W.2d 481 (1976);
(3) the extension of liability to tavern owners would create a flood of litigation; e.g.,
Hamm v. Carson City Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358 (1969); (4) in jurisdictions
with a dramshop act, some courts have concluded that the dramshop act is the exclusive
remedy; e.g., Busser v. Noble, 22 Ill. App. 2d 433, 161 N.E.2d 150 (1959); Rowan v.
Southland Corp., 90 Mich. App. 61, 282 N.W.2d 243 (1979); Fitzer v. Bloom, 253
N.W.2d 395 (Minn. 1977); and (5) it is the province of the legislature to impose civil
liability on furnishers of alcohol; e.g., Alsup v. Garvin-Wienke, Inc., 579 F.2d 461- (8th
Cir. 1978) (applying Missouri law); Meade v. Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 462 P.2d 54
(1969); Holmes v. Circo, 196 Neb. 496, 244 N.W.2d 65 (1976); Yoscovitch v. Wasson,
98 Nev. 250, 645 P.2d 975 (1982); Griffin v. Sebeck, 90 S.D. 692, 245 N.W.2d 481
(1976).
147
See infra notes 148-63 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Rappaport v.
Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959), a leading case on the application of a beverage
control act against a licensee in a negligence action, see infra notes 273-88 and accompanying text.
148
5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971). The California legislature
explicitly abrogated the Vesely decision in 1978; see infra notes 200-01 and accompanying
text.
149 Id. at 165, 486 P.2d at 159-60, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 631-32. Section 25602 stated:
"Every person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or given away,
any alcoholic beverage to any habitual or common drunkard or to any obviously intoxicated person is guilty of a misdemeanor." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West 1964)
(amended at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West Supp. 1984)).
150 5 Cal. 3d at 157-58, 486 P.2d at 154, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
'5'
Id.
152
Id.
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The plaintiff brought a negligence action against the licensee.' 53 The California Supreme Court rested its decision on two
grounds. First, the court concluded that the common law rule of
proximate cause was unsound because the intervening causes of the
injury, consumption of the liquor, resulting intoxication, and driving down the mountain road, were reasonably foreseeable at the
time of the defendant's conduct.' 5 4 The court reasoned that it
should not invoke strict rules of proximate cause in cases involving
the furnishing of alcohol.' 55 Second, the court held that under California evidence law, the violation of a statute raises a presumption
of negligence.1 5 6 Thus, in the court's view, the central question was
whether the licensee, because of a criminal statute, owed a duty of
care to the plaintiff.' 57 The court concluded that section 25602 did
impose such a duty of care upon the licensee because one of the
legislative purposes in enacting the statute was to protect the people
of the state. 158 Hence, the plaintiff only needed to establish that he
was "within the class of persons" section 25602 sought to protect
and that his injuries "resulted from an occurrence that the statute
59
was designed to prevent."'
Most courts adopting a beverage control act as the standard of
due care agree with the Vesely rationale that the common law rule of
proximate cause is unsound 160 and that a beverage control act
should be adopted as the standard of due care because the legislature intended the act to protect the public.' 6 ' Courts also reason
Id. at 153, 486 P.2d at 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 623.
Id. at 163-64, 486 P.2d at 158-59, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 630-31.
155 Id. at 163, 486 P.2d at 158, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 630.
156 Id. at 165, 486 P.2d at 159-60, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 631-32. Section 669 of the California Evidence Code stated in pertinent part:
The failure of a person to exercise due care is presumed if:
(1) He violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public entity;
(2) The violation proximately caused death or injury to person or
property;
(3) The death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature which
the statute, ordinance, or regulation was designed to prevent; and
(4) The person suffering the death or the injury to his person or property
was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute, ordinance, or regulation was adopted.
CAL. EvID. CODE § 669 (West 1964) (amended version at CAL.EVID. CODE § 669 (West
Supp. 1985)).
157 5 Cal. 3d at 164, 486 P.2d at 259, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
158 Id. at 165, 486 P.2d at 159, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
159 Id., 486 P.2d at 159-60, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 631-32.
160
See, e.g., Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959);
Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966); Trail v. Christian, 298 Minn. 101,
213 N.W.2d 618 (1973); Berkeley v. Park, 47 Misc. 2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup. Ct.
1965).
See, e.g., Marusa v. District of Columbia, 484 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Waynick
161
v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959); Nazareno v. Urie, 638 P.2d
153
154
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that civil liability will encourage the licensee to monitor the intoxication level of patrons, thereby reducing the crime and injury traceable to alcohol abuse, 162 or that it is not unfair to hold a licensee
liable when the licensee has the privilege of operating an establish1 63
ment for profit.
b. Statutory Violations Applied to Social Hosts. In cases involving
social hosts, courts have been reluctant to adopt a beverage control
act as the standard of due care.' 64 In these states, a third party cannot maintain a cause of action based on negligence against a social
host. For example, in Manning v. Andy, 165 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court refused to hold a social host liable for a third party's injuries. 16 6 Acknowledging that a Pennsylvania licensee who violated a
167
beverage control act might be liable for a third party's injuries,
the court nevertheless refused to extend such liability to the defendant social host. The opinion stated that courts should not impose
168
civil liability on persons who gratuitously furnish alcohol.
The lack of remuneration to the social host is one of several
reasons why courts refuse to impose liability on social hosts. In
Chastain v. Litton Systems, Inc., 1 69 the District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina held that in the absence of a controlling
North Carolina statute or case, the common law rule of proximate
cause shields the social host from liability.' 7 0 The court reasoned
that the statutes which specify where alcoholic beverages may legally
7
be furnished could not be extended to social hosts.' '
The Oregon Supreme Court has also held a beverage control
act inapplicable to a negligence claim against a social host. 7 2 The
court reasoned that the Oregon beverage control act at issue sought
671 (Alaska 1981); Alesna v. LeGrue, 614 P.2d 1387 (Alaska 1980); Elder v. Fisher, 247
Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966); Trail v. Christian, 298 Minn. 101, 213 N.W.2d 618
(1973); Berkeley v. Park, 47 Misc. 2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
162
See, e.g., Marusa v. District of Columbia, 484 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Alesna v.
LeGrue, 614 P.2d 1387 (Alaska 1980).
163 See, e.g., Alesna v. LeGrue, 614 P.2d 1387 (Alaska 1980).
164 See infra notes 165-77 and accompanying text.
165
454 Pa. 237, 310 A.2d 75 (1973).
166
Id. at 239, 310 A.2d at 76.
167 Id.
168 Id. See also Runge v. Watts, 180 Mont. 91, 94, 589 P.2d 145, 147 (1979) ("there
has been greater justification for imposing liability on a commercial purveyor than on a
social purveyor").
169
527 F. Supp. 527 (W.D.N.C. 1981).
170
Id. at 531; see also Runge v.Watts, 589 P.2d 145 (Mont. 1979).
171 527 F. Supp. at 531.
172
Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Frat., 258 Or. 632,485 P.2d
18 (1971). The beverage control act provided that "no one other than ... parent or
guardian shall ... give or otherwise make available any alcoholic liquor to a person
under the age of 21 years." OR. REV. STAT. § 471.410(2) (amended version at OR. REV.
STAT. § 47.410 (1983)).
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to protect minors from the vice of alcoholic beverages, not third
parties from injury resulting from the acts of intoxicated minors. 173
Hence, the court refused to adopt the beverage control act as a basis
for the host's liability because the plaintiff was not a member of the
class protected by the statute, the plaintiff's particular interest was
not of the type protected by the act, the plaintiff's injury was not of
the type the statute sought to prevent, and the particular hazard
from which the plaintiff's harm resulted was not the type of hazard
the act sought to prevent. 174
In another case, Hulse v. Driver,17 5 the Court of Appeals of
Washington refused to adopt a statutory prohibition against serving
alcohol to minors as a basis for social host liability to an injured
third party. 176 The court stated that the issue of the civil liability of
social hosts raises policy questions that the legislature should answer "'after full investigation, debate and examination of the relative merits of the conflicting positions.' ",177
Despite judicial reluctance to impose civil liability on social
hosts, a minority of states have abrogated the common law rule and
178
adopted a beverage control act as the standard of due care.
Courts in these states have predicated social host liablity on the
premise that the legislature, in enacting a beverage control act, intended to protect the general public.
In Brattainv. Herron179 the defendant social host furnished alcoholic beverages to her minor brother and his friend. After an afternoon of drinking, the two visitors left to drive home. En route the
defendant's brother collided with a pick-up truck, killing all three of
80
its passengers.'
The plaintiffs sued the social host, alleging that the violation of
an Indiana beverage control act which prohibited furnishing liquor
to minors constituted negligence per se and served as a basis for
civil liability.' 8 After a jury verdict in favor of the three plaintiffs,
258 Or. at 638, 485 P.2d at 21.
See supra note 140.
175
11 Wash. App. 509, 524 P.2d 255 (1974).
176 Id. at 513-14, 524 P.2d at 257-58.
177
Id. (quoting Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 759, 765, 458 P.2d
897, 900 (1969)) (emphasis omitted); see also Runge v. Watts, 589 P.2d 145 (Mont.
1979).
178
See infra notes 179-205 and accompanying text.
179
159 Ind. App. 663, 309 N.E.2d 150 (1974).
180 Id. at 665-66, 309 N.E.2d at 152.
181
Id. at 671-72, 309 N.E.2d at 155. The act read in part:
12-600. Minors; Habitual drunkards; Houses of ill fame; Sales prohibited.
No alcoholic beverages shall be sold, bartered, exchanged, given,
provided or furnished, to any person under the age of twenty-one
173
174
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the defendant social host appealed.' 8 2
In affirming the trial court, the appellate court followed the rationale of the Indiana Supreme Court in Elder v. Fisher,183 a case involving the same beverage control act, but there applied to a
licensee.' 84 The Brattain court, after noting that the act was not confined to vendors of liquor, extended the Elder decision to hold the
defendant social host liable. 18 5 The court concluded that the common law rule of proximate cause was unsound and that proximate
cause required only that the injury arise as a natural and probable
result of the negligent act. 18 6 Moreover, the court added, the negligent act" 'need[ed] not be the only proximate cause.' "187
In Coulter v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 188 the California
Supreme Court held that section 25602 of the California Business
and Professions Code provided a basis for the civil liability of a social host. 18 9 In Coulter the plaintiff suffered injuries when the car in
which he was a passenger collided with a roadway abutment.' 90 The
years.. . . Any person guilty of violating this paragraph shall be
punished.
IND. CODE § 7-1-1-32(10) (1971). The act has since been repealed and the section relating to the furnishing of alcoholic beverages to minors is now § 7.1-5-7-8. IND. CODE
ANN. § 7.1-5-7-8 (Bums 1984).
182
159 Ind. App. at 665, 309 N.E.2d at 151.
247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966); for references to Elder, see supra notes 160183
61 and accompanying text.
184
247 Ind. at 603, 217 N.E.2d at 850-5 1. In Elder the Supreme Court held that the
act "was designed to protect the people of the state" and that the plaintiff was a member
of that class of protected persons. Id. at 603, 217 N.E.2d at 850. Hence, "an allegation
of the violation of this statute [was] an allegation of negligence." Id. at 603, 217 N.E.2d
at 851.
185
159 Ind. App. at 674, 309 N.E.2d at 156. The court stated: "We see no distinction between one who sells alcoholic beverages to a minor and one who gives alcoholic
beverages to a minor. The Legislature has provided that either of these actions is a
violation of the statute." Id. Other courts, also citing a legislative intent to protect the
public, have adopted beverage control acts as a basis for social host liability. E.g., Thaut
v. Finley, 50 Mich. App. 611,213 N.W.2d 820 (1973); Lover v. Sampson, 44 Mich. App.
173, 204 N.W.2d 69 (1972). In Lover, a case involving the violation of a statute prohibiting the furnishing of liquor to minors, the court decided that because the common law
rule of proximate cause applied to "able-bodied men," the rule did not apply to cases
involving minors. Thus, the court left open the possibility that the common law rule of
proximate cause would still apply in negligence actions involving adults.
159 Ind. App. at 673-74, 309 N.E.2d at 156 (citing Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. at
186
605, 217 N.E.2d at 852).
187 Id. at 673, 309 N.E.2d at 156 (quoting Elder v. Fisher, 274 Ind. at 606, 217
N.E.2d at 852). For a more recent Indiana appeals court decision holding a social host
liable under a state liquor dispensation law, see Ashlock v. Norris, 475 N.E.2d 1167
(Ind.App. 1985).
188 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978).
189 Id. at 152, 577 P.2d at 673, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 538. For the text of § 25602, see
supra note 149.
190 21 Cal. 3d at 147, 577 P.2d at 671, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 536.
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driver of the car was intoxicated at the time of the accident.1 91 The
plaintiff alleged that an apartment manager and the owners and operators of the apartment complex had negligently served the driver
large quantities of alcoholic beverages. 192 The negligence claim was
grounded upon a violation of section 25602193 and upon principles
194
of ordinary negligence.
The court first declared the common law rule of proximate
cause unsound, 9 5 noting that "'it is clear that the furnishing of an
alcoholic beverage to an intoxicated person may be a proximate
cause of injuries inflicted by that individual upon a third person.' "196 The court proceeded to hold that the defendant's alleged
violation of section 25602 could be the basis for social host liability1 9 7 because the legislature enacted the statute to protect the general public. The court stated that the term "every person" was
intended to include social hosts and that the legislature's failure to
amend the statute after the Vesely decision' 98 indicated that the legislature intended to impose a duty of care on all furnishers of
alcohol. 199
Several months after the Coulter decision, the California legislature amended section 1714 of the California Civil Code and section
25602 of the California Business and Professions Code.2 0 0 The
amendments specified that the consumption, not the service, of al20
coholic beverages proximately causes third party injuries. '
Id. at 148, 577 P.2d at 671, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 536.
Id.
193 See infra notes 195-201 and accompanying text.
194
For a discussion of the ordinary negligence claim, see infra notes 247-56 and
accompanying text.
195 21 Cal. 3d at 149, 577 P.2d at 671, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 536 (citing Vesely v. Sager, 5
Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971), discussed supra notes 148-59 and
accompanying text).
196 Id. at 149, 577 P.2d at 671, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 536 (quoting Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal.
3d at 164, 486 P.2d at 159, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 631).
197
Id. at 152, 577 P.2d at 673, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 538. The court noted that in Vesely it
had expressly reserved the question whether a social host could be subject to civil liability under § 25602. Id. at 149, 577 P.2d at 672, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
198 See supra text accompanying notes 148-59.
199 21 Cal. 3d at 150-52, 577 P.2d at 672-73, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 537-38.
200
CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714(b) (West 1985) (responsibility for wilful acts and negligence; contributory negligence). Subsection (b) declared that the holdings in Vesely v.
Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971), discussed supra at notes
148-59 and accompanying text; Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d
719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976), cited infra at notes 252-53 and
accompanying text; and Coulter, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978),
were abrogated in favor of the common law rule of proximate cause.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602(c) (West Supp. 1984) (sales to drunkard or intoxicated person; offense; civil liability). Subsection (c) similarly abrogated the holdings in
Vesely, Bernhard, and Coulter.
201
CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714(b) (West 1985); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602(c)
191
192
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As in Coulter, a federal district court in Giardina v. Solomon 20 2
predicated the liability of a defendant fraternity on the Pennsylvania
legislature's intent to protect third parties.2 0 3 The court's decision,
however, was a deliberate contravention of the Pennsylvania Superior Court decision in Manning v. Andy.2 0 4 The federal court reasoned that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not adopt the
lower court's holding because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
"would consider of primary importance the fact that a significant
interest served by the criminal statute would also be served by imposition of civil liability .... -205
Thus a majority of courts have refused to predicate social host
liability on the violation of a beverage control act, reasoning that the
social host derived no profit from furnishing liquor, the consumption of liquor was a supervening cause in the chain of events leading
to a third party's injuries, the legislature did not intend to apply
beverage control acts to social hosts, the plaintiff was not a member
of the class protected by the beverage control act, or that the legislature, not the judiciary, should impose liability on social hosts. Nevertheless, a few courts have accepted a violation of a beverage
control act as a basis for social host liability.2 0 6 They reason that
because such laws are intended to protect the general public, a violation of the act is presumptive evidence of the social host's
negligence.
2.

Ordinary Negligence as a Basisfor Social Host Liability

A plaintiff's claim based upon principles of ordinary negligence
differs from a claim based on the violation of a beverage control act.
(West Supp. 1984). Subsequent to these amendments, in Cantor v. Anderson, 126 Cal.
App. 3d 124, 178 Cal. Rptr. 540 (1981), a California appeals court stated that the
amendments had returned California to the old rule of proximate cause; that is, a furnisher of alcohol could be liable to a third party only if the intoxicated person was "unable to voluntarily resist its consumption .. " Id. at 130, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 544. The
person must have been deprived of will power or responsibility for his conduct when the
furnisher served the alcohol. Id. In cases involving the voluntary consumption of alcohol, however, the consumption proximately causes any resulting injuries.
360 F. Supp. 262 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
Id. at 263.
204
218 Pa. Super. 902, 279 A.2d 267 (1971).
205 Giardina, 360 F. Supp. at 264. Contrary to the federal court's expectation, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Manning v. Andy, 454 Pa. 237, 310 A.2d 76 (1973),
202

203

discussed supra at notes 165-68 and accompanying text, held that a social host could not
be liable for civil damages under the beverage control act.
206 On March 20, 1985, the Iowa Supreme Court held that a trial court improperly
dismissed a claim against a social host predicated on a state liquor dispensation law.
Citing Kelly v. Gwinnel, 96 NJ. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984), with approval, the Iowa
court determined that the plaintiffs' petition was sufficient to permit the introduction of
evidence on the claim. See Clark v. Mincks, 364 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1985). The state law
at issue was IOWA CODE § 123.49(1) (1977).
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In the latter, the beverage control act supplies the standard of due
care, 20 7 while under ordinary negligence, the standard of conduct is
that of a reasonable person under like circumstances. 20 8 At common law, however, the furnisher of intoxicating liquors was not liable for the harm caused by an intoxicated person. 20 9 The common
law rule held that the voluntary consumption of intoxicating liquor
by an able-bodied man was the proximate or legal cause of the
plaintiff's injuries.2 10 Thus, even if a furnisher of alcohol had acted
negligently, the doctrine of intervening cause shielded social hosts
21
from liability. '
a. Ordinary Negligence Applied to Licensees. Recognizing that the
furnisher of alcohol may act negligently, and that only the common
law rule of intervening cause barred a cause of action in negligence,
some courts have abrogated the common law rule and held that the
furnishing of alcohol may be the legal cause of harm. In Colligan v.
Cousar,2 12 one of the earliest of such cases, an intoxicated driver
struck and injured the plaintiff pedestrian in Indiana.2 13 The defendant operated a tavern in Illinois and had allegedly served liquor
to both occupants of the automobile.2 1 4 The plaintiff brought suit
in Illinois on two counts, the first based on the Illinois dramshop act
2 15
and the second based on principles of ordinary negligence.
The principle of extraterritoriality prevented the court from applying the Illinois dramshop act to a claim arising in Indiana.2 16 Indiana law also controlled the negligence count. 2 17 However,
because Indiana common law had no authoritative statements on
the maintenance of a negligence claim against a tavern owner, the
court resorted to Illinois law. It concluded that if Illinois had not
enacted a dramshop act, Illinois common law would have allowed a
cause of action based on principles of negligence against a tavern
owner.2 1 8 The court justified its result by noting, "We must preSee supra notes 129-40 and accompanying text.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1964) ("Conduct of a Reasonable Man:
The Standard").
209
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
207
208

210

Id.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281(c) (1964).
38 Ill. App. 2d 392, 187 N.E.2d 292 (1963).
Id. at 395, 187 N.E.2d at 293.
Id.
Id. at 394-95, 187 N.E.2d at 293. The court stated that negligence could properly be based on either the violation of the beverage control act or "without considering
the statute, on a duty imposed on every person not to do an act the consequences of
which were known to him or could reasonably be anticipated, and which resulted in
harm to another." Id. at 401, 187 N.E.2d at 296.
216 Id. at 396-400, 187 N.E.2d at 294-96.
217
Indiana applied lex loci delecti. Id. at 401, 187 N.E.2d at 296.
218
Id. at 414, 187 N.E.2d at 302.
211
212
213
214
215

1985]

SOCIAL HOST LIABILITY

1087

sume that the common law of Indiana ... was the same as the com2 19
mon law of Illinios."
The court stated that the negligent furnishing of alcohol to an
intoxicated person can be the legal cause of an injury suffered by a
third person. 2 20 The court restated its definition of legal cause:
The injury must be the natural and probable result of tlfe negligent act or omission and be of such a character as an ordinarily
prudent person ought to have foreseen as likely to occur as a result of the negligence, although it is not essential that the person
charged with negligence should have foreseen the precise injury
22 1
which resulted from his act.

The court held that when a tavern owner serves alcohol to an intoxicated person with knowledge that he is likely to drive an automobile,
injuries to a pedestrian are reasonably foreseeable. 2 22 Hence, if the
tavern owners acted as the complaint alleged, their negligent conduct would be the legal cause of the injury, and the plaintiff could
22 3
maintain a cause of action in negligence.
219

Id.

220

Id.

Id. at 413, 187 N.E.2d at 302 (quoting Neering v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 383 In. 366,
380, 50 N.E.2d 497, 503 (1943)).
222
Id. at 414, 187 N.E.2d at 302.
223
Id. For other cases holding that the conduct of a negligent licensee could be the
legal cause of injuries arising from an intoxicated person's conduct, see Nazareno v.
Urie, 638 P.2d 671 (Alaska 1981); Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d
719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976); Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho
617, 619 P.2d 135 (1980); Blarney v. Brown, 270 N.W.2d 884 (Minn. 1978) (dramshop
act inapplicable because no illegal sale, but ordinary negligence claim may be maintained against licensee).
The common law rule that service of alcohol by a tavern owner is not the legal cause
of a plaintiff's injuries, however, continues to be the rule in a number of states. See, e.g.,
Alsup v. Garvin-Wienke, Inc., 579 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1978) (applying Missouri law);
Profitt v. Canez, 118 Ariz. 235, 575 P.2d 1261 (1977); Marchiondo v. Roper, 90 N.M.
367, 563 P.2d 1160 (1977). Tavern owners in these states are free from liability for
injuries their intoxicated patrons cause unless there is a dramshop act expressly creating
such liability. See supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text. The judicial reluctance to
apply principles of ordinary negligence to tavern owners has been justified on several
grounds, including: (1) at common law, the consumption of liquor, rather than its sale,
was the proximate cause of injuries arising from an intoxicated person's conduct, e.g.,
Alsup v. Garvin-Wienke, Inc., 579 F.2d 461,463 (8th Cir. 1978) (applying Missouri law);
Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 535, 538, 104 P.2d 147, 148 (1940); Holmes v. Circo, 196 Neb.
496, 501, 244 N.W.2d 65, 68 (1976); Parsons v.Jow, 480 P.2d 296, 397 (Wyo. 1971); (2)
the extension of liability to tavern owners is a legislative concern, e.g., Profitt v. Canez,
118 Ariz. 235, 236, 575 P.2d 1261, 1262 (1977); Holmes v. Circo, 196 Neb. 496, 505,
244 N.W.2d 65, 70 (1976); Marchiondo v. Roper, 90 N.M. 367, 368-69, 563 P.2d 1160,
1161-62 (1977); Griffin v. Sebeck, 245 N.W.2d 481,486 (S.D. 1976); Parsons v.Jow, 480
P.2d 396, 397-98 (Wyo. 1971); (3) the extension of liability to tavern owners is against
public policy, e.g., Alsup v. Garvin-Wienke, Inc., 579 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1978); and (4) in
jurisdictions with dramshop acts, some courts have stated that the dramshop act is the
exclusive remedy, e.g., Rowan v. Southland Corp., 90 Mich. App. 61, 68-69, 282 N.W.2d
243, 246 (1979).
221
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b. Ordinary Negligence Applied to Social Hosts. As in the cases involving licensees, many states adhere to the common law rule that
the gratuitous furnishing of alcohol is not the legal cause of a plaintiff's injuries. 224 The judicial hesitancy to apply principles of ordinary negligence to the social host is attributable to several factors.
For example, in Runge v. Watts2 25 the Supreme Court of Montana
affirmed the dismissal of a negligence claim against the defendant
social host because a social host, unlike a commercial vendor, lacks
pecuniary motives and because a commercial vendor can more easily monitor patrons' level of intoxication. 2 26 Moreover, the court
stated that a judicial extension of civil liability to purveyors of alcohol, especially social hosts, "would infringe upon a matter more appropriately within the province of the legislature. ' 22 7 The court,
therefore, concluded that the minor driver's excessive drinking,
rather than the provision of alcohol, proximately caused the
2 28
accident.
The courts of Oregon and California, 2 29 however, have not
been reluctant to apply principles of ordinary negligence to the social host. The highest court in both states has rejected the common
law rule that the voluntary consumption of alcohol proximately
causes any injuries resulting to third parties.
The first case to hold a social host liable under a theory of ordiSee infra notes 225-29 and accompanying text.
180 Mont. 91, 589 P.2d 145 (1979).
226
Id. at 93, 589 P.2d at 147; see also Miller v. Moran, 96 Ill.
App. 3d 596,421 N.E.2d
1046 (1981); Klein v. Raysinger, 504 Pa. 141, 470 A.2d 507, 510-11 (1983) (consumption, not furnishing, of alcohol is proximate cause of injuries). But see Kelly v. Gwinnell,
96 N.J. 538, 548, 476 A.2d 1219, 1224 (1984) ("liability proceeds from the duty of care
that accompanies control of the liquor supply" and not from the motive for providing
the liquor).
227
180 Mont. at 93, 589 P.2d at 147. Montana did not have a dramshop act extending liability to licensees. Id. Given the court's holding that a greater justification
exists for imposing liability on licensees, the absence of a dramshop act imposing such
licensee liability helps explain the court's reluctance to impose liability on social hosts.
See also Cartwright v. Hyatt Corp., 460 F. Supp. 80, 81-82 (D.D.C. 1978); Halvorson v.
Birchfield Broiler, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 759, 765, 458 P.2d 897, 900 (1969) ("such a policy
decision should be made by the legislature after full investigation, debate and examination of the relative merits of the conflicting positions"). But see Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J.
538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984), discussed infra Section II.
228
180 Mont. at 93, 589 P.2d at 147. The court did note that a cause of action could
be brought against a furnisher of alcohol if" 'the person to whom the liquor was sold or
given was in such a state of helplessness. . . as to be deprived of his willpower or responsibility for his behavior.'" Id. at 93, 589 P.2d at 146-47 (quoting 45 AM. JUR. 2d
INTOXICATING LIQUORS § 554 (1969)). E.g., LeGault v. Klebba, 7 Mich. App. 640, 152
N.W.2d 712 (1967); Kohler v. Wray, 114 Misc. 2d 856, 452 N.Y.S.2d 831 (Sup. Ct.
1982); Tarwater v. Atlantic Co., 176 Tenn. 510, 144 S.W.2d 746 (1940); Halvorson v.
Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 759, 458 P.2d 897 (1969).
229
For a discussion of New Jersey cases applying ordinary negligence to social
hosts, see infra notes 307-17 and accompanying text.
224
225
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nary negligence was Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega
Fraternity.23 0 In Weiner the defendant Alpha Tau Omega hosted a
fraternity party at the University of Oregon.2 3 1 The plaintiff attended the party and later departed in an automobile driven by a
minor who had also attended the party. The minor driver crashed
23 2
into a building, injuring the plaintiff.

The plaintiff sued the fraternity member who had arranged for
the purchase and provision of alcoholic beverages at the party, the
owners and operators of the ranch where the party was held, the
fraternity, and the chapter of the fraternity. 23 3 The plaintiff predicated the fraternity member's liability on two grounds, common law
negligence 2 34 and the violation of the Oregon alcoholic beverage
2 35
control act.
Although the court refused to hold the fraternity member liable
under principles of ordinary negligence, it explicitly rejected the
rule that furnishing alcohol in a social setting can never give rise to
social host liability.2 3 6 The court explained that liability should not
extend to one who merely supplies, but does not serve, the liquor,
"even where the one supplying the alcohol might have reason to
believe that the host is likely to make an unwise choice in dispensing
it to others." 23 7 Thus, although the defendant may have acted unreasonably under the circumstances, the court held that a person

must have direct control over the decision to serve alcohol before
liability for injuries inflicted by inebriated guests may attach.23 8
The court also dismissed the claims against the owners and operators of the ranch because these defendants had merely provided

the premises for the party.23 9 The court refused to impose a duty
230 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971) (discussed supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text).
231 Id. at 636, 485 P.2d at 20.
232 Id. at 636-37, 485 P.2d at 20.
233 Id. at 635-36, 485 P.2d at 19-20. The trial court had quashed the service of summons on the individual chapter of the fraternity. The appellate court, having recently
held that such an order is unappealable, dismissed plaintiff's appeal as to the fraternity
chapter and proceeded on the appeal against the remaining defendants. Id. at 643-44,
485 P.2d at 23.
234 Id. at 638, 485 P.2d at 21. The court noted that none of the defendants could be
liable under the Oregon dramshop act which allowed a cause of action only by a wife,
husband, parent, or child of an intoxicated person or habitual drunkard. Id. at 638 n.2,
485 P.2d at 21 n.2 (citing OR. REv. STAT. § 30.730). The Oregon dramshop act was
repealed in 1979. OR. REv. STAT. § 30.730 (1983).

235
nying
236
237

258 Or. at 643-44,485 P.2d at 23-34 (discussed supra notes 172-74 and accompatext).
Id. at 639-40, 485 P.2d at 21-22.
Id. at 640, 485 P.2d at 22.
238 Id.
239 Id. at 641, 485 P.2d at 22.
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on them to protect guests or third parties 240 or to supervise the
24 1
party.
As to the defendant fraternity the court held that the plaintiff
had stated a cause of action under common law negligence. 24 2 After
first acknowledging that ordinarily a social host is not liable for a
third party's injuries resulting from a guest's intoxication, the court
stated that "[t]here might be circumstances in which the host would
have a duty to deny his guest further access to alcohol. ' 243 For example, if the host serves an individual especially likely to act unreasonably, liability could ensue. 244 The court explained that in this
case the driver's status as a minor coupled with the allegation that
the fraternity should have known the minor would have to drive
home could demonstrate that the fraternity's behavior was unreasonable. 24 5 According to the court, the fraternity's status as a host
and direct dispenser of alcohol created a duty to refuse to serve alcohol to any guest whose circumstances would render service
246
unreasonable.
The California Supreme Court in Coulter v. Superior Court of San
Mateo County2 4 7 similarly held that a plaintiff may bring an action
against a social host based on principles of ordinary negligence. In
Coulter the plaintiff sued an apartment manager and the owners and
operators of the apartment complex, 24 8 alleging that the defendants
had negligently served alcoholic beverages to the driver of the car in
which the plaintiff was a passenger. 24 9 In addition, the plaintiff alleged a violation of section 25602 of the California Business and

240
241
242
243
244

Id.
Id.

Id. at 643, 485 P.2d at 23.
Id. at 639, 485 P.2d at 21.
Id. The court noted that persons likely to act unreasonably included those already severely intoxicated, those the host knew were unusually affected by alcohol, and
minors. Id.
245
Id. at 643, 485 P.2d at 23.
246
Id. In 1979 the Oregon legislature limited the Wiener holding by defining the
circumstances that will trigger social host liability. Section 30.955 provides that a social
host may be liable for a guest's injurious acts if the host provided alcoholic beverages
when the guest was visibly intoxicated. OR. REv. STAT. § 30.955 (1983). Section 30.960
provides that a social host may be liable for damages caused by a minor on a showing
that he failed to request identification or should have determined that the identification
was altered and did not accurately describe the person served the alcohol. OR. REv.
STAT. § 30.960 (1983).
247
21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978). The California legislature expressly abrogated Coulter when it amended § 1714 of the Civil Code and § 25602
of the Business & Professions Code. See supra note 200.
248
Id. at 148, 577 P.2d at 671, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 536.
249
Id.
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Professions Code.250
The court concluded that the furnishing of alcoholic beverages
may be the proximate cause of injuries to third parties. 2 5' Addressing the issue of the negligence of the social host, the court extended
an earlier holding 2 52 that a licensee may be liable to third parties for
injuries resulting from an intoxicated patron's conduct. 2 53 The
25 4
court emphasized the foreseeability of injuries to third parties,
noting that the service of alcohol to an obviously intoxicated guest
who the social host knows will be driving constitutes a "fail[ure] to
exercise reasonable care." 2 55 The court believed that reducing "potential. . . human suffering which attends the presence on the highways of intoxicated drivers" justified the imposition of civil liability
on social hosts, despite its tempering effect on "the spirit of convivi'
ality at some social occasions. "256
In sum, courts that have applied principles of ordinary negligence to social hosts emphasize the foreseeability of the events leading to a third party's injuries. The consumption of liquor resulting
in intoxication and the guest's driving while intoxicated are all reasonably foreseeable at the time of the social host's furnishing of the
liquor. In arguing that these intervening causes are reasonably foreseeable, courts have effectively abrogated the common law rule that
the consumption of liquor is a supervening cause of a third party's
injuries. More recently, in Kelly v. Gwinnell,25 7 the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that principles of ordinary negligence create
social host liability for injuries to a third party resulting from an in258
toxicated guest's behavior.
II
RECENT DEVELOPMENT-KELLY V. GWINNELL

In Kelly v. Gwinnell,2 59 the Supreme Court of New Jersey held
that a social host who directly serves liquor to an adult social guest,
250 For a discussion of the negligence claim based on a statutory violation and the
legislative response, see supra notes 188-201 and accompanying text.
251 21 Cal. 3d at 149,577 P.2d at 671, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 536 (citing Veselyv. Sager, 5
Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971), discussed supra notes 148-59 and

accompanying text).
252 Bernard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976).

253 Id. The Bernard decision extended the Vesely decision which held a California
licensee liable in a negligence action for violation of § 25602 of the California Business
and Professions Code.
254
255
256
257
258
259

21 Cal. 3d at 152-53, 577 P.2d at 674, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 539.
Id. at 153, 577 P.2d at 674, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 539.
Id. at 154, 577 P.2d at 675, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
See infra notes 325-448 and accompanying text.
96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
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when he knows that the guest is intoxicated and will soon be driving,
is liable for injuries to third parties which result from the guest's
operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated. 26 0 The decision is
significant for several reasons. First, in an apparent attempt to restrict potential liability, the court articulated a number of prerequisites to liability. Such an approach is unusual in a case based solely
on common law negligence grounds. 26 1 Second, the court expressly
left open the possibility of extending liability to social hosts in other
circumstances. 26 2 Finally, the decision made New Jersey the only
state to impose social host liability solely on common law negligence
grounds. 26 3 The court's action also raises questions about the propriety of judicial, rather than legislative, imposition of liability.
This section traces the common law development of social host
liability in New Jersey. It then examines the approach of the Kelly
court, focusing on the court's prerequisites to imposing liability.
The section concludes that although these factors provide certainty
and guidance for a social host's behavior, the opinion leaves a large
"gray area" where liability remains unpredictable. 264 Finally, the
section evaluates the propriety ofjudicial activism in this area of the
law, finding such activism appropriate.
A.

Background
1. Actions Against Tavern Owners Based on Negligence Principles
and Statutory Violations in New Jersey

In 1922, during national prohibition, 26 5 the New Jersey legislature enacted a dramshop law 266 which "imposed strict [civil] liability
for compensatory and punitive damages upon unlawful sellers of alcoholic beverages." 26 7 In 1934, following the repeal of prohibi260
261

Id. at 559, 476 A.2d at 1230.
See Fischer, Tort Law: Expanding the Scope of Recovery Without Loss ofJury Control, 11
HoFsTRA L. REv. 937, 941 (1983) (in most negligence cases, judge and jury share functions: judge defines standard of conduct and jury tests defendant's conduct against that
standard).
262
96 N.J. at 556, 476 A.2d at 1228.
263
See cases cited infra note 278.
264
See Fischer, supra note 261, at 940 (argues that predictability should give way to
flexibility in some cases).
265
The eighteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, which became effective in 1920, prohibited the manufacture, sale, transportation, importation, and exportation of intoxicating liquors within the United States. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIIl.
For a discussion of the circumstances and events leading up to its passage, see supra
notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
266
A civil damages law or dramshop act creates civil liability against the seller or
furnisher of alcoholic beverages for injuries resulting from the drinker's intoxication.
See generally supra notes 45-67 and accompanying text (tracing historical development of
dramshop acts).
267
Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 NJ. 188, 200, 156 A.2d 1, 8 (1959) (citing 1921 NJ.
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tion, 268 the legislature repealed the dramshop law 26 9 and replaced it
with the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act. 27 0 This act regulates the

sale of alcoholic beverages to the public but, unlike the repealed
statute, does not impose civil liability on sellers of alcohol for injuries to patrons or third parties. 2 7 1 Violators of the act's provisions
2 72
face criminal misdemeanor charges.
Despite the absence of a New Jersey statute, case law concerning the imposition of civil liability on furnishers of alcohol has developed rapidly over the past twenty-five years. In 1959 the Supreme
Court of New Jersey held in Rappaport v. Nichols 27 3 that the repeal of
the state's dramshop law did not preclude tort claims against liquor
licensees based on common law negligence principles. 274 In Rappaport an intoxicated minor drove an automobile and collided with a
vehicle driven by the plaintiff's husband, causing his death. 2 75 The
plaintiff alleged that the defendant tavern owners had caused the
accident by unlawfully and negligently selling and serving alcoholic
276
beverages to an apparently intoxicated minor.
The court acknowledged that an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions adhered to the common law rule that a liquor vendor
2 77
could not be held liable for the acts of an intoxicated patron.
Laws ch. 257, at 628). The Civil Damages Law provided that "a right of action... shall

accrue to, or on account of any person who shall be injured in person, property, means
of support .... or by reason of the intoxication of, or the sale of any intoxicating liquor
to any person, in violation of law." 1922 N.J. Laws ch. 257, at 628-9, repealed 1934.
268
The twenty-first amendment to the United States Constitution repealed nationwide prohibition. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
269 1934 N.J. Laws ch. 32, at 104.
270 1933 NJ. Laws ch. 436, at 1180 (current version at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 33:1-5.4 to
33:1-93.10 (West Supp. 1984)). All states and the District of Columbia have alcoholic
beverage control acts. For a compilation of these acts, see supra notes 62-67, 70.
271 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-77 (West Supp. 1984).
272 Id. at §§ 33:1-5.4 to -93.10.
273 31 NJ. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
274 Id. at 201, 156 A.2d at 8.
275 Id. at 192-93, 156 A.2d at 3.
276 Id. at 192, 156 A.2d at 4. Under the applicable New Jersey law, anyone who sold
any alcoholic beverage to a minor was guilty of a misdemeanor. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:177 (West Supp. 1984).
Also in effect at that time was Regulation No. 20, Rule 1 of the Division of Alcoholic
Beverage Control, which prohibited liquor licensees from selling, serving, or delivering
any alcoholic beverage to a minor or "to any person actually or apparently intoxicated."
NJ. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control Regulation No. 20, rule 1 (current version at
NJ. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 13:2-23.1 (1984).
277
The traditional common law rule has been stated as follows:
It is generally held, in the absence of statute to the contrary, that there
can be no cause of action against one furnishing liquor in favor of those
injured by the intoxication of the person to whom it has been so furnished ... so long as the person to whom the liquor was sold or given
was not in such a state of helplessness or debauchery as to be deprived of
his willpower or responsibility for his behavior.
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These jurisdictions typically reasoned that the consumption of liquor, rather than its sale or furnishment, proximately caused such
injuries to third parties.2 78 The Rappaport court rejected this rationale, holding that a jury could reasonably find the defendant tavern
owners negligent and their negligence the proximate cause of the
accident.2 79 The court reached this result by applying traditional
negligence principles and relying on the defendants' violation of the
28 0
New Jersey Alcoholic Beverage Control Act.
Under the Rappaport court's rationale, a tavern owner who
serves alcohol to a minor or visibly intoxicated patron should foresee an unreasonable risk of harm to third parties.2 8 1 The court
viewed the patron's subsequent negligent operation of a motor vehicle as an intervening cause. Nevertheless, this intervening event
would not break the chain of causation if defendants should have
reasonably anticipated the risk that the intoxicated patron would op28 2
erate a motor vehicle.
The Rappaport court also pointed to New Jersey's statute
prohibiting the sale of alcohol to minors 28 3 and an administrative
45 AM.JUR. 2D IntoxicatingLiquors § 554 (1969) (footnotes omitted). The traditional reasoning given for this rule was that the consumption of the liquor and not the furnishing
of it was the proximate cause of the injury. For recent cases applying this reasoning, see
Runge v. Watts, 180 Mont. 91, 589 P.2d 145 (1979); Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc.,
76 Wash. 2d 759, 438 P.2d 897 (1969); see also supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text
(discussing traditional common law rule of nonliability).
Thosejurisdictions which imposed civil liability for negligence in the sale of alco278
hol did so through the interpretation of existing civil damages or dramshop statutes. See
supra notes 102-23 and accompanying text.
At the time of the Rappaport decision, only two decisions imposed civil liability in the
absence of a dramshop statute. In Schelin v. Goldberg, 188 Pa. Super. 341, 146 A.2d
648, a Pennsylvania court allowed a complaint based on negligence against a tavern
which had served a visibly intoxicated patron who later assaulted the plaintiff. The assault complained of in Schelin occurred shortly after the Pennsylvania legislature had
repealed that state's civil liability act of 1854. In Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store,
269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, apparently applying
Michigan law, refused to dismiss a complaint based on common law negligence where
the Illinois defendants unlawfully sold alcoholic beverages to intoxicated persons who
were later involved in a collision in Michigan which injured the plaintiffs. Both the Schelinand the Waynick courts relied on the existence of alcohol licensing statutes in their
respective states.
279
31 N.J. at 203-04, 156 A.2d at 9.
280
Id. at 202-04, 156 A.2d at 8-10.
Id. at 202, 156 A.2d at 8. The court stressed that the risk of harm to members of
281
the traveling public was foreseeable because "traveling by car to and from the tavern is
so commonplace and accidents resulting from drinking are so frequent." Id.; see also
McKinney v. Foster, 391 Pa. 221, 225, 137 A.2d 502, 504 (1958) (court took judicial
notice of fact that because great numbers of persons, including minors and adults, drive
automobiles, it was foreseeable that one illegally served with intoxicants might negligently drive automobile).
31 N.J. at 203-04, 156 A.2d at 9.
282
283
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-77 (West Supp. 1984) ("Anyone who sells any alco-
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28 4
regulation prohibiting sales to minors and intoxicated persons.
The court stated that "these. . .restrictions were not narrowly intended to benefit the minors and intoxicated persons alone but were
wisely intended for the protection of members of the general public
as well." 28 5 The court adopted the requirements of the statute and
administrative regulations as defining the standard of care applica28 6
ble to licensed sellers in a civil action brought by a third party.
The plaintiff could introduce defendants' violation of the statute
and regulations as evidence of negligence, but each of the defendants could "assert that it did not know or have reason to believe that
its patron was a minor, or intoxicated when served, and that it acted
as a reasonably prudent person would have acted at the time and
under the circumstances. ' 28 7 Although the Rappaport court stressed

holic beverage to a person under the legal age for purchasing alcoholic beverages is a
disorderly person.").
284 N.J. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control Regulation No. 20, Rule 1 (current version at N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 13:2-23.1 (1984)). These regulations prohibit licensees from selling, serving or delivering any alcoholic beverage to a minor or "to any
person actually or apparently intoxicated."

NJ. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 13:2-23.1

(1984). Violation of these provisions may subject the licensee to suspension or revocation of the license or to criminal charges. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-31 (West Supp.
1984).
285 31 N.J. at 202, 156 A.2d at 8. The court may have based its broad construction
of the statute and regulation on the section addressing the interpretation of the liquor
provisions which states: "This chapter is intended to be remedial of abuses inherent in
liquor traffic and shall be liberally construed." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-73 (West 1940).
As a general matter of tort law, penal provisions designed to protect the class of persons
which includes the plaintiff against the risk of the type of harm which has occurred as a
result of a violation of the provision are considered appropriate laws upon which to base
a civil cause of action. Thus, the creation of a civil cause of action in Rappaport follows
directly from the court's finding of a broad protected class. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 36 (5th ed. 1984); Koloff, Torts of the Intoxicated- Who Should Be
Liable?, 15 CoLu.J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 33, 43-48 (1979).
Other courts have construed similar alcoholic beverage control provisions as protecting a much narrower class of persons. A narrow construction precludes the use of
such provisions as a standard of conduct in claims brought by third persons. In Wiener
v. Gamma Phi Chap. of Alpha Tau Omega Frat., 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971), the
Supreme Court of Oregon narrowly construed an Oregon statute providing that "no
person other than his parent or guardian shall give or otherwise make available any
alcoholic liquor to any person under the age of 21 years." Id. at 638, 485 P.2d at 21
(quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 471.410(2) (1979)). The court stated: "We think that the
design of [the statute] was to protect minors from the vice of drinking alcoholic beverages; it was not the purpose of the statute to protect third persons from injury resulting
from the conduct of inebriated minors.... .Id.
286 31 N.J. at 202-03, 156 A.2d at 9.
287
Id. at 203, 156 A.2d at 9. Under NewJersey law, the violation of a statute constitutes evidence of negligence. In light of all of the evidence, the trier of fact may reject a
finding of negligence even when there has been a violation of a statute. Shatz v. TEC
Technical Adhesives, 174 NJ. Super. 135, 415 A.2d 1188 (1980). The majority ofjurisdictions consider an unexcused violation of a statute to establish negligence conclusively. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 285, § 36. This doctrine is commonly
referred to as negligence "per se." Under this doctrine a party's violation of a statute
constitutes negligence as a matter of law when the plaintiff is in the class of persons the
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that its decision only applied to unlawful and negligent service by
liquor vendors, 288 the court's broad language left open the possibility of future expansions of liability based on common law negligence
principles.
Such an expansion took place seven years later in Soronen v. Olde
Milford Inn. 28 9 In Soronen the NewJersey Supreme Court held that a

tavern owner may be civilly liable for injuries suffered by an adult
patron as a result of the patron's own intoxication. 29 0 The Soronen
case involved the death of an intoxicated patron who fell while in
the defendant's tavern. 2 9 1 The decedent's wife instituted a wrongful
death action, claiming that the tavern unlawfully served liquor to
her husband when he was visibly intoxicated. The court ruled that
the tavern had breached its duty if it served the decedent while he
was visibly intoxicated "in the sense that [the Inn's bartender] knew
or should have known of the [patron's] condition from the attendant
circumstances."

292

Having resolved the questions of forseeability and causation in
Rappaport, the Soronen court focused on the defendant's affirmative
defense: the decedent's intoxication constituted contributory negligence which should bar the claim. The court rejected this contention, holding that a tavern owner may not assert the defense of
contributory negligence when he has violated a statute enacted "to
protect a class of persons from their inability to exercise self-protective care."' 29 3 Moreover, the licensee's duty not to serve intoxicated
persons would be meaningless if it could be avoided merely by
pointing to the patron's intoxication. 29 4 Thus, Soronen expanded liability under the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act by permitting intoxstatute is designed to protect and the harm that has occurred is the type of harm the
statute was designed to avoid. Id.
288 31 NJ. at 205, 156 A.2d at 10.
289 46 NJ. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966).
290 Id. at 594, 218 A.2d at 637.
291 Id. at 584, 218 A.2d at 632.
292 Id. at 594, 218 A.2d at 637. As in Rappaport, the court applied an objective standard, in that it did not require actual knowledge of the patron's intoxication. The court
remanded the case to the trial court because the jury instructions permitted a finding of
negligence even though the jury was not satisfied that the patron exhibited signs of
intoxication such that the defendant either knew or should have known of the decedent's
intoxicated condition. Id.
293 Id. at 590, 218 A.2d at 635 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 483 (1934)). The
court ruled that the prohibition against serving intoxicated persons set forth in the New
Jersey Administrative Code had the full force of law for purposes of deciding the contributory negligence question. Id.
294 Id. at 589, 218 A.2d at 634. The Soronen court relied in part on Galvin v. Jennings, 289 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1961), a federal appellate court decision applying NewJersey
law. In Galvin the plaintiff alleged that he was served liquor while visibly intoxicated and
was later injured in an accident. The court held that contributory negligence would not
apply in a case involving the violation of a statute intended to protect the plaintiff from
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icated patrons, as well as innocent third parties, to bring civil actions
295
against tavern owners.
In Anslinger v. Martinsville Inn 296 the Appellate Division of the
NewJersey Superior Court, the state's second highest court, refused
to extend Rappaport and Soronen and dismissed a cause of action
against a corporate defendant which hosted a social affair for its employees and business associates. 29 7 Anslinger, a guest at what the
court described as a "quasi-business" event, became intoxicated,
drove away, and was killed in an automobile accident. 298 The administratrix of Anslinger's estate argued that the hosts of the
"quasi-business" affair should be held to the same standard of conduct as licensed tavern owners and therefore should be liable for
injuries suffered by a person to whom they served alcoholic
299
beverages.
The court rejected the plaintiff's claim, stating that imposition
of liability on business enterprises for the actions of their guests at
social affairs would require a considerable extension of the Rappaport decision.3 0 0 Furthermore, the court reasoned that such an extension would raise "extremely difficult questions of deciding what
the very condition alleged as contributory negligence. Id. at 19. Soronen, 46 N.J. at 591,
218 A.2d at 635-36.
295
In Aliulis v. Tunnel Hill Corp., 59 N.J. 508, 284 A.2d 180 (1971), the NewJersey
Supreme Court extended the Soronen holding to a case involving injuries to a third party
passenger after the driver had purchased liquor at a tavern in violation of provisions
prohibiting sales to minors. The defendant alleged that the plaintiff's contributory negligence in riding with the intoxicated driver should be a complete bar to recovery. The
court held that because of the late hour, and because the plaintiff had no other means of
transportation, "any contributory negligence-should not be available as a defense to a
tavern keeper." Id. at 511, 284 A.2d at 182. The court refused, however, to rule that a
seller of alcoholic beverages to minors or intoxicated persons may never assert a defense
of contributory negligence. Id.
See also Rhyner v. Madden, 188 N.J. Super. 544, 457 A.2d 1243 (1983) (public policies advanced in Soronen would extend to cases decided under New Jersey comparative
negligence act, which became effective in 1973).
296
121 N.J. Super. 525, 298 A.2d 84 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972), cert. denied 62
N.J. 334, 301 A.2d 449 (1973).
297
The defendants in Anslinger included the inn where the decedent attended a dinner meeting on the night he died, a corporation whose employees and guests occupied a
table at that meeting, and the business club that sponsored the meeting. Id. at 529, 298
A.2d at 86.
298
Id. at 529, 298 A.2d at 86.
299
The plaintiff argued that corporate businesses that serve alcoholic beverages in
the course of their business should be held to the same standard of conduct as licensed
tavern owners because both occupations create risks and the resulting injuries can be
widely spread through price adjustments. Id. at 534, 298 A.2d at 88.
300 Id. Although the Rappaport decision contained broad language based upon general concepts of negligence, the court in that case had explicitly limited the decision to
liquor licensees who "have long been under strict obligation not to serve minors and
intoxicated persons." Rappaport, 31 N.J. at 206, 156 A.2d at 10.

1098

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 70:1058

is business and what is social." 30 1 In addition, the court ruled that
the decedent's voluntary intoxication completely barred any recov30 2
ery against the "quasi-business" host.

The administratrix also claimed that the tavern where the event
took place was liable because it served the decedent alcoholic beverages in violation of the administrative regulation3 0 3 prohibiting the
sale of alcoholic beverages to intoxicated persons. In response, the
court ruled that the administrative regulation did apply to the tavern's method of providing whole bottles of liquor from which the
guests served themselves. 30 4 Although such a method of service
may not give a tavern's employees as great an opportunity to observe a customer's condition as they would have if they served each
drink individually, the court did not wish to enable a licensee to escape liability simply by adopting this method of service.3 05 Nevertheless, the court did not hold the inn liable because the plaintiff
failed to show that the defendants knew or should have known that
the decedent was intoxicated when he was served. 30
2.

Liability of the Social Host Based Solely on Negligence Principles

In Linn v. Rand3 0 7 the Superior Court of New Jersey further
extended Rappaport by holding that a social host who serves alcohol
to a visibly intoxicated minor may be liable for injuries to third parties caused by the minor's acts.3 0 8 In Linn the minor guest allegedly
hit a pedestrian with her car soon after leaving the defendant's
home.3 0 9 The Linn court discarded the traditional distinction be301

121 NJ. Super. at 534, 298 A.2d at 88.
Id., 298 A.2d at 88-89.
303 NJ. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, Regulation No. 20, Rule 1 (current version at N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 13:2-23 (1984)).
304
121 NJ. Super. at 530, 298 A.2d at 87. The regulation made it unlawful for a
licensed liquor dealer to "sell, serve or deliver ... any alcoholic beverage, directly or
indirectly. . . to any person actually or apparently intoxicated, or permit or suffer the
consumption of any alcoholic beverage by any such person in or upon the licensed
premises." N.J. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, Regulation No. 20, Rule 1 (current
version at NJ. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 13:2-23.1 (1984)).
305 In dicta the court stated that the defendant inn would have a duty to its customers even if the regulation were not so broadly worded: "Permitting consumption by an
intoxicated person would, we think, be the equivalent of serving him." 121 N.J. Super.
at 532, 298 A.2d at 87.
306 The court stated that "there was no proof that his conduct was of a rowdy or
boisterous nature while he was in the Inn, or that he acted in such a manner as to draw
attention of the Inn's employees to anything unusual in his condition." Id. at 533, 298
A.2d at 88.
307
140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
308 Id. at 219, 356 A.2d at 19.
309 Id. at 214, 356 A.2d at 19. The court based its reversal of the grant of summary
judgment for the defendant in Linn in part on its opinion that "the record was wholly
inadequate for a decision on the merits by the summary judgment route" in which all of
the facts must be judged in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at 220, 356 A.2d
302
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tween a social host and a licensee, stating that "[i]t makes little sense
to say that the licensee in Rappaport [was] under a duty to exercise
care, but give immunity to a social host who may be guilty of the
same wrongful conduct merely because he is unlicensed." 3 1 0 The
court ignored explicit statements in the Rappaport opinion limiting
liability to holders of liquor licenses, stating that nothing in Rappaport or its progeny specifically barred social host liability as a matter of law. 3 1 ' The court distinguished Anslinger on the grounds that
the decedent in that case was contributorily negligent and the claim
was *broughton behalf of an adult. 3 12 Linn stands as the first New
Jersey case extending liability to a social host and the first case extending liability in the absence of an underlying statute or
3 13
regulation.
In Figuly v. Knoll 3 14 a New Jersey trial court extended Linn to a
social setting in which the intoxicated guest was an adult. The defendant host in Figuly had previously worked as a commercial bartender and knew his guest from that work. 3 15 The defendant
considered his guest "an alcoholic or close to it" and admitted he
could recognize various stages of intoxication when this particular
guest manifested them. 3 16 The court found "no reasonable basis
for limiting the holding of Linn to minors" and ruled that the defendant could be held liable for injuries caused by the guest. 3 17 The
at 19-20. The record in Linn did not reveal the age of the intoxicated guest, the amount
of alcohol furnished to her, or any evidence pertaining to the social host's knowledge of
the guest's physical condition. Id. at 215, 356 A.2d at 16-17.
310
Id. at 217, 356 A.2d at 18.
311
Id. at 216, 356 A.2d at 17. The Linn holding was actually rather narrow. The
court stated that a successful plaintiff must prove that the intoxicated guest was a minor;
that the social host knew the guest was a minor, knew the guest intended to drive a car,
and nevertheless served alcoholic beverages in an amount that caused the guest to become unfit to drive; that it was reasonably foreseeable that the guest might injure herself
or others; and that the host's negligence was a proximate cause of the accident and the
plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 217, 356 A.2d at 18.
312
Id. at 219-20, 356 A.2d at 19.
313
The Linn court, of course, could not rely on the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act
or the applicable regulations because these promulgations apply to licensees, not hosts
who gratuitously furnish liquor. Because the Linn case involved a claim brought by an
innocent third party rather than by the intoxicated guest, the court was not faced with
the question of whether the contributory negligence of the guest in becoming intoxicated would bar an action brought by the guest against the social host. Thus, the court's
statement that the plaintiff must prove that it was reasonably foreseeable that the guest
"might injure herself or others" must be read as dicta.
314
185 N.J. Super. 477, 449 A.2d 564 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982).
315
Id. at 479, 449 A.2d at 564.
316

Id.

Id. at 480, 449 A.2d at 565. The court cited Coulter v. Superior Court of San
Mateo County, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978), as support for
its holding. In Coulter the California Supreme Court held that a social host who furnishes alcohol to an obviously intoxicated person may be held accountable to third parties who are injured as a result of that person's intoxication. The California legislature
317
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Figuly case was not appealed; thus the New Jersey Supreme Court
did not address the question of social host liability until its decision
in the case of Kelly v. Gwinnell.
B.

Kelly v. Gwinnell

On January 11, 1980, Donald Gwinnell left his home to assist
Joseph Zak in removing Zak's truck from the mud. The men were
not successful, and Gwinnell drove Zak home. Zak invited Gwinnell
into his house and offered Gwinnell a drink. 3 18 According to Gwinnell and the Zaks, Gwinnell consumed two or three drinks while at
the Zaks' home. 319 Less than ten minutes after Gwinnell left the
Zaks' home, Gwinnell's automobile entered Marie Kelly's lane of
traffic and injured her in a head-on collision. A blood test performed on Gwinnell after the accident revealed that his blood had
3 20
an alcohol content of 0.286 percent.
Kelly filed a complaint against Gwinnell and his employer, who
in turn filed a third party complaint against the Zaks. The plaintiff
subsequently amended her complaint to include the Zaks as defendants. The trial court granted the Zaks' motion for summary judgment, concluding that as a matter of law a social host was not liable
for injuries caused by an adult social guest who became intoxicated
specifically abrogated the Coulter decision over four years before the Figuly decision. See
infra note 322.
318
Kelly v. Gwinnell, 190 NJ. Super. 320, 321, 463 A.2d 387, 388 (NJ. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1983), rev'd, 96 NJ. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
3 19 Kelly, 96 NJ. at 541,476 A.2d at 1220. Gwinnell stated that he consumed two or
three scotches on the rocks. Joseph Zak stated that Gwinnell had two drinks, each consisting of a shot of scotch and two ice cubes. Catherine Zak also stated that Gwinnell
had two drinks while in their home. Brief and Appendix for Defendants-Respondents at
2, Kelly, 96 NJ. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984). The plaintiff contended that Gwinnell had
more than two or three drinks. See infra note 320.
96 NJ. at 541, 476 A.2d at 1220. New Jersey law makes it illegal for a person
320
with a blood alcohol concentration equal to or above 0.10% to operate a motor vehicle.
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50 (West Supp. 1984). At trial Kelly's expert chemist testifed
that, based on a reading of 0.286%, Gwinnell may have consumed up to 13 drinks and
that he would have been showing "unmistakable signs of intoxication" while at the Zaks'
home. 96 NJ. at 541, 476 A.2d at 1220.
The blood alcohol concentration (BAG) resulting from consumption of a given
number of drinks varies with, inter alia, the weight of the individual, the rate of drinking,
the presence or absence of food in the stomach, and the concentration of alcohol in the
drink. A 150-pound person who consumes three to five ounces of liquor within a short
period of time could have a BAG between 0.05 and 0.08%o.
A concentration of alcohol greater than 0.05% in an automobile driver's blood significantly increases the probability that the driver will be involved in an accident. The
probability that the driver will be involved in an accident increases exponentially as the
drinker's BAG level rises. A driver with a 0.06% BAG level is twice as likely as a sober
driver to have an accident. When the BAG increases to 0.10%o, the driver is six times as
likely to be involved in an accident. At 0.15% or more, the accident involvement risk
multiplies by 25. See Cramton, The Problem of the Drinking Driver, 54 A.B.A. J. 995, 996
(1968).
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while at the social host's home.3 2 ' The appellate division affirmed,
refusing to extend Rappaport and Linn.3 22 The court noted the economic problems inherent in extending liability to persons who make
no profit from their service of alcohol3 23 and concluded that "any
' 3 24
change in the law is best left to the judgment of the legislature.
In a six to one decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, holding that a host who directly serves liquor to an adult
social guest after the host knows the guest is intoxicated and will
soon be driving is liable for injuries to third parties caused by the
guest's drunken driving.3 25 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice
Wilentz found that the "elements of a cause of action for negligence
[were] clearly present."3 2 6 The court asserted that Zak could have
foreseen that Gwinnell would be incapable of driving safely if Zak
3 27
continued to serve him drinks.
The majority next considered whether a social host should have
a duty to prevent the risk that a guest might cause injury by driving
while intoxicated. Acknowledging that the question involved public
policy and value judgments, the court noted the high number of
3 28
deaths and extensive damage caused each year by drunk drivers
321
322

96 NJ. at 541-42, 476 A.2d at 1220-21.

190 N.J. Super. at 325-26,463 A.2d at 390-91. The court acknowledged that two
jurisdictions had judicially recognized a cause of action against a social host serving alcoholic beverages to an adult. Id. at 323, 463 A.2d at 389. The California Supreme Court
had permitted such a cause of action in Coulter v. Superior Court of San Mateo County,
21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978). That decision remained in
effect for only eight months before the California legislature abrogated it. See CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE §§ 25602, 25602.1 (West Supp. 1985); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714(b) (West
Supp. 1985).
In Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chap. of Alpha Tau Omega Frat., 258 Or. 632, 639, 485
P.2d 18, 21 (1971), the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled that "rt]here might be circumstances in which the host would have a duty to deny his guest further access to alcohol."
There are no reported Oregon cases holding a social host liable for serving alcoholic
beverages to an adult; however, in 1979 the Oregon legislature enacted a statute which
permits a plaintiff to sue a private host who serves alcoholic beverages to a social guest
when that guest is visibly intoxicated. OR. REv. STAT. § 30.995 (1984).
323
190 NJ. Super. at 324-35, 463 A.2d at 390.
324
Id. at 324, 463 A.2d at 390. The opinion of the appellate division did not mention the decision of Figuly v. Knoll, 185 NJ. Super. 477, 449 A.2d 564, which had extended common law liability to a social host when the guest was an adult. See supra notes
314-17 and accompanying text.
325
96 NJ. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224. The court held the host and guest jointly liable
to the injured third party. Id. at 559, 476 A.2d at 1230. The court declined, however, to
resolve any right of contribution or indemnification questions between the host and the
guest, directing the trial court to determine that issue on remand. Id. at 549 n.8, 476
A.2d at 1224 n.8. The trial court never resolved this issue because the parties settled
following the supreme court's decision. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
326 96 N.J. at 544, 476 A.2d at 1222. The court described these elements as "an
action by defendant creating an unreasonable risk of harm to plaintiff, a risk that was
clearly foreseeable, and a risk that resulted in an injury equally foreseeable." Id.
327
Id.
328 Id. at 545 n.3, 476 A.2d at 1222 n.3. The court relied on data provided by the
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and concluded that such a duty was "both fair and fully in accord
'3 2 9
with the State's policy."
The court next reviewed Rappaport, Soronen, and Linn and asserted that its decision in Kelly was "a fairly predictable expansion of
liability in this area." 3 30 The court relied heavily on Linn because
the Linn court had imposed a common law duty on a social host that
arose independent of the statute and regulation prohibiting sales of
33
liquor to a minor. '
The court rejected the argument that the legislature is the only
proper body to determine whether liability should be imposed on
social hosts.3 3 2 Noting that the determination of the scope of duty
in negligence cases has traditionally been a judicial function, and
that the legislature had not objected to the court's earlier expansions of liability, the court asserted that "we assume that our decisions are found to be consonant with the strong legislative policy
against drunken driving." 33 The court also cited the absence of a
dramshop act in New Jersey to support its decision, reasoning that
the existence of a dramshop act holding only licensees liable would
New Jersey Division of Motor Vehicles, which established that from 1978 to 1982 there
were 5,755 highway fatalities in NewJersey. Alcohol was involved in 2,746 or 47.5% of
these deaths. Of the 629,118 automobile accident injuries for the same period, 131,160
or 20.5%o were alcohol related. The societal cost for NewJersey alcohol-related highway
deaths for this period was estimated as $1,149,516,000.00, based on statistics and documents obtained from the New Jersey Division of Motor Vehicles. The total societal cost
figure for all alcohol-related accidents in New Jersey in 1981 alone, including deaths,
personal injuries and property damage, was $1,594,497,898.00. Id. (citing NEWJERSEY
DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES, SAFETY, SERVICE, INTEGRITY, A REPORT ON THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES 45 (Apr. 1, 1982 through

Mar. 31, 1983)). These New Jersey statistics are consistent with nationwide figures. Id.
(citing PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON DRUNK DRIVING, FINAL REPORT 1 (1983)).
329
Id. at 545, 476 A.2d at 1222.
330
Id. at 556, 476 A.2d at 1228.
331
96 N.J. at 547, 476 A.2d at 1223. The court deemphasized the factual differences
between Linn and Kelly, stating that:
The entire rationale of the [Linn] opinion is that there is no sound reason
to impose liability on a licensee and not on a social host. There is not a
word nor the slightest implication in the opinion suggesting that the underlying purpose of the decision was to protect minors.
Id. at 556 n.14, 476 A.2d at 1228 n.14.
The Kelly court overruled the portion of Anslinger v. Martinsville Inn, 121 NJ.
Super. 525, 298 A.2d 84 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972), cert. denied, 62 NJ. 334, 301
A.2d 449 (1973), which held that policy considerations should preclude the imposition
of liability on hosts in social or quasi-business settings. 96 N.J. at 548 n.8, 476 A.2d at
1224 n.8.
332
96 N.J. at 552-56, 476 A.2d at 1226-28. Courts in other states that have considered the issue of social host liability have concluded that only the legislature should
impose it. See, e.g., Camille v. Berry Fertilizers, Inc., 30 Ill. App. 3d 1050, 1053, 334
N.E.2d 205, 207 (1975); Gabrielle v. Craft, 75 A.D.2d 939, 940, 428 N.Y.S. 84, 86
(1980). For a discussion of the propriety of judicial action in the Kelly case, see infra
notes 417-48 and accompanying text.
333
96 N.J. at 553, 476 A.2d at 1226. See infra notes 441-45 and accompanying text.
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evince a legislative intent to preclude the imposition of liability on
33 4
social hosts.
The court argued that its decision would make fair compensation to innocent victims of drunk driving more likely and would also
tend to deter drunk driving. The court expressly refused, however,
to condition its decision on statistical proof that the fear of liability
would deter social hosts from serving alcohol in an irresponsible
manner. 3 35 The court did not think a legislative study of the deterrent and compensatory effects of its decision was necessary. 3 36 Finally, the court noted that if the legislature disagreed, it could
3 37
nullify the decisions.
Although the Kelly decision extended liability, the court placed
two specific limits on social host liability: the host must directly
serve a guest, and liability is limited to injuries resulting from the
guest's drunken driving.3 38 The court refused to speculate on the
potential applicability of the decision to other social situations. Instead, the court indicated that it would approach new situations by
weighing "if necessary and if legitimate, the societal interests alleged to be inconsistent with the public policy considerations that
'33 9
are at the heart of today's decision.
In dissent Justice Garibaldi criticized the majority for acting
with "scant knowledge and little care for the possible negative consequences of its decision. ' 340 The dissent maintained that imposition of social host liability represented "a radical departure from
41
prior law, with. . . extraordinary effects on the average citizen."'
As such, this extension of liability should have been imposed only
after an in-depth review by the legislature.3 4 2 Furthermore, the extension was inappropriate in light of continuing legislative activity in
"creating duties and remedies to protect the public from drunk drivers."3 4 3 Noting that the legislature had recently passed a bill subjecting a social host to criminal penalties for serving alcohol to a
minor, the dissent maintained that the absence of a parallel provision applicable to a social host who served an adult guest demonstrated the legislature's intent not to impose liability on social
3 44
hosts.
334
335

336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344

96
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

N.J. at 554, 476 A.2d at 1227.
at 551-52, 476 A.2d at 1226.
at 558, 476 A.2d at 1229.
at 555, 476 A.2d at 1227.
at 559, 476 A.2d at 1230.
at 556, 476 A.2d at 1228.
at 563, 476 A.2d at 1232 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
at 561, 476 A.2d at 1231 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
at 563, 476 A.2d at 1232 (Garibaldi, J, dissenting).
at 569, 476 A.2d at 1235 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
Justice Garbaldi believed that the existence of state statutes or regulations
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The dissent reminded the majority that the court had based its
earlier decisions imposing tort liability on licensees on the violation
of explicit statutes and regulations.3 45 According to the dissent, the
majority's imposition of liability ignored relevant distinctions between social hosts and licensees.3 4 6 First, a social host does not
have the experience of a commercial licensee in assessing a person's
level of intoxication.3 4 7 The dissent criticized the majority for relying on the results of Gwinnell's blood alcohol concentration test to
conclude that the Zaks must have known that Gwinnell was intoxicated. Because the effects of a particular concentration of alcohol in
the blood vary from person to person, the dissent concluded that an
elevated blood alcohol level after an accident did not necessarily indicate that Gwinnell was obviously intoxicated while at the Zak's
3 48

home.

Second, the dissent contended that a social host has less control
over the serving of liquor than a commercial establishment because
3 49
guests frequently prepare drinks for themselves or other guests.
In addition, a commercial bartender does not usually drink on the
job, whereas a host will often drink with the guests, reducing his
ability to determine when a guest is intoxicated. Justice Garibaldi
stated that "[i]t would be anomalous to create a rule of liability that
social hosts can deliberately avoid by becoming drunk themselves." 3 5 0 Furthermore, the dissent raised questions which the majority left unanswered regarding the extent to which a host must go
to avoid liability: "Is the host obligated to use physical force to restrain an intoxicated guest from drinking and then from driving? . . . What is the result when the host tries to restrain the guest
imposing criminal penalties on a particular class of persons represented "significant
enough evidence of legislative policy to impart knowledge of foreseeable risk on the
provider of the alcohol and to fashion a civil remedy for negligently creating that risk."
Id. at 561, 476 A.2d at 1231 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Thus, she would approve the
creation of a civil cause of action when an underlying statute or regulation defined the
standard of conduct to be followed.
Accordingly, Justice Garibaldi agreed with the imposition of social host liability in
Linn, see supra notes 307-13 and accompanying text, despite the absence of a relevant
statute or regulation, because of legislative action in that area. She noted that "the distinction I draw [between Linn and Kelly] is based on the clearly and frequently expressed
legislative policy that minors should not drink alcoholic beverages. . . and on the fact
that minors occupy a special place in our society and traditionally have been protected
by state regulation from the consequences of their own immaturity." 96 N.J. at 561 n.1,
476 A.2d at 1230-31 n.1 (citation omitted).
345
96 N.J. at 561, 476 A.2d at 1231; see supra notes 276-95 and accompanying text.
346
96 NJ. at 565-68, 476 A.2d at 1233-35.
347
Id. at 565-66, 476 A.2d at 1233.
348
Id., 476 A.2d at 1233-34.
349
Id. at 566, 476 A.2d at 1234. The dissent noted that patrons in a bar or restaurant are typically served directly by a bartender or waiter. Id.
350
Id. at 567, 476 A.2d at 1234.
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but fails? Is the host still liable?" 3 5 1
The most significant difference between a social host and a
commercial licensee, according to the dissent, is the social host's
inability to defray the cost of liability. 3 52 The dissent disagreed with
the majority's unsubstantiated contention that homeowner's insurance would cover such liability. 35 3 Furthermore, even if insurance
would cover such liability, many homeowners and renters do not
have and cannot afford homeowner's insurance, especially with the
3 54
potential increase in premiums that the decision could cause.
C. Analysis

A striking aspect of the Kelly decision is the specificity with
which the court delineated the scope of social host liability. In an
apparent attempt to limit the scope of liability, the court established
several prerequisites to liability. The jury must find certain facts
before it may consider the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct. This approach differs from a typical negligence case where the
jury simply evaluates the defendant's conduct to determine whether
it was reasonable.3 55 This section examines the court's criteria and
concludes that although they may provide more certainty than a reasonable person standard, the criteria are not defined with sufficient
clarity to preclude future expansion of liability.
1. Elements of the Kelly Rule
a. Service to a Visibly Intoxicated Guest. According to Kelly, a social host may be liable only when he has served alcohol to a visibly
intoxicated guest.3 56 In prior decisions the court indicated that the
visibly intoxicated requirement was satisfied if the defendant knew
or should have known of the drinker's intoxicated condition when
the service was made. 3 57 The Kelly court abandoned this standard
and instead required that the social host possess actual knowledge
of the guest's intoxication. 3 58 The court did not, however, specify
the factors to be considered to determine whether the visibly intoxi351 Id. at 567-68, 476 A.2d at 1234. The dissent also noted that a social host does
not have a bouncer or other enforcer to prevent difficulties that may arise when the host
requests that an intoxicated person stop drinking or refrain from driving home. Id. at
567, 476 A.2d at 1234.
352 Id. at 568, 476 A.2d at 1234-35.
353

Id.

354 Id. at 568, 476 A.2d at 1235. For a discussion of the effect of the Kelly decision
on insurance premiums, see infra notes 481-97 and accompanying text.
355 Fischer, supra note 261, at 941.
356 96 N.J. at 556, 476 A.2d at 1228.
357 See Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, 46 NJ. 582, 218 A.2d 630, 636 (1966). See also
Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 202, 156 A.2d 1, 9 (1959).
358 See Kelly, 96 N.J. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224.
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cated requirement has been met. Consequently, the court left it to
future cases and lower courts to set standards for the application of
this requirement, leaving open the possibility of an expansion of liability through the adoption of a lenient standard.
The Kelly court's application of the visibly intoxicated standard
is troubling. The court appears to have relied only on the results of
Gwinnell's post-accident blood alcohol concentration test. The
court determined that a jury could reasonably conclude that the
Zaks "continued to serve [Gwinnell] even after he was visibly intoxicated." 35 9 The court failed to consider Gwinnell's physical appearance or behavior in order to determine whether his intoxicated
condition was in fact visible to the Zaks. Instead, the court merely
inferred knowledge from the results of the blood alcohol test.
Other jurisdictions have required evidence that the guest or patron exhibited "outward manifestations" of intoxication.360 These
jurisdictions believe it is inequitable to hold a provider of alcohol
responsible for serving alcohol to an intoxicated person unless the
provider has sufficient notice of the person's intoxicated condition.
For example, in People v. Johnson,3 61 the Supreme Court of California
held that a liquor seller would not be civilly liable under the obviously intoxicated standard unless the patron disclosed symptoms
readily apparent to anyone having normal powers of observation.3 62
In Anslinger v. Martinsville Inn 3 63 the New Jersey Appellate Division

required outward signs of intoxication. The Anslinger court dismissed the plaintiff's claim against a tavern owner because the plaintiff did not produce any evidence that the patron's behavior drew
the attention of the Inn's employees.3 64
Id. at 543, 476 A.2d at 1221-22.
See Note, One Morefor the Road: Civil Liability of Licensees and Social Hosts For Furnishing Alcoholic Beverages to Minors, 59 B.U.L. REv. 725, 734-35 (1979) (survey of the
actual manifestation requirement); Comment, Negligence Actions Against Liquor Purveyors:
Filling the Gap in South Dakota, 23 S.D.L. REv. 227, 246-48 (1978) (recommending that
courts adopt the "outward manifestation" test of intoxication when applying statutes
prohibiting the sale of liquor to inebriates).
361
81 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 973, 185 P.2d 105 (1947).
362 Id. at 975, 185 P.2d at 106. See also Samaras v. Department of Alcoholic Bev.
Control, 180 Cal. App. 2d 842, 844, 5 Cal. Rptr. 856, 858 (1960) (watery eyes, slumped
position at bar, incoherent yelling, hysterical laughing, and spitting on floor are sufficient outward manifestations of intoxication); People v. Smith, 94 Cal. App. 2d Supp.
975, 210 P.2d 98 (1949) (evidence that customer spoke loudly, spilled beer, and had
poor balance, flushed face, and bloodshot eyes sufficient to sustain finding that he was
"obviously" intoxicated); Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, Inc., 413 Pa. 626,
629, 198 A.2d 550, 552 (1964) (unsteadiness, poor coordination, bloodshot eyes, thick
speech sufficient to find defendant visibly intoxicated).
363
121 N.J. Super. 525, 298 A.2d 84 (1972), cert. denied, 62 N.J. 334, 301 A.2d 449
(1973). For a more complete discussion of this case, see supra notes 296-306 and accompanying text.
364
121 NJ. Super. at 533, 298 A.2d at 88; see also Comment, Social Host Liabilityfor
359
360

1985]

SOCIAL HOST LIABILITY

1107

Some courts have been particularly concerned with the proper
application of the visibly intoxicated standard. In Cartwrightv. Hyatt
Corp.365 the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
disallowed a cause of action by an injured party against a cocktail
lounge which had served drinks to the intoxicated patron who
caused the accident. The court dismissed the claim despite testimony that the driver appeared obviously intoxicated after the accident and that a post-accident blood alcohol test revealed a
concentration of 0.29 percent.3 6 6 The court observed that although
the post-accident findings constituted evidence that the patron was
intoxicated shortly before the accident, they did not show that the
patron appeared to be intoxicated to those who served the
drinks. 36 7 In Shelby v. Keck 368 the Supreme Court of Washington rejected test results as an indication of obvious intoxication. The
court dismissed an action brought against a cocktail lounge, holding
that "[e]ven if [the patron] had consumed more than two drinks, his
state of sobriety must be judged by the way he appeared to those
'36 9
about him, not by what a blood alcohol test later revealed.
The need to protect society against drunk drivers must be balanced against the unfairness of imposing high recoveries on social
hosts. As one commentator has noted, the courts "must establish a
reasonable standard of care, so that the social host is not burdened
with inequitable obligations, and is given some protection against
frivolous lawsuits." 3 7 0 The Kelly court's application of the visibly intoxicated standard does not accomplish these ends because the
court relied on the results of a post-accident blood alcohol concentration test which did not necessarily demonstrate that the Zaks
knew Gwinnell was intoxicated.371
The court's superficial analysis of this issue arose in the context
of the court's review of the trial court's grant of summary judgment
in favor of the Zaks. The standard of review of this stage was highly
FurnishingAkohoL" A Legal Hangover?, 10 PAC. LJ. 95, 103 (1979) (warns that after-thefact assessments of visible intoxication create risk of "objective review of subjective
decision").
365
460 F. Supp. 80 (D.D.C. 1978).
366 Id. at 83.
367
Id.
368
85 Wash. 2d 911, 541 P.2d 365 (1975).
369
Id. at 915, 541 P.2d at 369. Accord McNally v. Addis, 65 Misc. 2d 204, 216, 317
N.Y.S.2d 157, 170-71 (1970) (no inference that patron appeared intoxicated at time of
sale drawn from blood alcohol level of .28%). See generally Note, supra note 360, at 73438 (persons found to be legally intoxicated by blood alcohol test frequently are not
obviously intoxicated).
370

Keenan, Liquor Liability in California, 14 SANTA CLARA L. REV.46, 69 (1973). The

author concludes that the visibly intoxicated standard, when applied strictly, meets these
goals.
371
See supra note 359 and accompanying text.
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favorable to the plaintiff.3 7 2 The procedural posture does not, however, justify the court's failure to advise the lower courts how to apply the visibly intoxicated standard. If lower courts follow Kelly's
approach and fail to examine whether the guest exhibited outward
signs of intoxication, social hosts could be held liable without
knowledge of their guest's intoxication. Imposition of liability in
these circumstances would be unjust because the host could not
have foreseen the harm to third parties absent actual knowledge of
the guest's intoxication. Because the Kelly decision gives little guidance to lower courts concerning the proper application of the visibly intoxicated standard, it has created uncertainty and the potential
for expansion of the scope of liability.
b. Knowledge that the Guest Will Soon Be Driving a Motor Vehicle.
The Kelly court expressly predicated liability on the host's knowledge that the intoxicated guest would be operating a motor vehicle
shortly after consuming alcoholic beverages.3 7 3 The court's requirement of actual knowledge differs significantly from the standard in its earlier decisions. In Rappaport, for example, the court did
not examine whether the tavern owner knew that the intoxicated
guest would be driving. The Rappaport court found that the risk of
harm to third parties was foreseeable because "traveling by car to
and from the tavern [was] so commonplace and accidents resulting
from drinking [were] so frequent." 3 74 The Kelly court's restrictive
approach to this issue demonstrates the court's desire to impose
more limited liability on social hosts than on tavern owners.
c. The Direct Service Requirement. The Kelly court expressly limited liability to situations where a host directly serves alcoholic beverages to a guest. 37 5 This limitation apparently precludes liability in
cases where the host merely provides liquor but does not directly
serve it to the guest. 37 6 Under a strict application of the direct service requirement, a social host who provides an open bar from which
guests serve themselves would not be liable.
Because the direct service requirement allows hosts to circumvent liability with ease, it may be susceptible to modification in future decisions. One commentator believes that a distinction
between a host who selects a self-service arrangement and a host
Kelly, 96 N.J. at 543, 476 A.2d at 1221.
Id. at 559, 476 A.2d at 1230.
374
31 N.J. at 202, 156 A.2d at 8 (citing National Safety Council, Accident Facts 49
(1959)).
375
96 N.J. at 559, 476 A.2d at 1230.
376
The host could also avoid liability by requiring guests to provide their own liquor. Commentators agree that a host will not be liable for the consequences of a
guest's intoxication if the guest served himself. See Note, supra note 360, at 742 nn.125,
129; Comment, supra note 360, at 236; Comment, supra note 364, at 107.
372
373
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who directly provides alcohol serves no valid purpose.3 7 7 If courts
abandon the direct service requirement, the host of a self-service
party will have a duty to prevent visibly intoxicated guests from serving themselves. Failure to do so would subject the host to the same
liability as if he had directly served the guest.
The Anslinger3 7 8 court expressed a willingness to impose such a
duty on those licensed to serve alcohol, such as tavern owners. In
Anslinger the licensee provided bottles of liquor at each table from
which the guests served themselves.3 7 9 The court, in dicta, noted
that even though the self-service scheme may not permit the same
opportunities for observing the customer's condition as if each
drink were served individually, a licensee cannot escape liability sim380
ply by adopting this method of service.
Whether the New Jersey courts will employ a less rigid direct
service requirement in the future remains uncertain in light of the
Kelly holding. If courts permit hosts to escape liability by providing
a self-service bar, many hosts will opt for such an arrangement, thus
curtailing the deterrent effects of the Kelly decision. In order to fulfill the policy aims of Kelly, a modification of this prerequisite to liability seems inevitable.
d. Conduct Required to Fulfill Duty. The duty imposed on social
hosts by the Kelly court is a duty to "reasonably oversee the serving
of liquor."3 8 1 An open question is exactly what actions the host
must take to satisfy this legal obligation. The decision permits the
host to serve the guest up to the point of intoxication without incurring liability,3 8 2 but service after that point creates potential liability
377
Note, supra note 360, at 743. The author concedes that a social host who chooses
a self-service arrangement may not be able to directly observe guests. A social host who
chooses this method, however, should be required to take additional precautions to prevent intoxicated guests from serving themselves. Id.
378

121 N.J. Super. 525, 298 A.2d 84 (1972), cert.
denied, 62 N.J. 334, 301 A.2d 449

(1973).
Id. at 532, 298 A.2d at 86.
Id., 298 A.2d at 87. Courts in other jurisdictions have imposed liability on providers of alcohol in the absence of direct service. See, e.g, Peterson v.Jack Donelson Sales
379
380

Co., 4 Ill.
App. 3d 792, 281 N.E.2d 753 (1972) (licensee who provided unattended beer
truck at picnic held liable under Illinois dramshop act). But see Wiener v. Gamma Phi
Chap. of Alpha Tau Omega Frat., 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971) (lessors of hall for

fraternity party not liable for injuries resulting from intoxicated minor's automobile accident because lessors did not have control over dispensation of alcohol).
96 N.J. at 557, 476 A.2d at 1229.
See Note, Commercial and Social Host Liability for Dispensing Alcoholic Beverages, 16
WiLLiWiEr L.J. 191, 195 (1979) ("No liability attaches to the host who served an intox381

382

icated guest who appeared sober when served even if the guest became visibly intoxicated after having been served." (citing Campbell v. Carpenter, 279 Or. 237, 243, 566
P.2d 893, 897 (1977)); see also Comment, supra note 364, at 104 n.80 (no liability attaches

to bartender who serves patron up to point of intoxication).
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if the host knows that the guest will drive.3 8 3 In order to fulfill this
duty, a host must assess the effect each drink will have on the
guest. 384 Moreover, a host may not notice the condition of a guest
until after the guest has become visibly intoxicated. If the guest attempts to depart while in this state, the host may be faced with a
choice between detaining the guest and risking liability by permitting the guest to drive away. 3 85 Consequently, the host's duty may
extend to physically restraining guests from driving.3 86 Because the
social host in Kelly made no attempt to stop the guest from driving,
the extent of the host's duty to restrain a guest remains unclear.
Justice Garibaldi's dissenting opinion raises serious questions
about a host's ability to fulfill the duty once the host becomes aware
that a particular guest is intoxicated. Garibaldi notes that "[w]e
should not ignore the social pressures of requiring a social host to
tell a boss, client, friend, neighbor, or family member that he is not
going to serve him another drink."38 7 In response to this argument,
one commentator contends that "temporary unpopularity seems a
small price to pay in return for a meaningful cause of action for
those injured in alcohol related accidents." 38 8 Another commentator points out that a social host has several advantages over licensees in fulfilling his legal obligation; the host can permit an
intoxicated guest to stay overnight or can have a sober guest escort
the intoxicated guest home. 38 9 The commercial licensee is less
likely to have these options available to him.
e. Harmfor Which a Host May Be Liable. The Kelly court explicitly limited the social host's liability to injuries to third parties result390
ing from the operation of a motor vehicle by an intoxicated guest.
383 See Kelly, 96 NJ. at 556, 476 A.2d at 1228; see also supra notes 373-74 and accompanying text.
384 In Kindt v. Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 850, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603, 606 (1976) a
California appellate court highlighted one of the problems with the obvious intoxication
requirement by noting that "what is patent when the drinker falls off his bar stool may
have been only latent 60 seconds earlier."
385 One commentator has argued that an intoxicated person who is refused alcohol
by a host is not likely to remain at the host's home, thus "one who refuses to serve a
drink to avoid the risk of civil liability may only hasten the placing of an intoxicated and
dangerous person behind the wheel of an automobile." Note, supra note 360, at 737.
386 One commentator has suggested that a host who affirmatively acts to prevent an
obviously intoxicated guest from driving may conceivably be subject to charges of false
imprisonment. See Comment, supra note 364, at 105.
387 96 N.J. at 567, 476 A.2d at 1234 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
388 Comment, supra note 360, at 236.
389 Keenan, supra note 370, at 69.
390 96 NJ. at 559, 476 A.2d at 1230. The court noted that because law enforcement
officers investigate auto accidents and make routine determinations as to whether the
drivers and occupants are intoxicated, limiting social host liability to automobile accidents would prevent unsubstantiated claims against social hosts. Emphasizing the blood
alcohol tests, the court stated that "[tihe availability of clear objective evidence estab-
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Other jurisdictions have extended the liability of liquor purveyors to
harm caused by other acts of the intoxicated party, such as deaths or
39 1
injuries caused by the negligent or intentional discharge of a gun
and injuries resulting from assault and battery.3 9 2 Recovery for
these types of harm would not be possible under the Kelly holding.3 93 In addition, many jurisdictions, including New Jersey, have
permitted an intoxicated party who injured himself to recover from
a licensee who continued to serve the party after he became intoxicated.3 9 4 The Kelly holding restricts social host liability to injuries
incurred by third parties, thus precluding recovery by the intoxicated guest for self-inflicted injuries.
2. Additional Factors Affecting Liability
The Kelly court's formulation of the social host liability rule
does not provide hosts with sufficient guidance as to what conduct
will subject them to liability. The court expressly reserved the opportunity to extend social host liability to other circumstances when
appropriate.3 9 5 The court acknowledged that it did not face a case
involving a drunken host, a party where many guests congregated, a
lishing intoxication will act to weed out baseless claims and to prevent this cause of
action from being used as a tool for harassment." Id.
391
Marusa v. District of Columbia, 484 F.2d 828, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (tavern
owner liable for injuries resulting from intoxicated patron's intentional shooting of third
party); Taggart v. Bitzenhofer, 33 Ohio St. 2d 35, 294 N.E.2d 226 (1973) (tavern owner
liable for shooting death where bartender served intoxicated patron who had placed
pistol on bar and threatened to shoot); Prevatt v. McClennan, 201 So. 2d 780, 780-81
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (tavern owner liable for injuries to third party resulting from
negligent shooting by intoxicated person).
392
Morrissey v. Sheedy, 26 App. Div. 2d 683, 683, 272 N.Y.S.2d 430, 431-32 (1966)
(cause of action lies against tavern owner who served intoxicated patron who thereafter
assaulted another patron).
393 In Griesenbeck v. Walker, 199 N.J. Super. 132, 488 A.2d 1038 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1985), the New Jersey Superior Court, citing Kelly, refused to hold social hosts
liable to third parties for injuries which did not result from the guest's drunken driving.
In Griesenbeck the intoxicated guest, after arriving home, allegedly caused a fire by leaving a cigarette burning in a sofa. The court reasoned that the hosts could not be expected to foresee the sequence of events which led to the deaths and injuries. Id. at 136,
488 A.2d at 1042.
394 E.g., Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, 46 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966) (recovery
permitted for wrongful death of plaintiff's husband who died as a result of injuries incurred in fall in defendant's tavern). See supra notes 289-95 and accompanying text; see
also Ramsey v. Anctil, 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965) (tavern liable for injury caused
when patron slammed his fist on bar and severed nerve in his hand).
See generally Keenan, supra note 370, at 73; Note, Dram Shop Liability-A Judicial Response, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 995, 1005 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Note,Judicial Response];
Note, Beyond the Dram Shop Act: Imposition of Common-Law Liability on Purveyors of Liquor, 63
IOWA L. REv. 1282, 1294 (1978); Note, Liquor Vendor Liabilityfor Injuries Caused By Intoxicated Patrons-A Question of Policy, 35 OHio ST. L.J. 630, 642-43 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Note, A Question of Policy].
395
96 NJ. at 556, 476 A.2d at 1228.
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host busily occupied with other responsibilities, or guests who
served each other.3 9 6 Analysis of these four possible situations
reveals some of the questions that the Kelly court left unanswered
and highlights several factual variables that may affect the outcome
of future cases.
As Justice Garibaldi noted in her dissent, social hosts frequently
drink with their guests, thus reducing their ability to evaluate a
guest's level of intoxication.3 97 The dissent suggested that social
hosts could evade liability by becoming drunk themselves.3 98 In response to such an argument, one commentator has suggested that a
host's duty not to serve alcohol to a visibly intoxicated guest necessarily places an obligation on the host to effectively supervise the
guest's consumption of alcohol. 3 99 A host, therefore, must limit his
own consumption of alcohol in order to retain the ability to supervise his guests and properly assess their level of sobriety. It does
not seem unreasonable nor inconsistent with the policy and rationale of the Kelly rule to place this additional obligation on one who
engages in an activity which creates a risk to public safety. Furthermore, this obligation would prevent the host from deliberately becoming intoxicated to evade the responsibility imposed by the Kelly
decision.
The court also recognized two other common situations in
which its rule may not apply: a large social gathering with many
guests in attendance and a gathering where the host is busy with
other responsibilities and consequently has little face-to-face contact
with the guests. 40 0 A host's ability to supervise the amount of liquor
consumption by his guests will obviously be diminished in these situations because he will not necessarily be in a position to observe or
restrain every guest who chooses to have a drink. 40 1 No case has yet
imposed social host liability for serving an adult under such circumstances, and an extension of liability to these circumstances would
place a heavy burden on the host of a large party, who would most
likely need assistance in order to adequately supervise all of the
guests in attendance. The outcome of such cases may depend upon
Id.
Id. at 566-67, 476 A.2d at 1234 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Justice Garibaldi
stated that the Zaks drank with their guest, but the majority opinion does not mention
this fact. Id.
398
Id.
399
Keenan, supra note 370, at 69. Keenan states that "undoubtedly, such a duty...
places additional obligations upon the social host in order to effectively police the [alcohol] consumption of his guests. The host, for example, should not permit himself to
become intoxicated." Id.
400 96 NJ. at 556, 476 A.2d at 1228.
396
397

401 Note, Extension of the Dramshop Act, New Found Liability of the Social Host, 49 N.D.L.
REv. 67, 80 (1972).
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a close examination of the particular circumstances of the case and
the imposition of liability in these circumstances would require a
modification of the direct service requirement.
Curiously, the final factual setting which the Kelly court failed to
resolve is the situation where guests serve alcoholic beverages to
each other.40 2 The court's failure to resolve this situation is somewhat surprising because the direct service requirement appears to
absolve the host under these circumstances. By including a situation where guests serve one another as a potential variable to be
considered in future cases, the court cast even more doubt on the
direct service requirement and further increased the uncertainty en40 3
gendered by its decision.
3.

PolicyJustifications

The Kelly court advanced two policy considerations to justify its
decision to impose liability on social hosts. First, the court believed
that its decision would increase the likelihood that victims of drunk
drivers would be fairly compensated for their injuries. 40 4 Although
some authorities contend that the compensatory effects of social
host liability are minimal because the injured party has a direct remedy against the intoxicated driver40 5 and the Kelly court did not offer
any empirical evidence in support of its argument, 40 6 the court's argument is well founded. Drunk drivers are not always sufficiently
40 7
insured to fully compensate those injured by their negligence.
Allowing recovery against a social host as well as the intoxicated
40 8
driver provides a greater opportunity for complete recovery.
Second, the court asserted that the rule would advance the goal
of deterring drunken driving.40 9 The court placed less emphasis on
the goal of deterrence than that of compensation, however, because
it had "no assurance that [the rule would] have any significant [deKelly, 96 NJ. at 556, 476 A.2d at 1228.
See supra notes 377-80 and accompanying text.
96 NJ. at 551, 476 A.2d at 1226.
404
See, e.g, Olsen v. Copeland, 90 Wis. 2d 483, 280 N.W.2d 178, 181 (1979) ("The
405
problem presented by this issue is not one of the adequate remedies for an injured
plaintiff.").
406 The court admitted that it did not know how often the victim would require compensation from the host in order to be made whole. 96 NJ. at 558, 476 A.2d at 1229.
See Note,Judicial Response, supra note 394, at 996.
407
Comment, supra note 360, at 232 ("shifting the responsibility from a negligent
408
driver, who may have no insurance or only the statutory minimum coverage, to liquor
suppliers who have greater access to larger amounts of insurance, would clearly increase
the chances of recovery") (footnote omitted). See also Note, A Question of Policy, supra note
394, at 648 (availability of compensation from tavern owners would assure compensation for the acts of intoxicated person).
96 N.J. at 551, 476 A.2d at 1226.
409
402
403
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terrent] effect." 4 10 Perhaps the court underestimated the deterrent
effects of the decision. The fear of economic liability is likely to induce hosts to take greater care in serving alcoholic beverages at social gatherings.
The Kelly decision holds the host and the intoxicated guest
jointly and severally liable. 4 11 The host's potential liability should
not reduce the deterrent effect on the drinker, however, because the
drinker remains liable for the full damage award. Even if the addition of a defendant who may share the burden of compensating the
victim were to reduce the deterrent effect upon the drinker, the
overall deterrent effect increases when both parties are held liable.4 12 It is probable that when "[t]wo parties polic[e] alcohol con-

sumption, each with the power to stop it, [they] increase the
'41 3
probability that abuses will be prevented.
An examination of the operation of the Kelly rule, however, indicates that the decision may only deter drunk driving in the most
severe cases of intoxication. Kelly does not require that the host determine whether the guest has reached the point of legal intoxication. Rather, civil liability arises only if the social host continues to
4 14
serve alcohol to a guest who already appears visibly intoxicated.
A person will often be legally intoxicated and suffer impaired driv4 15
ing abilities well before his intoxication is apparent to others.
Under Kelly, if the guest departs prior to reaching the point of visible intoxication, the host is not liable for injuries to third parties
resulting from the guest's drunken driving. Consequently, social
host liability, as formulated by the Kelly court, will help prevent only
the most dangerous guests from driving while intoxicated. 4 16
Id.
96 NJ. at 559, 476 A.2d at 1230.
412
Note, supra note 360, at 731 & n.49 (courts considering dual civil liability have
found overall increase in deterrence).
The deterrent effects of Kelly may be particularly strong because New Jersey has no
statutory provision imposing criminal sanctions on social hosts who serve adult guests.
In states which have such a statute, the deterrent effect of a civil cause of action would
merely add to the deterrent effects of the criminal provision.
413
Id. at 731 (footnote omitted).
414 Kelly, 96 NJ. at 556, 476 A.2d at 1228.
415
The level of legal intoxication in New Jersey and in most states is .10% or more
by weight of alcohol in the blood. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50(a) (West Supp. 1984). Expert testimony presented in Ewing v. Cloverleaf Bowl, 20 Cal. 3d 389, 398, 572 P.2d
1155, 1158, 143 Cal. Rptr. 13, 17 (1978) demonstrated that a casual observer can normally detect signs of intoxication only when the level of alcohol in the person's blood
exceeds .20%. See Note, supra note 401, at 80.
416
Because of the uncertainty of the Kelly rule, the decision could have a chilling
effect on host behavior, adding to the deterrent effect. This is because risk-averse hosts
may stop serving alcohol well before their guests are visibly intoxicated.
410
411
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4. JudicialImposition of Social Host Liability
The court's imposition of social host liability without a statutory
basis constitutes one of the most controversial aspects of the Kelly
decision. The decision provoked charges that the court infringed
on the legislative domain41 7 and prompted the introduction of a bill
and a resolution in the New Jersey legislature. 4 18 With the exception of Linn v. Rand4 19 and Figuly v. Knoll,420 each New Jersey decision imposing civil liability prior to Kelly involved a violation of an
alcoholic beverage control statute or regulation. 4 21 Although these
enactments provided for criminal liability only, the court deemed
their existence as a sufficient indication of legislative policy to form
the basis for the imposition of civil liability on commercial licensees. 4 22 The Kelly court did not attempt to extend statutory or regu417
New Jersey State Bar president WilliamJ. Brennan III said that the court might
be infringing on the legislature by "substituting its view of what's best for NewJersey for
that of the elected representatives." Nat'l L.J., Nov. 5, 1984, at 39, col. 3.
418
Senate Bill No. 2122 may have been derived from one of the dissent's alternative
suggestions. S. 2122, 201 Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 1984). The bill states that a social host
would only be liable if he or she "willfully and knowingly, manifesting extreme indifference to the rights of others, served the alcoholic beverages to a person who was visibly
intoxicated in his presence, and who he knew or should have known would operate a
motor vehicle reasonably soon thereafter."
Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 116 would establish "a commission to study the
duties, responsibilities and liabilities of private and licensed servers of alcohol beverages" and to "recommend ways to reduce alcohol-related accidents and provide compensation for victims of these accidents." S. Con. Res. 116, 201 Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J.
1984).
Assembly Bill No. 43, introduced prior to Kelly, would exempt "social hosts from
civil liability for injuries caused by adult consumers of alcoholic beverages served by
them." A.43, 201 Leg., 1st Sess. (NJ. 1984). It would not preclude the imposition of
civil liability on licensees or anyone who served a minor. Thus, this bill would implicitly
approve of the liability imposed in Rappaport, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1, Soronen, 46 N.J.
582, 218 A.2d 630, and Linn, 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15, but would overrule Kelly.
419
140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (1976). In Linn there was no applicable criminal restriction from which the court could derive a duty. That case, however, involved
service of alcoholic beverages to a minor. The dissent in Kelly argued that Linn could be
distinguished from Kelly because "minors occupy a special place in our society and traditionally have been protected by state regulation from the consequences of their own
immaturity." Kelly, 96 N.J. at 561 n.1, 476 A.2d at 1230-31 n.1 (Garibaldi, J.,
dissenting).
420
185 N.J. Super. 477, 449 A.2d 564 (1982). Figuly can be distinguished in part
because the host had previously worked as a bartender and knew the effects of alcohol
upon persons. See supra notes 314-17 and accompanying text.
421
See, e.g., Aliulis v. Tunnel Hill Corp., 59 N.J. 508, 284 A.2d 180 (1971); Soronen
v. Olde Milford Inn, 46 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J.
188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
422
Other jurisdictions have grounded civil liability in the violation of administrative
or penal provisions regulating alcohol. See supra notes 129-206 and accompanying text.
Judicial imposition of civil liability based upon criminal statutes, however, is not
universally accepted. Many jurisdictions hold that the purpose of the restrictions is to
regulate the business of selling intoxicants and not to create a civil remedy or impose a
duty on the part of the provider of alcoholic beverages toward injured third parties.
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latory coverage to social hosts; instead, the court based its decision
423
solely on common law negligence principles.
The fundamental question faced by the court in Kelly was
whether the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff not to
serve liquor to a visibly intoxicated guest.424 According to Prosser,
"the problem of duty is as broad as the whole law of negligence, and
• . . no universal test for it ever has been formulated. ' 4 25 Courts
generally consider many factors in determining whether to create a
426

duty.

In support of its decision, the Kelly court relied primarily on the
strong legislative policy against drunk driving. 4 27 The court also
sensed a change in social attitudes and drinking customs, noting
that "society. . . has finally recognized that it must change its habits and do whatever is required . . . in order to stop the senseless
loss inflicted by drunken drivers. '4 28 The dissent's arguments
against the imposition of a duty and the rejection of a similar cause
of action by nearly every other jurisdiction in the country demonstrate that although the goal itself may not be controversial, authorities disagree about the appropriate means to accomplish the goal.
a. Legislative Intent. The majority in Kelly advanced three arguments to support its claim that the decision comports with legislative policy. First, the court noted the absence of a dramshop act in
New Jersey. The existence of an act imposing civil liability only on
licensees would indicate a legislative intent not to impose liability on
others, such as social hosts. 4 29 Second, the court observed that the
legislature had recently strengthened the state's criminal sanctions
against drunken drivers. 43 0 Third, the NewJersey judiciary had continued to expand the liability of a server of alcoholic beverages since
the landmark decision in Rappaport.43 l Because the legislature was
aware of these decisions and had not disapproved them, the court
43 2
concluded that the decision did not contravene legislative policy.
The majority interpreted the absence of a dramshop act as eviNote, Social Host Liabilityfor Injuries Caused by the Acts of an Intoxicated Guest, 59 N.D.L. REv.
445, 462-69 (1983).
423 96 NJ. at 545-47, 476 A.2d at 1222-23.
424

The New Jersey Supreme Court had removed problems of proximate causation

as a bar to liability in Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 NJ. 199, 156 A.2d 1 (1959). See supra text
accompanying note 282.
425

W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 285, § 53.

426
427
428
429
430
431

See id.
96 NJ. at 545, 476 A.2d at 1222.
Id. at 558-59, 476 A.2d at 1229.
Id. at 554, 476 A.2d at 1227.
Id. at 545, 476 A.2d at 1222.
Id. at 553, 476 A.2d at 1226.

432

Id.
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dence that the imposition of liability on social hosts would not contradict legislative policy. Courts in other jurisdictions, however,
have construed the enactment of an alcoholic beverage control act
without a civil liability provision as evidence of legislative intent not
to impose civil liability. 4 33 In Holmes v. Circo4 34 the Nebraska
Supreme Court noted that the Nebraska legislature had repealed a
dramshop act in 1935 and enacted the Nebraska Liquor Control Act
in its place. 43 5 The Liquor Control Act regulated the sale of alcoholic beverages to the public, but did not impose civil liability on
sellers of alcohol for injuries to patrons or third persons. The court
in Holmes ruled that the enactment of the Liquor Control Act, and
the repeal of the dramshop act, indicated a legislative intent to bar a
43 6
civil cause of action.
The Kelly court, however, correctly viewed civil liability as an
area of legislative silence rather than legislative preemption. The
New Jersey legislature repealed its civil liability provision when it
repealed the entire liquor code at the end of prohibition. 43 7 The
dramshop act established broad liability, imposing strict liability on
sellers of alcohol and subjecting them to compensatory and punitive
damages. 438 Thus, it is unclear whether the legislature would have
abolished the more limited liability now imposed by Kelly. In addition, the repeal did not expressly preclude common law negligence
causes of action.4 3 9 Consequently, the repeal of the dramshop act
440
does not indicate a legislative intent to bar all civil liability.
Faced with legislative silence on civil liability, the Kelly majority
looked to the state's criminal provisions for an indication of legislative intent. The Kelly court reasoned that the legislature's strong
criminal sanctions against drunk driving supported the court's decision to create a new civil cause of action. 44 ' The dissent rejected
this argument, pointing to a bill passed by the legislature in 1984
which imposed a criminal penalty on a social host who serves alcohol to a minor. 44 2 Because the legislature did not enact a similar
433
Some courts in states without dramshop acts have based their rejection of liability on the argument that their legislatures are aware of the existence of dramshop acts in
other states. The absence of such statutes in these states would therefore reveal legislative intent to preclude judicial action in this area. See Keenan, supra note 370, at 48-49.
434
196 Neb. 496, 244 N.W.2d 65 (1976).
435 Id. at 498-99, 244 N.W.2d at 67.
436
Id. at 504, 244 N.W.2d at 70. See also Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76
Wash. 2d 759, 761, 458 P.2d 897, 898 (1969) (similar interpretation of more recent
repeal of dramshop act).
437
See supra notes 269-72 and accompanying text.
438
See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
439
See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
440
Koloff, supra note 285, at 43.
441
96 NJ. at 545, 476 A.2d at 1222.
442 Id. at 569, 476 A.2d at 1235.
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provision imposing criminal liability on social hosts who serve adult
guests, the dissent argued that the creation of a civil cause of action
against social hosts who serve alcohol to adult guests contravened
443
legislative intent.
Neither the majority nor the dissent successfully invoked the
legislature's intent. The New Jersey legislature has simply not spoken on the topic of civil liability for social hosts, and legislative silence does not reliably indicate legislative intent. 4 44 The absence of
a criminal statute prohibiting social hosts from serving visibly intoxicated adult guests does not necessarily mean that the legislature
disapproves of civil liability. Neither does the legislature's imposition of strict sanctions on drunk drivers indicate that the legislature
would approve of social host liability as an alternative means of
deterrence.
The majority's final argument, that the legislature had not responded adversely to the judiciary's earlier expansions of liability in
the same general area, is weak for several reasons. First, Kelly significantly expands social host liability beyond the liability imposed in
earlier NewJersey decisions. Consequently, the lack of adverse legislative reaction to those decisions may not accurately predict the
legislative reaction to this decision. Second, the argument that legislative inaction constitutes tacit approval of the judicial status quo
requires the questionable assumption that legislatures review court
445
decisions to insure conformity with current legislative values.
Thus, whether the NewJersey legislature will support the Kelly decision remains an open question.
b. Legitimacy of Judicial Action. Despite its tenuous legislative
intent arguments, the New Jersey Supreme Court acted within its
authority when deciding Kelly. Many authorities support the Kelly
court's assertion that "[d]eterminations of the scope of duty in neg'4 46
ligence cases has traditionally been a function of the judiciary.
This statement also holds true for the issue which Kelly decided.
The New Jersey courts had been expanding the civil liability of liquor providers for over twenty-five years. 4 47 During this time, the
New Jersey legislature enacted no legislation concerning such civil
liability. Thus, the court did not invade a legislative domain. FiId.
Note, Judicial Response, supra note 394, at 1008-09.
445 Williams, Statutes as Sources of Law Beyond Their Terms in Common Law Cases, 50 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 554, 567 (1982).
446 96 NJ. at 552, 476 A.2d at 1226. See, e.g., Greene, The Thrust of Tort Law PartII:
JudicialLaw Making, 64 W. VA. L. REv. 115, 117 (1962); Peck, The Role of the Courts and
Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. REV. 265, 285 (1963).
447 See supra notes 265-317 and accompanying text (tracing development of civil liability for sellers and servers of alcoholic beverages in New Jersey).
443
444
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nally, the court recognized that if the legislature does not agree with
the decision, it has the power to abrogate or modify it.448
III
CHOOSING A SYSTEM OF LIABILITY

4 49
The first section of this Project discussed dramshop acts,

beverage control acts, 450 and ordinary negligence principles 4 5 1 as

methods of imposing liability on social hosts. This section of the
Project will examine the merits of each. Part A will discuss the cost
of insurance under the three choices of liability. Part B will then
examine problems with the negligence standard adopted in Kelly v.
Gwinnell. Next, part C will attempt to predict the legislative response to each method. Finally, part D will present alternatives to
the negligence standard established by the courts.
A.

The Cost of Insurance Under the Three Methods
of Liability

An important goal of imposing liability is to reduce the costs
associated with accidents. 4 52 Courts have expressed concern that
social host liability will lead to higher insurance costs. 45 3 Hosts may
find it less expensive to insure against liability under a negligence
standard than under a dramshop act. How social host liability under
a beverage control act would affect insurance rates is less clear, however. This section attempts to determine which method of liability is
the least expensive to insure under.
448 Kelly, 96 NJ. at 555, 476 A.2d at 1227.
449 See supra notes 102-26 and accompanying text.
450 See supra notes 129-206 and accompanying text.
451 See supra notes 207-56 and accompanying text.
452 See Schmalz, Superfunds and Tort Law Reforms-Are They Insurable?, 38 Bus. LAw.
175, 179 (1982). According to Professor Calabresi, "it [is] axiomatic that the principal
function of accident law is to reduce the sum of the costs of accidents and the cost of
avoiding accidents." G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS Or ACcIDErTS (1970). Other scholars
agree that accident cost reduction is an aim of tort law. See C. MORRIS & C.R. MORRIS,
JR., MORIS ON TORTS 246-53 (1953); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 148-49, 659-60 (4th
ed. 1971); Henderson, Extending the Boundaries of Strict Products Liability: Implications of the
Theoy of the Second Best, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1036, 1038 n.7 (1980) (citing 2 F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 12.4 (1956)).
There is no evidence that adopting a stricter standard of care will prevent accidents.
Professor Posner suggests that a choice between strict liability and negligence will not
affect the number of accidents because individuals will adopt accident prevention methods only if the methods are cost effective. Regardless of whether the individual is held
to a strict liability or negligence standard this cost-benefit analysis will be the same. R.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw § 6.11, at 137-38 (2d ed. 1977). But see Calabresi &
Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE LJ. 1055, 1074-76 (1972)
(attributing trend towards strict liability to its superior ability to minimize sum of accident and avoidance costs).
453 See infra notes 470-71 and accompanying text.
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1. Insurance Under a Dramshop Act
Most social hosts who are exposed to liability will purchase insurance for protection against large losses. 45 4 As the probability of
loss increases, however, the cost of insurance approaches the cost of
the loss. 4 55 At some point, "loss becomes so certain that either the
insurer withdraws the protection or the cost of the premium becomes prohibitive, or both." 45 6 Dramshop acts impose strict liability on hosts 4 57 and are therefore likely to result in higher premiums
than would occur under a negligence regime. According to one expert, "strict liability systems . . . can easily run out of control.
They can make it impossible for private insurers to provide high4 58
limit liability coverage at reasonable cost."
The experience of tavern owners with strict liability under a
beverage control act can help predict how it might affect a social
host's ability to insure. Before the California state legislature abrogated both social host and tavern owner liability, 4 5 9 tavern owners
were concerned that the liability imposed on them under a beverage
control act would put them out of business due to the high cost of
insurance. 4 60 Between approximately 1971 and 1979, for example,
one California tavern owner's premium climbed from $10,000 to
$190,000.461 About one-third of California's 25,000 tavern owners
462
chose to risk liablity rather than pay the high premium.
Even if a tavern owner does have dramshop liability insurance,
the policy may not cover all claims. A tavern owner's policy may
exclude coverage when the insured has violated a beverage control
act.4 65 Some policies relieve the insurer of liability if the insured
sold or gave alcohol to a minor. 4 64 Others exclude coverage of inju454
See generally M. GREENE, RISK AND INSURANCE 58 (3d ed. 1973) (potential loss to
insured must warrant cost of protection).
455 Id.
456 Id. According to Greene, "if the chance of loss is greater than 50%, the insurer
finds it impossible to offer the protection because the premium becomes too great to be
worth it to the insured." Id. at 58-59.
457
See supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
458 Schmalz, supra note 452, at 192. Schmalz contends that some critics of the tort
liability system advocate strict liability because it compensates more tort victims by reducing the burden of proof at trial and eroding the proximate cause requirement.
Schmalz argues that "such a course ... risks unmanageable costs and insurance crises."
Id. at 178-79.
459
See supra notes 188-201 and accompanying text.
460
See Note, CaliforniaLiquor Liability: Who's to Pay the Costs, 15 CAL. W.L. REv. 490,
531 (1980).
461
Note, supra note 360, at 745 n.146.
462 Id. Proponents of the California bill immunizing tavern owners and social hosts
argued that passage of the bill would decrease insurance rates for both groups. Id. at
745 n. 148.
463
464

7AJ. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw AND PRACTICE § 4507, at 331 (1979).

Id. at 330.
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ries resulting from sales to habitual drunkards. 4 65 If policies go so
far as to "exclude injuries resulting from wilful and wanton acts of
the insured, a huge number of instances in which tavern keepers or
46 6
owners would be rendered liable would be excepted thereby."
Each tavern owner's coverage and exclusions will depend on his
specific policy; thus, it may be misleading to generalize as to the
extent of coverage. Policies available to social hosts, however, are
likely to contain similar exclusions, leaving the insured exposed to
some risks. Because social hosts as a group serve fewer drinks than
tavern owners, they will probably experience fewer accidents per insured; as a result, cost spreading would lower social host premiums.
Also, an injured third party is more likely to sue the tavern owner
because his business is more likely to have the resources to cover
the judgment. 4 67 The host is a less likely target, especially if it is
known that he has few assets or is uninsured. Thus, social hosts'
premiums would not escalate as fast as tavern owners' premiums
under a strict liability scheme.
Commentators generally agree, however, that social host liability should not be imposed by dramshop acts. 4 68 Whereas tavern
owners can pass the cost of insurance to their customers in the form
of higher prices, social hosts cannot. Some courts have cited this
factor as a reason for immunizing social hosts from liability. 4 69 In
Lowe v. Rubin 4 70 the Appellate Court of Illinois refused to create a
common law negligence cause of action against a social host because
Id.
Id.
Some states require tavern owners to post bonds or carry liability insurance. See
supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
468 See Graham, supra note 68, at 568 (arguing for negligence standard); see also Note,
supra note 422, at 458 (noting that courts find extension of strict liability to social hosts
unfair); Note, supra note 401, at 80 (listing factors weighing against social host liability);
Comment, supra note 364, at 115.
469 The focus of this discussion is on selecting the most cost effective method of
liability, not whether liability should be imposed at all. The reasoning of the cases cited
is applicable because, if courts are reluctant to hold social hosts to a negligence standard
because of their inability to pass on the cost of insurance, they will be even more reluctant to hold hosts to the stricter standard of dramshop acts.
One commentator disagrees with the proposition that it is fair to hold tavern owners and social hosts to different liability standards merely because tavern owners can
pass on the higher premium costs to their customers. See Note, supra note 360, at 745.
He argues that neither group can afford the cost of insurance. "mhe inability of either
group to afford insurance coverage suggests that liability should not attach at all, rather
than that licensees should be held liable while hosts should not." Id. This argument
only addresses whether to impose liability on social hosts. If, however, courts and legislators are choosing a method of liability, a tavern owner's ability to pass on the cost of
insurance is a useful distinction. The author also argues that it is the availabilityof insurance, not the ability to spread its cost, which is the more important element in the decision to impose liability. Id. at 745 n.149.
470
98 Ill. App. 3d 496, 424 N.E.2d 710 (1981).
465
466
467
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the social host, unlike the tavern owner, " 'receives no pecuniary
gain for providing alcoholic beverages to his guest and will have to
personally absorb the cost of insurance or other security.' -471 Similarly, the California Supreme Court in Cory v. Shierloh 47 2 acknowledged that "licensees are in a better position to defray the costs of
liability and insurance than the usual 'social host' or other unli4 73
censed provider."
2.

Insurance Under a Beverage Control Act

Although the cost of social host liability insurance would be
higher under a dramshop act than a negligence standard, insurance
rates might not be higher under a beverage control act than under a
negligence standard. In general, beverage control acts forbid the
sale or gift of intoxicating liquor to minors or obviously intoxicated
persons. 474 Courts have interpreted these criminal misdemeanor
statutes as establishing the duty of care for civil liability. 4 75 Courts
4 76
generally hold that violation of the statutes is negligence per se.
Some courts have not allowed the defendant to assert the defense of due care once a violation of the statute is shown. 4 7 7 Courts
that recognize no excuses for the violation are in effect applying a
strict liability standard, although they "not infrequently continue,
out of habit, to speak of the violation as 'negligence per se.' "478
Prohibiting the defense of due care makes it easier for plaintiffs to
prevail at trial. Thus, insurance would be more expensive for social
hosts when a beverage control act, rather than a negligence standard, imposed liability.
Some courts, however, hold that beverage control act violations
are only rebuttable evidence of negligence. 4 79 These cases are,
therefore, almost indistinguishable from cases decided under com471 Id. at 499, 424 N.E.2d at 713 (quoting DeMoulon & Whitcomb, Social Host's Liability in FurnishingAlcoholic Beverages, 27 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 347, 357 (1977)).
472 29 Cal. 3d 430, 629 P.2d 8, 174 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1981).
473 Id. at 441, 629 P.2d at 14, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 506. Cory upheld the constitutionality
of the 1978 amendments to California's liquor laws. The amendments immunized social
hosts from liability and created a limited cause of action against licensees who furnish
alcohol to minors. See infra text accompanying note 581.
474 See supra notes 129-37 and accompanying text.
475 Note, supra note 422, at 459; see also supra notes 145-63 and accompanying text.
476 Note, supra note 422, at 459-60; see, e.g., Brattain v. Herron, 159 Ind. App. 663,
309 N.E.2d 150 (1974) (violation is negligence per se); see also supra notes 138-44 and
accompanying text.
477 See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 285, at 227; see also Note, Social Host
Liabilityfor FurnishingLiquor-Findinga Basisfor Recovery in Kentucky, 3 N. Ky. L. REv. 229,
238 (1976) (discussing violation of liquor control statute as basis for social host liability).
478 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 285, at 227.
479
See id.; see also, e.g., Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d 18
(1968) (violation of statute is some evidence of defendant's negligence).
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mon law negligence principles.480 Thus, whether hosts will face
higher insurance premiums under a beverage control act than under
a negligence standard will depend on the effect given to statutory
violations as proof of negligence. To the extent that it is easier to
prove the defendant's negligence, insurance premiums will be
higher.
3.

Insurance Under Ordinary Negligence Principles

Of the three methods of imposing social host liability, courts
should choose negligence as the most cost effective. Dramshop acts
set too high a standard, and beverage control acts were designed to
regulate licensees rather than social hosts.4 8 ' Even under a negligence standard, however, insurance may still be too expensive or
unavailable.
In Coulter v. Superior Court of San Mateo County 48 2 the Supreme
Court of California cited insurance as a factor supporting the imposition of social host liability. 48 3 The court assumed that "insurance
coverage (doubtless increasingly costly) will be made available to
protect the social host from civil liability." 48 4 The New Jersey
Supreme Court in Kelly v. Gwinnel14 8 5 also discussed the insurance
issue. Responding to the concern that the extent of potential liability may be disproportionate to the fault of the host, the court as480 See, e.g, Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959). In Rappaport the
NewJersey Supreme Court stated that a violation of the state's beverage control act was
admissible as "evidence of the defendants' negligence." Id. at 203, 156 A.2d at 9. The
court held that each of the defendants was "at liberty to assert that it did not know or
have reason to believe that its patron was a minor." Id. Thus, the court allowed the
defense of due care, as it would have in any other negligence case. See also Linn v. Rand,
140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (plaintiff must show that
defendant knew or should have known that patron was a minor). Cf. Deeds v. United
States, 306 F. Supp. 348 (D. Mont. 1969) (violation of criminal statute is negligence per
se, but court considered intent, proximate cause, and defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk).
481
See, e.g., Manning v. Andy, 454 Pa. 237, 310 A.2d 75 (1973) (only licensed persons engaged in sale of intoxicants can be held liable under beverage control statute);
Hulse v. Driver, 11 Wash. App. 509, 524 P.2d 255 (1974) (refusing to apply beverage
control statute to social setting).
482 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978); see also supra notes 18894 and accompanying text.
483 Id. at 153, 577 P.2d at 674, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 539.
484 Id. The Coulter court adopted a portion of the reasoning of Rowland v. Christian,
69 Cal. 2d 108, 113, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1968), as support for
using the availability of insurance, in addition to foreseeability, as a factor in determining the existence of a duty to third persons. The Rowland court used the assumed existence of insurance to determine whether a possessor of land should receive immunity.
The Rowland court maintained that "there is no persuasive evidence that applying ordinary principles of negligence law to the land occupier's liability will materially reduce
the prevalence of insurance due to increased cost or even substantially increase the
cost." Id. at 118, 443 P.2d at 567-68, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 103-04.
485 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
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social host

liability. 48 6 The majority acknowledged, however, that homeowners

and apartment dwellers would have to pay an additional premium
48 7
for such coverage.
The dissent in Kelly strongly challenged the majority's assumption that insurance would be readily available. 48 8 Justice Garibaldi
stated that "many homeowners and apartment renters may not even
have homeowner's insurance" and those that do may not be able to
48 9
afford the increased premium.
Justice Garibaldi's challenge to the majority's assumption that
social hosts can insure against liability is persuasive if one looks at
the experience of tavern owners. If, as with tavern owners, premiums become increasingly costly, many social hosts may choose to
remain uninsured. 4 90 Even if reasonably-priced insurance is initially
available, affordable rates which are also profitable for the insurer
may disappear once plaintiffs begin to win large judgments. 4 9 1 Insurance companies will not continue to sell the insurance if it is no
longer profitable. 4 92 As one commentator put it, "[s]o long as control of the actual availability of insurance lies almost wholly in the
hands of the insurers, . . . all assumptions are precarious." 493 Furthermore, predicting the expense and availability of social host liability insurance will remain difficult until juries deliver judgments
against hosts.
Id. at 549-50, 476 A.2d at 1225.
Id. at 550 n.9, 476 A.2d at 1225 n.9.
488
Id. at 568, 476 A.2d at 1234-35 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The dissent made this
objection despite the parties' acknowledgement that homeowners' insurance would
cover social host liability. Id. at 550 n.9, 476 A.2d at 1225 n.9. The majority's assumption that homeowners' insurance will cover host liability is correct. See Ins. Information
Inst. Fact Sheet at 6 (Aug. 1984). Most policies, however, exclude "business pursuits,"
so the social host may need additional coverage if he or she is entertaining customers or
clients at home. Id. Furthermore, insurers might withdraw social host liability if plaintiffs recover large verdicts. See supra notes 454-58 and accompanying text.
489 96 NJ. at 568, 476 A.2d at 1235 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
490 See Comment, Coulter v. Superior Court of San Mateo County and Its Legislative
Abrogation: The Common Law Liability of the Social Host, 23 ST. Louis U.LJ. 612, 627
(1979).
491 One commentator has noted the conflict between a public policy imposing liability on the assumption that insurance exists and the private financial interests of the insurers. He further argues that because courts assume defendants have insurance, more
cases come into courts than the courts can handle. In addition, because liability insurance coverage often promotes settlement, the tort rules imposed will be only suggestive
and not determinative. See Smith, The Miscegenetic Union of Liability Insuranceand Tort Process in the Personal Injuy Claims System, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 645, 680-81 (1969).
492
See supra note 454 and accompanying text.
493 Smith, supra note 491, at 681. The assumption seems even more precarious in
the cases of apartment renters. A 1981 survey showed that while only 5% of homeowners carry no insurance, 70% of renters are completely uninsured. See Ins. Information
Inst. 1983-84 Ins. Facts at 13 (1983).
486
487
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At the present time, insurance is not prohibitively expensive for
the average host. One author claims that a comprehensive umbrella
liability policy is readily available with premiums ranging from $70 a
year for a $1 million in coverage to $250 for $8 million in
4 94
coverage.
Choosing the most cost effective system of social host liability is
difficult. Insurance premiums would be lower under a negligence
stanadard than under strict liability or a dramshop act standard.
The experience of tavern owners indicates that a strict liability standard will make insurance more expensive for hosts.4 9 5 A beverage
control act standard would also be more costly than a negligence
standard.4 9 6 Although some commentators believe insurance would
become too expensive even under a negligence standard, inexpensive policies covering host liability are currently available. 49 7 Future
availability of inexpensive liability insurance for social hosts will
largely depend on the losses insurers incur as claims are settled or
litigated.
B.

The Common Law Negligence Standard

If courts and legislatures place liability on social hosts, they are
4 98
likely to choose the common law negligence standard of care.
Three court decisions illustrate how courts may use ordinary negligence principles to impose social host liability. In Wiener v. Gamma
Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity4 9 9 the Oregon Supreme
Court held that "[t]here might be circumstances in which the host
would have a duty to deny his guest further access to alcohol." 50 0
Seven years later, in Coulter v. Superior Court of San Mateo County,5 0 1
the California Supreme Court delineated a standard of care by holding that a social host who serves an obviously intoxicated guest who
he knows will be driving creates a "reasonablyforeseeable risk of injury
to those on the highway. '50 2 In Kelly v. Gwinnell5 03 the New Jersey
494
What if You're Suedfor a Million, CHANGING TIMES, Dec. 1984, 83, 84. According
to the author, an umbrella policy includes auto and homeowner or tenant liability insurance in amounts prescribed by the insurer. Currently the policies are inexpensive because the insurers have not had to satisfy many claims. Id. If an individual does not have
auto or residential insurance, he may obtain a comprehensive personal liability policy
for $50-$90 with $500,000 in coverage. Id. at 86.
495 See supra notes 454-73 and accompanying text.
496 See supra notes 474-80 and accompanying text.
497 See supra notes 468, 494 and accompanying text.
498 See Graham, supra note 68, at 588; Note, supra note 422, at 475.
499
258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971).
500
Id. at 639, 485 P.2d at 21.
501
21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978).
502
Id. at 153, 577 P.2d at 674, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 539 (emphasis in original).
503
96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984). For a detailed analysis of Kelly, see Section
II.
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Supreme Court held that a social host who directly served liquor to
an adult guest, knowing both that the guest was visibly intoxicated
and that he would be driving, was liable for injuries inflicted on a
third party as a result of the guest's negligent operation of a motor
50 4
vehicle while intoxicated.
The Coulter court did not expressly require direct service as a
prerequisite to liability, but it held that allegations that the defendant merely aided, abetted, and encouraged the guest to drink in excess failed to state a claim. 50 5 All three courts failed to address the
myriad situations a host might face in attempting to satisfy the standard of care. As the Kelly majority stated,
We are not faced with a party where many guests congregate, nor
with guests serving each other, nor with a host busily occupied
with other responsibilities and therefore unable to attend to the
matter of serving liquor, nor with a drunken host. We will face
those situations when and if they come before us .... 501
This section of the project will analyze some of the concerns relating
to a negligence standard.
Some courts have refused to impose liability on social hosts because of the problems hosts might face in satisfying their duty of
care. In Edgar v. Kajet50 7 a New York court refused to apply New
York's dramshop act 50 8 to a social host who served alcohol to a visibly intoxicated guest, knowing the guest would soon be driving. 50 9
The court questioned the "visibly" or "obviously" intoxicated requirement, indicating that a social host might not know when one of
his guests had reached his level of tolerance. 5 10 The court also
questioned the host's general ability to supervise his guests' social
activities. 5 1 1 Other courts and commentators have criticized the di96 N.J. at 556, 476 A.2d at 1228.
21 Cal. 3d at 155, 577 P.2d at 676, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 541. The court also required some "affirmative" action by the host in serving the guest. Id. at 148, 155, 577
P.2d at 671, 676, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 536, 541.
506
96 N.J. at 556, 476 A.2d at 1228 (citation omitted).
507
84 Misc. 2d 100, 375 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
508
See N.Y. GEN. OBG. LAw § 11-101 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1984).
509 84 Misc. 2d at 103, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 552. The court did not consider applying
any other standard of liability to the host.
510
Id.
511
Id. The Court stated, "The implications are almost limitless as to situations that
might arise when liquor is dispensed at a social gathering, holiday parties, family celebrations, outdoor barbeques and picnics .... ." Id. One Wisconsin court refused to
impose liability on a tavern owner, fearing that such a precedent could lead to social
host liability. See Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724, 176 N.W.2d 566 (1970). The
Garcia court stated in dicta that "extending liability to the noncommercial vendor would
result in great social pressure being applied to such individuals and require their policing the activities of friends and social guests." Id. at 734, 176 N.W.2d at 570. The court
questioned how successfully hosts could accomplish this task. Id.
504
505
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rect service and "obviously intoxicated" requirements, 51 2 pointing
out that the courts adopting these standards have not clearly defined how to apply them.
1.

The Direct Service Requirement

Courts imposing liability on social hosts have not clarified how
to apply the direct service requirement in certain situations. One
commentator has characterized the requirement as an invitation for
social hosts to avoid liability. 5 13 If a host required his guests to
bring their own alcohol to the party, most courts would not require
the host to act affirmatively to control his guests' consumption of
the alcohol. 5 14 Further, hosts may set up self-service bars, or they
may be too busy to supervise their guests' consumption. In Kelly
and Coulter, the hosts directly and continually served their intoxicated guests. 5 15 Thus, the Kelly and Coulter courts correctly found
that the respective hosts had the opportunity to observe their
guests' consumption of alcohol. Neither court, however, addressed
situations in which a host had difficulty monitoring his guests.
Two cases involving licensees illustrate how courts have applied
the direct service requirement. In Peterson v. Jack Donelson Sales Co. 5 16
an Illinois appellate court found that the defendant licensee was
negligent in providing an unattended beer truck for a company picnic. Even though the defendant did not physically serve the beer,
the court concluded that he controlled its distribution. 5 17 The court
held the defendant liable under the Illinois dramshop act. 5 18 A New
Jersey superior court faced a similar problem in Anslinger v. Martinsville Inn.519 In Anslinger the licensee placed bottles of alcohol on a
table for self-service. Finding the licensee not liable because the patron was not visibly intoxicated, 520 the court stated in dicta that "a
See infra notes 513-33 and accompanying text.
See Comment, supra note 364, at 107.
Id.; see also Coffman v. Kennedy, 74 Cal. App. 3d 28, 37, 141 Cal. Rptr. 267, 272
(1977); Calrow v. Appliance Indus., Inc., 49 Cal. App. 3d 556, 568-69, 122 Cal. Rptr.
636, 643 (1975).
515 See Kelly, 96 NJ. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224; Coulter, 21 Cal. 3d at 152-53, 577 P.2d
at 674, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 539. For additional analysis of the direct service requirement,
see supra notes 375-80 and accompanying text.
516 4 Ill.
App. 3d 792, 281 N.E.2d 753 (1972).
517 Id. at 796-97, 281 N.E.2d at 756.
518
liquor Control Act § 14, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (1975). Although dramshop acts apply strict liability principles to the furnisher, they usually require the plaintiff
to show that the defendant "furnished" alcohol to the patron or guest. Therefore, it is
useful to examine how courts have defined "furnishing" when applying dramshop acts
to purveyors of alcohol.
519 121 NJ. Super. 525, 298 A.2d 84 (App. Div. 1972), cert. denied, 62 NJ. 334, 301
A.2d 449 (1973).
520
Id. at 533, 298 A.2d at 88.
512
513
514
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licensee cannot absolve himself from all responsibility simply by
adopting this method of service." 5 2 ' One commentator has argued
52 2
that the Anslinger court's dicta should be extended to social hosts.
Thus, when a host sets up a "fix-your-own" drink bar, he assumes
523
the risk of being unable to monitor his guests' behavior.
Requiring a host to directly serve each guest may be unrealistic
under some circumstances. For example, the host may have a large
party, making it practically impossible for him to directly serve each
guest. The Peterson and Anslinger cases suggest that because courts
hold licensees liable even absent direct service, social hosts may also
be liable without direct service. On the other hand, these cases also
support the conclusion that the courts should hold the licensee to a
higher standard in controlling alcohol. 524 Courts will more readily
apply strict liability principles to the licensee because he is making a
52 5
profit and can better absorb the costs of liability.
2.

The Visibly Intoxicated Requirement

By requiring direct service as an element of social host liability,
the Kelly court implicitly made it easier for the host to observe his
guest and determine whether he is intoxicated. As the court observed in Edgar v. Kajet,5 26 however, a host may not know when his
guest is intoxicated. One commentator contends that a host has no
52 7
criteria to rely on in making a decision whether to serve his guest.
As this commentator notes, "a state of obvious intoxication is a condition that is very susceptible to after-the-fact interpretations ...
[T]he determination that an individual is obviously intoxicated [is]
5 28
not so obvious after all."
A comparison of the relative abilities of tavern owners and social hosts to observe "obvious" intoxication is inconclusive. A tavern owner, unlike a social host, may have more experience in
Id. at 532, 298 A.2d at 87.
See Note, supra note 360, at 743.
Id.
See supra notes 468-73 and accompanying text.
Excusing social hosts from liability for self-serve bars may lead to more accidents. If hosts know that they will escape liability if they arrange a self-serve bar, they
may exercise even less control over a guest's consumption. As Professor Henderson
states, "[w]henever a proposed boundary extension distinguishes among substitutable
activities, consumers at the margin will move away from the . . . activities included
within the boundaries of. . . liability, the prices of which more adequately reflect their
true accident costs, and toward the excluded substitutes, the prices of which do not."
See Henderson, supra note 452, at 1037-38 (citation omitted). Thus, guests may drink
more at a self-serve bar, increasing the risk of an accident.
526
84 Misc. 2d 100, 375 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1975). See supra text accompanying
note 510.
See Comment, supra note 364, at 103.
527
528
Id. (citations omitted).
521
522
523
524
525
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observing the signs of intoxication and thus may more readily determine the appropriate time to cut off the supply of alcohol. In addition, a social host might drink with his guests and thus not be sober
enough to recognize his guests' obvious intoxication. Because the
commercial purveyor does not usually drink with his customer, he
can better monitor the customer's drinking. 5 29 In many instances,
however, the tavern owner may have more difficulty observing his
customers' degree of intoxication. For example, one patron may order a pitcher of beer for many others, or a cocktail waitress may
serve different individuals throughout the course of an evening.
Some taverns get so crowded that bartenders never have face-toface encounters with many customers.
In People v. Johnson53 0 a California court considered the responsibility placed on a tavern owner to detect obvious intoxication. The
defendant violated California's Alcoholic Beverage Control Act by
serving a customer who was "obviously intoxicated." The court
found that the law required the tavern owner "to use his powers of
observation to such extent as to see that which is easily seen and to
hear that which is easily heard, under the conditions and circumstances then and there existing. ' 53 1 AlthoughJohnson was a criminal
case, courts imposing civil liability on tavern owners have defined
53 2
the tavern owner's duty similarly.
Despite its problems, the obvious intoxication standard provides the best definition of the host's duty for courts holding social
hosts liable for the torts of their guests. A lower standard would be
unfair because "[o]nly at the point of 'obvious intoxication' would a
reasonable person know that a drinker who may drive threatens her
533
own safety and the safety of [others]."
3.

The Deterrent Effect of the Negligence Standard

The Kelly decision may help deter drunk driving in New
Jersey. 53 4 According to John F. Vasallo, Jr., director of the New
Jersey Alcoholic Beverage Control Division, many hosts are altering
the way they manage social events. 53 5 One homeowner reportedly
collects the car keys of his guests when they arrive at his home. He
returns keys only to those who he is convinced are fit to drive; the
529

Id.

530 81 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 973, 185 P.2d 105 (1947).
531 Id. at 975, 185 P.2d at 106.
532 See Note, supra note 360, at 734; see, e.g., Weiner v. Trasatti, 19 II. App. 3d 240,
244, 311 N.E.2d 313, 317 (1974).
533 Note, supra note 360, at 735.
534 Sullivan,Jersey Hosts Keeping Drunksfrom Driving,N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1984, § 1, at

1, col. 2.
535 Id. at 16, col. 1.
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other guests must ride home with someone else or spend the
night. 53 6 One individual reported going to an affair that had a reputation as a "knockdown and dragout party" and was surprised to
find that no one got intoxicated and that people were making sure
that others had rides home. 53 7 Despite the evidence that the host
liability rule may deter drunk driving, New Jersey remains the only
state to impose liability on a social host for serving an adult beyond
the point of obvious intoxication.
One commentator argues that finding social hosts negligent for
serving an obviously intoxicated guest does nothing to prevent accidents because impairment of driving ability occurs at relatively low
levels of blood alcohol concentration. 53 8 A host, however, can observe "obvious intoxication" only when a guest has a high blood
alcohol content.5 3 9 The host, therefore, may satisfy his duty of care
under the Kelly and Coulter rule, yet fail to prevent his guest from
driving with his faculties impaired.
Although it is true that one's driving abilities are impaired
before one is obviously intoxicated, 540 this criticism fails to account
for the added difficulties of requiring a host to stop service at a point
when his guest's intoxication may not even be discernable. In addition, the social implications of a lower cut-off standard would be far
more acute than the standard imposed by the Kelly court. As for
accident prevention, the Kelly standard may not be as efficacious as a
more stringent standard, but it will help to keep some of the worst
offenders off the road.
Social host liability as imposed by the Kelly decision fails to
achieve its full deterrent potential because it is limited to a narrow
factual situation. The court provided no guidance as to the duty of
care expected of a social host in other situations. 541 A social host
may have difficulty refusing an additional drink to an obviously inId.
Id. at 16, col. 3.
538
See Note, supra note 360, at 735-38. According to another commentator, detectable impairment of driving ability occurs at a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of .05.
Cramton, supra note 320, at 996 (citing study conducted by Professor Borkenstein of
Indiana University). The American Medical Association has stated that there is no evidence indicating that "at levels of 0.10 percent. . . and above there is not a severe,
significant and dangerous deterioration in driving abilities." AMA, ALCOHOL AND THE
IMPAIRED DRIER 59 (1968).
539 See Note, supra note 360, at 736; cf. Ewing v. Cloverleaf Bowl, 20 Cal. 3d 389, 572
P.2d 1155, 143 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1978) (expert testimony that at BAC of .20 or higher
casual observer could detect that person is drunk).
540
A driver with a BAG of .06 is twice as likely to have an accident as a sober driver.
Cramton, supra note 320, at 996. When the BAC reaches .10, the legal level of intoxication in most states, see supra note 320, the driver is six times as likely to have an accident.
Finally, at a .15 BAG level, the risk multiples by 25. Id.
541
See supra text accompanying note 506.
536
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toxicated guest, 5 4 2 either because the guest is a friend or because
the guest is antagonistic. 54 3 In some situations, a host might need a
bouncer to enforce his decision to stop the flow of alcohol. 5 44 If a
guest refused to stop drinking and then helped himself, a court
should not hold the host liable under the Kelly standard because the
host did not directly serve the guest after he was visibly intoxicated.
Kelly does not indicate, however, whether the host has a duty to
make every effort to prevent such a guest from driving. After the
host stops serving his guest, the guest is likely to leave the party. If
the host tries to stop his guest from leaving, the guest may have a
claim for false imprisonment. 54 5 Even a brief restraint of the plain54 6
tiff's freedom may give rise to the tort of false imprisonment.
The problem of potential liability for false imprisonment is more
serious in cases where the guest is able to prove that he was not
visibly intoxicated.
Some state legislatures have responded to these concerns by
overruling courts that impose social host liability. Thus, a choice
between competing theories of liability involves not only an analysis
of the merits of each alternative, but also a prediction of how state
legislatures will respond to the selection. The following section of
the project examines how legislatures have responded to the courtimposed social host liability through application of dramshop acts,
beverage control acts, and ordinary negligence principles.
C.

Legislative Response
1. Legislative Response to Social Host Liability Under a
Dramshop Act

Past experience indicates that most legislatures would reverse a
court's application of a dramshop act to a social host. Some courts
have refused to extend their states' acts, 54 7 reasoning in part that
542
See Comment, supra note 364, at 104; see also Graham, supra note 68, at 580 (arguing for flexible standard of social host liability under which court can consider that host
is not trained to detect intoxication).
543 See Comment, supra note 364, at 104.
544 Id.
545
546

See id. at 105.

See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 285, § 11, at 53. "[There may be
liability although the defendant believed in good faith that the arrest was justified, or
that the defendant was acting for the plaintiff's own good." Id. (citations omitted).
547
See, e.g., Delouch v. Mager Elec. Supply Co., 378 So. 2d 733 (Ala. 1979). In
Delouch the Alabama Supreme Court refused to extend the state's dramshop act to an
electric company that served alcohol to an intoxicated employee who subsequently injured a policeman in an auto accident. Id. at 734. The court limited application of the
act to those who derived a profit from the furnishing of alcohol, id. at 735, despite the
act's broad language that "[e]very ... person ... injured ... by any intoxicated person . . .shall have a right of action against any person who shall by selling, giving or
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the legislature did not intend to cover social hosts. Of the two jurisdictions that have extended their dramshop acts to social hosts, one
was later reversed by the legislature, 5 48 and the other was limited to
the case at hand because the legislature had already amended the
5 49
dramshop act to cover only licensees.
In Ross v. Ross 550 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the
state's dramshop act applied to every violator whether or not he was
in the liquor business. 5 5 1 The defendant in Ross purchased alcohol
for his minor brother, resulting in the minor's intoxication and subsequent death in an automobile accident.5 5 2 At the time Ross was
decided, Minnesota's dramshop act provided that "Every. . . person who is injured. . . by the intoxication of any person, has a right
of action. . . against any persons who, by illegally selling, bartering
or giving intoxicating liquors, caused the intoxication of such person." 5 53 The court stressed the language "any person" and reasoned that if the legislature had intended to confine the statute's
otherwise disposing of to another, contrary to the provisions of law, any liquors ...
cause the intoxication of such person," ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 (1975) (emphasis added).
Illinois courts have interpreted their dramshop act similarly. In Cruse v. Aden, 127
Ill. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889), the plaintiff sued the defendant after her husband was
thrown off his horse and died. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had provided two
drinks to her husband. The drinks were given as "an act of mere courtesy and politeness, and not for any pay, profit, benefit, or advantage." Id. at 233, 20 N.E. at 74. The
plaintiff argued that the Illinois dramshop act held that "all persons, though not engaged in the liquor traffic, can be held liable for selling or giving intoxicating drinks to
another, thereby ... causing intoxication and injury." Id. at 233, 20 N.E. at 74.
The Cruse court refused to apply the act. It began its analysis by quoting the state
constitution: "'No Act hereafter passed shall embrace more than one subject, and that
shall be expressed in the tile.'" Id. at 235, 20 N.E. at 75 (quoting ILL. CONsT. art. IV,
§ 13). The title of the act was "Dram Shop"; therefore, it would be unconstitutional to
extend it to social hosts. Id. Furthermore, other portions of the dramshop act explicitly
referred to licensees and permittees. Id. at 236, 20 N.E. at 76. Finally, the court believed that the legislature would not reasonably have intended to cover a host who "at
his own table at his private residence, gave a glass of wine to a guest as an act of hospitality." Id. at 236, 20 N.E. at 76.
Seventy-five years later, an Illinois court had another opportunity to extend its
dramshop act to a social host. In Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48 Ill. App. 2d 412,
199 N.E.2d 300 (1964), the plaintiffs were injured in a collision with an intoxicated
driver who had just come from a company picnic on Owens-Illinois Glass Co.'s property.
The court stated, "This court does not believe that the legislature ever intended to enact
a law that makes social drinking of intoxicating liquors and the giving of drinks of intoxicating liquors to another, such conduct as to render the giver or host liable under the
Dram Shop Act." Id. at 423, 199 N.E.2d at 306. The court believed that the legislative
intent was to regulate the business of selling, distributing, manufacturing, and wholesaling alcoholic liquors for profit. Id. According to the court, extension of the act was the
task of the legislature. Id. at 422, 199 N.E.2d at 306.
548
See infra notes 550-57 and accompanying text.
549
See infra text accompanying notes 558-64.
550 294 Minn. 115, 200 N.W.2d 149 (1972).
551
Id. at 116, 200 N.W.2d at 150.
552
Id.
553
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West 1972).
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application to liquor vendors, it would have included language to
that effect. 55 4 The court believed that because Minnesota's statute
only applied to the illegal sale or furnishing of liquor, 555 application
of the statute to nonlicensees would not result in a flood of
556
litigation.
The Minnesota legislature responded five years later by amending the dramshop act to restrict liability to "any person who, by illegally selling or bartering intoxicating liquors . . . caused the
intoxication of that person." 5 57 The amendment deleted the word
"giving" from the statute. Thus, although social host liability may
be viable under alternative theories, the Minnesota legislature believed applying a dramshop act was inappropriate.
In Williams v. Klemesrud 558 the Iowa Supreme Court imposed liability through its dramshop act 55 9 on a twenty-one year old college

student who gave vodka to his minor friend. The minor became
intoxicated and later drove his car into the plaintiff, causing him serious injury.5 60 At the time the incident occurred, Iowa's dramshop
act provided that: "Every. . . person who shall be injured in person or property . . . by any intoxicated person . . . shall have a
right of action. . against any person who shall, by selling or giving
to another contrary to the provision of this tide any intoxicating liquors, cause the intoxication of such person." 5 6' The court dismissed the defendant's argument that the statute was intended to
apply only to commercial vendors, stating, "We have rejected rules
of strict construction which would limit the scope of the act and thus
impair the remedy and advance the mischief sought to be
56 2
corrected."
The court imposed liability under the act even though the Iowa
legislature had recently amended the Liquor and Beer Control Act
to limit civil liability to licensees and permittees. 56 3 The court ig294 Minn. at 118, 200 N.W.2d at 151.
In this case, the brother violated MINN.
ing alcohol to a minor.
554
555

STAT.

ANN. § 340.73 (West 1972) by giv-

556 294 Minn. at 121, 200 N.W.2d at 152. The court distinguished the Illinois
court's interpretation of its dramshop act in Miller by noting that liability under the Illinois dramshop act did not require an illegal sale. The court probably would not have
applied Minnesota's dramshop act to the case if an illegal sale were not a prerequisite to
liability under the act. Id.
557
Act ofJune 2, 1977, ch. 390, § 1, 1977 Minn. Laws 887 (codified at MINN. STAT.
AN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1984)).
558
197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972).
559 IOWA CODE § 129.2 (1966) (repealed 1971).

560
561

197 N.W.2d at 615.
Id. (quoting IOWA CODE § 129.2 (1966)).

Id. (citations omitted).
Iowa Beer and Liquor Control Act of 1971, ch. 131, § 92, 1971 Iowa Acts 244,
274 (codified at IowA CODE § 123.92 (1977)).
562
563
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nored the amendment because the case arose before its effective
date. 5 64 Nevertheless, the new act dearly reflects the legislature's
intent that the Iowa dramshop act not apply to social hosts.
On balance, future extension of dramshop acts to social hosts
seems unlikely. If courts decide that strict liability under a dramshop act is appropriate for social hosts, they risk reversal by the legislature. Dramshop acts were so named because their purpose was
to regulate and control the major source of dangerous intoxication:
the local tavern and other licensees. 56 5 Because licensees benefit
financially from the furnishing of alcohol, it is appropriate to hold
them as insurers against their patrons' excesses. Application to social hosts, however, may be contrary to the legislature's intent.
2.

Legislative Response to Social Host Liability Under a Beverage
ControlAct

It is more difficult to predict how a legislature might respond to
court-imposed liability on a social host pursuant to a beverage control act. 5 6 6 Although many courts have imposed civil liability on a
licensee through application of a beverage control act, 56 7 few courts
568
have applied the statutes in actions against social hosts.
In Brattainv. Herron,5 69 for example, the Indiana Court of Appeals imposed liability on a social host, who served a minor intoxicating liquor. 570 The minor was later involved in a collision which
killed the occupants of the other vehicle. 57 1 Applying the Indiana
197 N.W.2d at 616.
See supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text.
566 See supra notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
567
See, e.g., Prevatt v. McClennan, 201 So. 2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (finding
tavern owner negligent per se for violating beverage control statute); Pike v. George,
434 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. 1968) (liquor store violated beverage act by selling to minor);
Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d 18 (1968) (finding barroom
owner's sale of liquor to intoxicated individual to be proximate cause of third party's
injuries under beverage control act); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1
(1959) (finding licensee liable under beverage control act); Berkeley v. Park, 47 Misc. 2d
381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (denying motion to dismiss civil liability claim
against vendor brought under dramshop act and beverage control act); Campbell v. Carpenter, 279 Or. 237, 566 P.2d 893 (1977) (finding tavern owner negligent for violating
statute prohibiting sale to obviously intoxicated person). Some beverage control acts
explicitly apply only to licensees. See infra notes 569-97 and accompanying text.
568
See, e.g., Coulter v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577
P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978) (applying Business & Professions Code to social
host as well as licensee); Brattain v. Herron, 159 Ind. App. 663, 309 N.E.2d 150 (1974)
(nonlicensee negligent per se under beverage control act); Giarnear v. Solomon, 360 F.
Supp. 262 (M.D. Pa. 1973) (finding legislature intended acts to apply to noncommercial
furnishers).
569
159 Ind. App. 663, 309 N.E.2d 150 (1974).
570
Id. at 665, 309 N.E.2d at 152.
571
Id. at 666, 309 N.E.2d at 152.
564

565
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Beverage Control Act, 5 72 the court found that the host had violated
the statute by allowing the minor to consume alcohol without objection. The court held that violation of the statute was negligence per
se.5 73 According to the court, the legislature had sought to protect
the citizens of Indiana from injuries caused by minors who consume
alcoholic beverages. The court saw "no distinction between one
who sells alcoholic beverages to a minor and one who gives alcoholic beverages to a minor." 574 The Indiana legislature has not
overturned this 1974 decision.
Another court's imposition of social host liability under a beverage control act did not survive legislative review. In Coulter v. Superior Court 57 5 the owners of an apartment complex continued to serve
a guest "extremely large quantities" of alcohol although they knew
she had reached the point of obvious intoxication and that she
would be driving home. 5 76 The court based the defendant's liability
on both a beverage control act 57 7 and common law negligence principles. 578 The Coulter court relied on the "every person" language
of the statute to infer a legislative intent to include social hosts as
well as licensees under the statute. 5 79 The court further noted that
the legislature had "dearly expressed its desire that the Alcoholic
Beverage Control Act shall be liberally construed to accomplish its
stated purposes of 'protection of the safety, welfare, health, peace,
and morals of the people of the State.' "580 Within one year the
572
At the time of the accident, the Indiana Beverage Control Act read in pertinent
part: "No alcoholic beverages shall be sold, bartered, exchanged, given, provided or
furnished, to any person under the age of twenty-one (21) years .... Any person
guilty of violating this paragraph shall be punished .... " IND. CODE § 7-1-1-32(10)

(1971) (current version at IND.

CODE ANN.

§ 7.1-5-7-8 (Bums 1984)).

573

159 Ind. App. at 674, 309 N.W.2d at 156.

574

Id.

21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978).
Id. at 148, 577 P.2d at 671, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 536.
577 At the time of the decision, California's statute provided that "[e]very person
who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or given away any alcoholic
beverage to ... any obviously intoxicated person is guilty of a misdemeanor." CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West 1964).
578
For an analysis of the court's imposition of liability through common law negligence principles, see supra notes 247-56 and accompanying text.
579 21 Cal. 3d at 151, 577 P.2d at 672, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 537. The court concluded
that the legislature must have intended "any person" to apply to noncommercial purveyors of alcohol as well as licensees. Id.
580
Id. at 151, 577 P.2d at 673, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 538. The California Supreme
Court's confident interpretation of legislative intent is dubious. According to one commentator, "[in the ordinary case inquiries into legislative intent are pure fiction, concocted for the purpose. The obvious conclusion must usually be that when the
legislators said nothing about [finding civil liability based on a criminal statute], they
either did not have the suit in mind at all, or deliberately omitted to provide it." See W.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 285, § 36, at 221 (footnote omitted).
575

576
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California legislature expressly overruled the Coulter decision. 58 1
The different reactions of the California and Indiana legislatures make it difficult to predict how other legislatures will react to
the imposition of social host liability under a beverage control act.
Nevertheless, social host liability under these statutes may fare no
better than under the dramshop acts. Legislatures may decide that
the beverage control acts, like the dramshop acts, impose too high a
standard of care for a social host.
3.

Legislative Response to Common Law Negligence

The third alternative for imposing liability is common law negligence. Although some courts, including the Kelly court, have used
this method, not all legislatures have supported the choice. This
section will discuss the legislative response in some jurisdictions and
the possible response in New Jersey to the negligence standard.
5 82
In Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity,
the defendant fraternity served alcohol to a minor, resulting in his
intoxication. The minor was later involved in a car accident in
which the plaintiff, a passenger in the minor's car, was injured. The
court held that there was a potential cause of action under general
negligence principles. According to the court, social host liability
may arise "where the host 'has reason to know that he is dealing
with persons whose characteristics make it especially likely that they
will do unreasonable things.' "585
In 1979 the Oregon legislature narrowed the Wiener decision by
passing a statute limiting a social host's liability to situations where
the host serves a "visibly intoxicated" guest.5 84 The court's stan-

dard allowed the trier of fact to evaluate the circumstances of each
case and decide whether the particular social host should be liable.5 8 5 The new statute is similar to the standard adopted by the
Kelly court. To date, no court in Oregon has imposed liability on a
social host whose guest was an adult.
After Coulter v. Superior Court imposed liability based partly on
common law negligence, 5 6 the California legislature reinstated the
Act of Sept. 19, 1978, ch. 969, 1978 Cal. Stat. 2903.
258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971).
Id. at 639, 485 P.2d at 21. The court noted as examples persons already "severely intoxicated," the young, or those who the host knows are unusually affected by
alcohol as protected groups. Id.
584
Act of July 25, 1979, ch. 801, § 2, 1979 Or. Laws 1091 (codified at OR. REv.
STAT. § 30.955 (1979)). The statute reads in full: "No private host is liable for damages
incurred or caused by an intoxicated social guest unless the private host has served or
provided alcoholic beverages to a social guest when such guest was visibly intoxicated."
OR. REv. STAT. § 30.955.
581
582
583

585

See Graham, supra note 68, at 582.

586

See supra text accompanying notes 498-502.
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old common law rule that "consumption rather than the sale of alcoholic beverages was the proximate cause of injuries sustained by
[a] third party." 5 87 The legislature believed that a person who
drinks is responsible for his or her own acts.58 8 As the sponsor of
the bill said, "'somehow, we have gone beyond the theory of personal responsibility, that is, that the individual must himself be held
accountable for his actions. To shift the blame to [social hosts] is to
fail to hold the individual accountable.' "589 Supporters of the legislation reinstating the common law rule believed that homeowner's
insurance premiums would rise considerably if the bills were not
passed. 5 90 As one commentator noted,
[b]y reverting to the traditional argument of lack of proximate
causation, the legislature demonstrated that it, and presumably
the majority of Californians, simply did not want to permit the
court to force dramatic changes in social behavior by imposing an
unwanted duty of care on the social host or on the tavern owner to
observe guests and patrons carefully to determine when and if
they should be refused further service of alcohol ....591
In Kelly v. Gwinnell 59 2 the NewJersey Supreme Court imposed a
common law negligence standard on a social host similar to that imposed in Coulter.5 93 In response to the dissent's criticism that the
legislature and not the courts should decide the issue,5 94 the Kelly
majority stated, "if the Legislature differs with us on issues of this
kind, it has a clear remedy." 59 5 Two bills recently introduced in the
New Jersey legislature would establish a committee to investigate
the issues raised by Kelly5 9 6 and would limit the cause of action
against a social host to those circumstances in which the host acted
"willfully and wantonly. '5 97 A third, Assembly Bill No. 43, introduced prior to Kelly, would immunize hosts from liability under all
59 8
circumstances.
The purpose of Assembly Bill No. 43 is "to exempt social hosts
from civil liability for injuries caused by adult consumers of alco587
See Comment, CaliforniaLiquor Liability: Who's to Pay the Costs?, 15 CA. W.L. REv.
490, 493 (1980) (footnotes omitted).
588 See id. at 523.
589 Id. at 531 (quoting press release from Ruden S. Ayala, California State Senator
(Aug. 17, 1978)).
590 Id.
591
Comment, supra note 490, at 630.
592
96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
593
See supra notes 188-201 and accompanying text.
594 96 N.J. at 560-61, 476 A.2d at 1230-31.
595 Id. at 555, 476 A.2d at 1227.
596 See S.Con. Res. 116, 201 Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 1984).
597
See S. 2122, 201 Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 1984).
598 See A. 43, 201 Leg., 1st Sess. 43 (N.J. 1984).
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holic beverages served by them." 5 9 9 The proposed legislation distinguishes between social hosts and licensees. Because a license is a
privilege and not a right, licensees have a strict obligation not to
serve intoxicated persons in order to fulfill their assumed responsibility to the public. Social hosts, however, are not as responsible for
their guests' drinking habits as are the guests themselves. Thus, the
bill immunizes social hosts from liability for adult guests. 60 0 The
legislature did not act on this bill because the Assembly Judiciary
60 1
Committee sought to study the problem further.
Almost immediately after the Kelly decision, legislative interest
in social host liability sparked the introduction of legislation in the
NewJersey Senate. OnJuly 30, 1984, Senator Orechio introduced a
resolution to establish a commission to study the issue, recognizing
that "the Kelly decision was without precedent anywhere in the nation." 60 2 According to the proposed resolution, the decision raised
questions regarding: the ability of the host to discover intoxicated
behavior; the methods a host must use to discover intoxicated behavior; the extent to which a host must monitor and restrain the
behavior of the guest; and the cost and extent of coverage of homeowner's and renter's insurance for liability imposed on the private
hosts.605 The proposed resolution recognized that the Kelly court
failed to consider the problems a social host might face in con6 °4
forming to the court's standard.
On September 13, 1984, Senate Bill No. 2122 was introduced. 60 5 The bill's stated purpose was to "substantially limit the
scope of host liability recently created by the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Kelly v. Gwinnell." 60 6 The proposed legislation would only
allow liability if the social host "willfully and knowingly, manifesting
extreme indifference to the rights of others, serve[d] a visibly intoxicated person, knowing in all likelihood that the guest would be driving a car within a reasonable period of time." 60 7 The bill requires
that there be "corroborating evidence" in addition to any evidence
that the guest had a high blood-alcohol content in order to prove
that the guest was visibly intoxicated. According to this bill, "it
seems grossly unfair to hold hosts responsible except in extreme
599

Id.

600

Id.
Telephone interview with Robert Hollenbeck, NewJersey Assemblyman (Nov. 5,

601

1984).
602

603
604

605
606

607

S. Con. Res. 116, supra note 596.
Id.
See supra note 506 and accompanying text.
S. 2122, supra note 597.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
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60 8

Alternatives to the Current Negligence Standard

Given the legitimate concerns of commentators, courts, and
legislatures regarding social host liability, a different standard of liability is warranted. Under the current standard, as announced in
Kelly v. Gwinnell,60 9 plaintiffs may prevail too easily against social
hosts. Plaintiffs should have to prove more than ordinary negligence because the intoxicated driver is primarily at fault for third
party injuries. Furthermore, it is unfair to hold the host to an ordinary negligence standard because the direct service and obviously
intoxicated requirements provide little guidance for the host. 61 0 Accordingly, courts should replace the current standard of care with a
gross negligence standard.
The court or jury should consider the totality of circumstances
in determining whether a host has been grossly negligent. One
commentator has identified five relevant factors:
(1) the host's opportunity to view the appearance and the conduct of the guest;
(2) the host's knowledge of the number of drinks a guest has
consumed;
(3) the host's knowledge of the guest's capacity to consume
alcohol;
(4) the host's knowledge that the guest will be driving home after the gathering; and
(5) the precautions the host has taken to control the disburse61
ment of beverages. '
The gross negligence standard would absolve the host from liability
where control was impossible. A host, however, should not necessarily be able to avoid liability at a small gathering by setting up a
self-service bar. The trier of fact should look at all the circumstances to determine if the host was grossly negligent.
The hosts in Kelly breached the gross negligence standard. According to the court, the hosts gave their guest as many as thirteen
drinks. 6 12 The hosts should have been able to control their guest's
consumption because it was a small, intimate gathering. In addition
to serving the guest beyond the point of visible intoxication, the
hosts "accompanied [him] outside to his car, chatted with him and
watched as [he] drove off to go home." 6 13 Presented with these
608
609
610
611
612
613

Id.
See supra text accompanying note 506.
See supra notes 498-546 and accompanying text.
See Note, supra note 401, at 82.
96 NJ. at 541, 476 A.2d at 1220.
Id.
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facts, a court or jury could conclude that the hosts were grossly negligent in taking no precautions to guarantee the guest's or others'
safety.
In addition to arguing for a gross negligence standard, 6 14 the
dissent in Kelly suggested that imaginative legislative drafting could
"result in a solution that [would] further the goals of reducing injuries related to drunk driving and adequately compensating the injured party, while imposing a more limited liability on the social
host." 6 15 Accordingly, the dissent proposed
funding a remedy for the injured party by contributions from the
parties most responsible for the harm caused, the intoxicated motorists; making the social host secondarily liable by requiring a
judgment against the drunken driver as a prerequisite to suit
against the host; limiting the amount that could be recovered
from a social host; and requiring a finding of wanton and reckless
6 16
conduct before holding the social host liable.
The dissent did not explain how the fund or secondary liability
would work. 6 17 It is difficult to speculate how courts or legislatures
would apportion liability between the host and driver because no
6 18
court imposing social host liability has confronted the issue.
Id. at 568-70, 476 A.2d at 1230-36 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
Id. at 569, 476 A.2d at 1235.
616 Id. at 569-70, 476 A.2d at 1235; see Comment, supra note 364, at 116. According
to Prosser and Keeton,
[t]he usual meaning assigned to "willful," "wanton," or "reckless," according to taste as to the word used, is that the actor has intentionally
done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would
follow, and which thus is usually accompanied by a conscious indifference
to the consequences.
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 285, § 34, at 213 (footnotes omitted). The authors
note the difficulty of proving that the defendant acted willfully. Thus,
[t]he willful requirement ... breaks down and receives at best lip service, where it is clear from the facts that the defendant, whatever his state
of mind, has proceeded in disregard of a high and excessive degree of
danger, either known to him or apparent to a reasonable person in his
position.
Id. at 213-14. Thus, the standard proposed by the dissent is very similar to the gross
negligence standard.
617
96 N.J. at 569, 476 A.2d at 1235. Although a complete discussion of the issue is
beyond the scope of this Special Project, a state could establish a fund to provide compensation for victims of drunk driving who are unable to collect against either the driver
or the host. Fines collected from violations of alcoholic beverage control acts could
provide a source of revenue for a fund. In addition, states could earmark tax revenues
from the sale of alcohol for a victims' compensation fund. One commentator estimates
that government receives "inthe form of tax revenues to the extent of less than 17
cents, and perhaps as little as 12 cents, for each dollar of alcohol-related costs it bears."
Oversight into the Administration of State and Local Court Adjudication of Driving While Intoxicated: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. 115 (1981) (statement of Prof. Leonard G. Schifrim).
618 The Kelly court declined to address the joint torffeasor issue. 96 NJ. at 549 n.8,
614
615
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CONCLUSION

The proposed gross negligence standard for social host liability
has several advantages over a dramshop act, a beverage control act,
or a simple negligence standard. First, insurance premiums would
be lowest under the gross negligence standard. Presumably, the
cost of insurance under a dramshop act or in jurisdictions which
treat beverage control act violations as "negligence per se" would
be higher. Similarly, premiums under the Kelly standard should be
higher than under the gross negligence standard because hosts can
be liable if they serve only one drink beyond the point of visible
intoxication.
Second, the proposed negligence standard recognizes the variety of circumstances which may confront a social host and the difficulties he may have in fulfilling his duty of care.
Third, a legislature is not likely to reverse the proposed standard. Legislatures should not reverse the proposed standard for being too inclusive because the standard would result in social host
liability only in extreme circumstances where even the strongest opponents would likely agree that such liability is appropriate.
Finally, the proposed standard recognizes the true culprit in the
war against drinking and driving: the driver. All efforts should be
made to hold the driver liable. In the event, however, that a host is
grossly negligent, society has an interest in holding the host liable to
reduce the risk that such behavior would occur again.
Mary M French
Jim L. Kaput
William R. Wildman

476 A.2d at 1224 n.8. It did state that any right of contribution or indemnification between [Zak and Gwinnell] would have to be determined by the trial court on remand. Id.
Whether a host would be liable for the entire injury to the third person or only a portion
might depend on whether the "harm" is "divisible" or "indivisible." See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 875-8868 (1979).

